tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post115816443613713741..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Black and BlackEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1160136635706912962006-10-06T05:10:00.000-07:002006-10-06T05:10:00.000-07:00Yes, Jennifer, that's the thought. But I remain u...Yes, Jennifer, that's the thought. But I remain undecided on the extent to which the lack-of-input/black similarity is phenomenally or sensorily real, as opposed to a culturally contingent hypothesis or analogy!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1159925693367056162006-10-03T18:34:00.000-07:002006-10-03T18:34:00.000-07:00I guess the problem for someone advocating a two-c...I guess the problem for someone advocating a two-component explanation like this is to provide an account of how the sensory component gets hooked up with the conceptual component- you suggest a very interesting causal hypothesis- receiving no sensory input is like perceiving black (or probably the other way around)- and so the lack of visual input when your eyes are closed causes you to apply the black concept- did I get you right?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1159804088357640382006-10-02T08:48:00.000-07:002006-10-02T08:48:00.000-07:00Thanks for the comment, Jennifer! It's interestin...Thanks for the comment, Jennifer! It's interesting to conjecture that maybe the application of the "black" concept affects the experience itself. I don't see why not -- but then also I wonder why we're tempted to apply that concept in the first place. Something pre-introspection, probably! And I agree with you here that something conceptual might be driving this -- e.g., an analogy between seeing something black and a lack of visual input...?Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1159367498991782362006-09-27T07:31:00.000-07:002006-09-27T07:31:00.000-07:00I do not know what your theory of introspection is...I do not know what your theory of introspection is but some may explain the experience of the first 'light-blackness' as seeming black only because in that instance you apply a black-concept, or recognize it as falling into that category- in the process of introspecting. You may also apply the concept when you introspect after covering your eyes- despite the fact that the second experience differs qualitatively (different qualia). I'm not sure I'd advocate this myself- as it leans in the direction of a higher-order theory of introspection- though it could be that we introspect in different ways at different times, or that different people introspect differently. So maybe then in this case you introspect in a way that affects the content of the experience by adding something conceptual. Bome to think of it though, I don't see any reason why this explanation couldn't apply to what is going on pre-introspection...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1158187200388672992006-09-13T15:40:00.000-07:002006-09-13T15:40:00.000-07:00Thanks for the links, Brad and Tanasije! That sec...Thanks for the links, Brad and Tanasije! That second demonstration Brad mentions is quite especially cool!<BR/><BR/>I agree completely that it could be black first and then not-black later, due to contrast effects, even if (say) the amount of light penetrating the eyelids is exactly the same. Maybe, indeed, that's the most likely possibility.<BR/><BR/>My suggestion that the experience in the first instant and the experience after removing the hands are the same is, however, not based on anything theoretical that would be undermined by Brad's and Tanasije's theoretical counterpoints above, but rather on my own subjective impression that the two experiences are the same. This is a subjective impression that I <I>don't</I> have about the gray dots in Brad's second luminance demonstration. So that's at least one reason to think something different is going on here.<BR/><BR/>My subjective impression of the sameness of the "before" and "after" experiences could be completely mistaken of course; but it's hard for me just to comfortably accept that without probing the other possibilities a little farther, too.<BR/><BR/>I find Tanasije's distinction between the concrete color and the color as an abstraction to be a useful one -- though it doesn't entirely settle my worries about the shiny desk -- this is no subtle difference in shading!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1158181310724042492006-09-13T14:01:00.000-07:002006-09-13T14:01:00.000-07:00Hi Eric,I don't see a problem there.We use "green"...Hi Eric,<BR/>I don't see a problem there.<BR/>We use "green" also to refer to all kinds of green.<BR/>The color expert can distinguish spring green and scarab green. And he can do that <I>only because</I> there is phenomenal difference based on which he can learn those colors.<BR/>What is needed to be distinguished is concreteness of the color seen, from the color as abstraction.<BR/>If you are interested, I wrote some time ago on my blog on this difference between concrete and abstract <A HREF="http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/04/15/qualia-example/" REL="nofollow">here</A>.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1158174860711974042006-09-13T12:14:00.000-07:002006-09-13T12:14:00.000-07:00Hi Eric,I have some (!) doubt that it is the same ...Hi Eric,<BR/><BR/>I have some (!) doubt that it is the same experience before and after. Consider, first, the simutaneous contrast effects (e.g. http://www.yorku.ca/eye/simcont2.htm). I have a painting that has grey, white and black squares (solid colors) but which looks shaded where the squares meet. <BR/><BR/>Next, consider the claim that many color-based sorieties paradoxes trade on a similar effect that occurs when we look at squares next to each other or in close temporal sequence. I seem to remember Williamson using that argument in his book on Vagueness, but am not sure where.<BR/><BR/>In any case, I think this could be tested empirically for color squares. I bet it has been tested....well, just a worry.<BR/><BR/>check this cool example out:<BR/><BR/>http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/<BR/>lum_dynsimcontrast/index.htmlBrad Chttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12698027539432083841noreply@blogger.com