tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post1195455820748815660..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: The Nature of Desire: A Liberal, Dispositional ApproachEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger27125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-17071458741031212682013-10-21T11:15:11.716-07:002013-10-21T11:15:11.716-07:00This dispositional approach implies that all that&...This dispositional approach implies that all that's necessary for belief/desire change is to change one's own behaviour. So I could believe or want anything as long as I fit the right attitude profile. Sweet!Juanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11147365675250798236noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-40790179785724399112013-10-15T17:49:06.746-07:002013-10-15T17:49:06.746-07:00Anon, if they have not figured out the exact trigg...Anon, if they have not figured out the exact trigger for it, it's not both sufficient and poised, they simply are ignorant of the exact trigger but are not admitting that. Ie, they aren't supporting some sort of 'sufficient yet also poised' state - they are just aggrandising so as to protect their paycheck.<br /><br />Folk can keep using 'sufficient' but keep using a black box definition of the term where it changes so as to, by chance, match the theory given. But it's not really convincing.Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-68925701988879869512013-10-15T13:04:15.960-07:002013-10-15T13:04:15.960-07:00the root of desire is a that nature "wants&qu...the root of desire is a that nature "wants" to minimize gibbs free energy and maximize entropy<br /><br />so, like, when you 'want' (in the intentional sense) chocolate cake, it can be traced back to some microstructure in your brain 'wanting' (in the reductionist mechanistic sense) to reach some chemical equilibrium or something<br /><br />in Michel's interesting doublethink case, where we both want cake and don't want cake, it's simplest to envision two distinct neural systems trying to "fold" into their preferred states, but being prevented by the other system from doing so<br /><br />this unpleasant state of affairs can be called 'ambivalence' which amusingly enough contains the word 'valence'<br /><br />/completebullshitJorge A.https://www.blogger.com/profile/02382191206864285204noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-37314165754726753422013-10-15T02:26:33.085-07:002013-10-15T02:26:33.085-07:00Callan - In terms of sufficient or poised? Both, I...Callan - In terms of sufficient or poised? Both, I would say. I am a beginning researcher in a memory lab. While certain genes that may predict for memory disorders may require the interaction of another variable to make them active (exposure to a trauma for PTSD, ingestion of alcohol in terms of Korkasoff's when people are prone to thiamin deficiency), there is a recent one that I've learned of that seems to prove sufficient and poised. There is a deep structure E called APOE which is a gene that predicts for Alzheimers. As far as researchers can tell, if a person lives long enough (noting varying ages that it affects different people) a person that carries the APOE gene (which is poised during youth), they will get Alzheimers. People who die too young may eventually have acquired it. It's such that researchers call it a "near" guarantee, but it's pretty much as sufficient as one gets in research, because if one lives long enough and has the gene - one'll get Alzheimers. But, when one is younger - one has the gene, not the disease. I would call that both poised, and suffiently poised. While Alzheimers is not cake, it offers the possibility that such a "deep structure" could exist for positive attributes or desires as well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-16145717973431705652013-10-14T17:22:29.343-07:002013-10-14T17:22:29.343-07:00Anon, is it sufficient or is it poised? If it'...Anon, is it sufficient or is it poised? If it's poised and we haven't figured out what makes something go one particular way, were not really in a position to say anything is sufficient for E. Yet.<br /><br /><br />Eric, I don't understand what you mean? <br /><br /><i>It seems that we could construct...</i><br /><br />I presume I'm part of that 'we', as are you. How does what appears to undermine your notion that 'we' can construct such a hypothesis, help your view?Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-87772533752389123482013-10-14T16:04:19.465-07:002013-10-14T16:04:19.465-07:00Callan: If you can't imagine it, even better f...Callan: If you can't imagine it, even better for my view, I think!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-83693756586551769552013-10-14T02:58:49.985-07:002013-10-14T02:58:49.985-07:00Semantics aside Callan, it's the scientific tr...Semantics aside Callan, it's the scientific truth that genes hold the possibility of more than one phenotype. There are also certain behaviors that are only expressed upon exposure to another variable. From philosophers, I've heard it referred to as poised, or having the potential for a certain attribute.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-2372960679298161722013-10-14T01:25:06.194-07:002013-10-14T01:25:06.194-07:00Anon, I don't know how something is both treat...Anon, I don't know how something is both treated as being sufficient for wanting cake (note the lack of caveats) yet at the same time it's treated as only sometimes being sufficient for wanting cake. That's like saying a magnet is sufficient for attracting metal, then saying it only does so sometimes. One or the other statement simply lacks information, or they just plain contradict each other.<br /><br />It sounds like semantic two step, to make the thing both somehow sufficient, yet not.<br /><br /><br /><br />Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-56114583968549101382013-10-13T12:49:18.733-07:002013-10-13T12:49:18.733-07:00Callan, I'd say absence of knowledge of deep s...Callan, I'd say absence of knowledge of deep structure E looks a bit like a genetic implication. People have genotypes and phenotypes. Phenotypes are the outward or inward expression of a gene. Genotypes are likely expressed, but not necessarily. In terms of cognition, this is true as well - memory is a prime example, of some neural based encoding that is not constantly expressed. This may be the case with cake desires as well, that a structurally based desire based on learning mechanisms has been encoded, but regularly not conscious - until something in the environment triggers the conscious desire for cake.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-74113569309404742062013-10-13T00:43:04.638-07:002013-10-13T00:43:04.638-07:00Hi Eric,
Alternatively, suppose some Deep Structu...Hi Eric,<br /><br /><i>Alternatively, suppose some Deep Structure E is held to be sufficient for wanting chocolate cake. It seems that we could construct, at least hypothetically, a possible case in which Deep Structure E is present but the person in no way acts or reacts, inwardly or outwardly, like someone who wants chocolate cake</i><br />Uh, I can't construct, even hypothetically, such a case, unless I make up stuff. It's like saying a magnet attracts metal, but we could imagine sans any magnet, metal being attracted to the same point (where the magnet was before). I can imagine it if I make up some imaginary physics. Otherwise no, I can't imagine it, hypothetically or otherwise.Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-61130362430413684632013-10-10T17:27:27.060-07:002013-10-10T17:27:27.060-07:00I absolutely agree about the mess, Michel! I thin...I absolutely agree about the mess, Michel! I think it's a major virtue of a dispositional cluster account that it is suitable for messy cases in a way that "Q in the Desire Box" is not, or not as naturally.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-24776489483893391112013-10-10T01:41:59.960-07:002013-10-10T01:41:59.960-07:00@Eric: you write"Maybe he does "on balan...@Eric: you write"Maybe he does "on balance" want the book to succeed. But is that the same as simply wanting the book to succeed?"<br /><br />You have deliberately set up a "messy, in-between case", and asked us to answer. Unsurprisingly, there are only messy, in-between replies.<br /><br />Compare this to the case of the drowning man. Here there is an absolute lack of messiness. He wants that breath of air NOW! There is nothing particularly philosophical about this level of desire: it is shared by any multicellular organism that lacks gills. This I could see as "simply wanting something". Anything above that on the evolutionary scale that instantly becomes messy. <br /><br />Do I want to eat that piece of food? Yes, but I could first look around to see if there are enemies waiting to attack me while I am eating. Do I want to have sex with the woman from the cave down the road? Yes, but her mate Ugh wields a mean club, so let's wait till he's out hunting. Do I want Rajan's book to be succesful? Yes, but he damn well better write a glowing review for mine next year.<br /><br />So I would suggest that the mess is our natural habitat, the environment in which we spend most of our lives. The world of simple, straightforward desire is something most of us will encounter quite rarely, and when we do, it may well be fatal.99% of the desire we feel is mediated (been a long time since I read Rene Girard - must go back and pick up the terminology)<br /><br /><br />clasqmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12812785541545674276noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-41329441478252630712013-10-09T12:41:35.449-07:002013-10-09T12:41:35.449-07:00@ Nick and Anon 08:21: Thanks for the kind words!
...@ Nick and Anon 08:21: Thanks for the kind words!<br /><br />@ Nick: I think it's reasonable to think that Matthew has desires of the sort you suggest, but I'm disinclined to think that it would follow that he has directly contrary desires -- both the desire that R's book succeed and the desire that it not succeed. This probably isn't metaphysically possible on my approach, since the dispositions constitutive of the one will contrary to the dispositions constitutive of the other such that one cannot very well match the profile for both desires.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-25198516342453906922013-10-09T12:37:26.334-07:002013-10-09T12:37:26.334-07:00@ Anon 03:07: Cool, thanks! Didn't know about...@ Anon 03:07: Cool, thanks! Didn't know about the Buddhist concept.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-53399944374112993752013-10-09T12:36:52.073-07:002013-10-09T12:36:52.073-07:00Carl: Some people say such things, but as you have...Carl: Some people say such things, but as you have probably surmised that is not going to work on my approach. I have yet to see a case that clearly (in my view) merits the ascription of contrary desires rather than the ascription of an in-between state of desiring. My guess is that it is an unjustified resistance to in-betweeness that pushes people, in desperation, toward ascribing contrary desires.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-31852427060144205292013-10-09T12:34:49.406-07:002013-10-09T12:34:49.406-07:00@ Michel 1 & 3: One still gives the considerat...@ Michel 1 & 3: One still gives the consideration weight but a countervailing force excuses one from manifesting the disposition by actually eating the chocolate. (See my response to Anon.) The robotic extension of the self, though, that's a brilliant idea! I think it's consistent with my approach that desires not always behaviorally manifest in the usual way, if the cognitive surroundings are unusual.<br /><br />Michel 2: Maybe he does "on balance" want the book to succeed. But is that the same as simply wanting the book to succeed? And it seems we might add detail to tilt the balance the other direction. Is there reason, in light of that, that it must always, or even usually, be right to either straightforwardly ascribe the desire (on balance) or straightforwardly deny it (on balance)? I'm inclined to think that there can often be messy, in-betweenish cases, like with extraversion or being an honest person.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-10487732502438991662013-10-09T12:28:01.342-07:002013-10-09T12:28:01.342-07:00@ Anon: We can build the case so that it's pre...@ Anon: We can build the case so that it's pretty clearly a straightforwardly held complicated desire, but that wasn't my intention. I think it's also to generate the case so that it's ambivalent.<br /><br />The nice thing about not going purely for behavioral dispositions on this is that I can easily handle cases when one doesn't pursue a desire due to contrary pressures (e.g., at the risk of one's career). One can still savor the possibility and give it some weight in considering one's options even if at the end of the weighing process it's clear that it is dramatically outweighed. Also (a point I discuss at length in my similar account of belief) I hold that dispositional claims are always "ceteris paribus" -- all else being equal or normal or absent countervailing forces. When the countervailing force is there, one is "excused" from manifesting the disposition. (A bit mushy, I confess!)Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-10435237175367850632013-10-09T12:23:16.571-07:002013-10-09T12:23:16.571-07:00Wow, thanks for all the interesting comments, folk...Wow, thanks for all the interesting comments, folks!<br /><br />@ Scott: Here's what I think you look for in the positive sense: empirical evidence of patterns of clustering and splitting, just like psychologists do with personality traits. Then, based on pragmatic interests, you can (a) adjust the stereotypes a bit (e.g., as we did when we started allowing "Freudian" expressions of desires) and/or (b) concoct new stereotypes or new names for common ways of splintering (e.g., Frankfurt's second-order desire).<br /><br />That's not to say that we don't also look at deep functional and physiological causes too. I do think they're important -- only *derivatively* important, is my suggestion.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-46406626967364397222013-10-09T08:21:12.864-07:002013-10-09T08:21:12.864-07:00I like your story about Matthew and Rajan because ...I like your story about Matthew and Rajan because that's essentially what it seems one ends with: narrative reconstruction, self-invention that involves positing possible future states of mind within a rather fictive present state of mind. In hindsight, we come to understand what it means to move like a crab.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-48835654103889027262013-10-09T06:07:45.365-07:002013-10-09T06:07:45.365-07:00(1) I have been thinking about how to classify fol...(1) I have been thinking about how to classify folk psychological states leading up to and since the BPS conference. I am attracted to a view like yours. I like your dispositionalism. I think seeing folk psychological states as theoretical entities (or models?) could also be advantageous. Long story short, I enjoyed this.<br /><br />(2) Your Rajan/Matthew example is about as close to home as it could be for many philosophers. Since I have a pet-peeve for far fetched examples, I want to commend this example!<br /><br />(3) Why not suppose Michael has two higher level desires? I.e., (i) for a compatriot to succeed and (ii) for himself to outshine his peers. In this case, these higher level desires lead to conflicting lower level desires: wanting Rajan to succeed and wanting Rajan to not succeed. <br /><br />Great post!Nick Byrdhttp://www.byrdnick.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-49650392886177498692013-10-09T03:57:51.794-07:002013-10-09T03:57:51.794-07:00Since I can either keep on posting here or grade t...Since I can either keep on posting here or grade term papers ... no contest.<br /><br />I am distressed my my lack of desire for chocolate cake. despite my inner turmoil, there is no outer evidence to convince Eric of my sincere desire to consume this symbol of cultural decline and calorific excess.<br /><br />However, why should the consumption of chocolate cakes be limited to my protoplasmic self. I shall construct a small robot, with a Raspberry Pi for a brain and a small chemical analyser that will constantly search the atmosphere for traces of chocolate cake and immediately pounce upon any that it detects. In this way, my outer behaviour (if we stipulate that the robot is a cybernetic extension of my good self) will match my inner desires without triggering my allergies and thereby putting an end to all desires, and I can proudly declare myself desirous of chocolate cake at last.<br /><br />clasqmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12812785541545674276noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-16814844131475510312013-10-09T03:42:20.617-07:002013-10-09T03:42:20.617-07:00Surely Matthew, an experienced academic by now, is...Surely Matthew, an experienced academic by now, is not so naive as to think that academia is a pure meritocracy? If Rajan made faster progress it is not necessarily because he was a better philosopher than Matthew. He might be, but then again, he might have gotten a break or two, a mentor here, a dropped hint there, a journal editor desperate for a paper ...<br /><br />Be that as it may, let's translate your definition from Choclatecakeish to Philosophian: <br /><br />If you will seek out Rajan, if you would choose Rajan over other philosophers, if you tingle with delight when reading his book, if you say "I want Rajan", if the thought of getting Rajan's attention captures your anticipatory attention, etc., then you like or want or desire Rajan. Nothing more to it.<br /><br />(I had to paraphrase slightly - the search and replace function produced some hilarious sexual innuendoes in there!)<br /><br />Matthew does seek out Rajan - at conferences, anyway<br /><br />By the same token, he is choosing Rajan over other philosophers - he could be spending this afternoon coffee talking to really significant philosophers like, I don't know, that guy from Riverside with the unpronounceable name.<br /><br />Reading Rajan's book does make Matthew tingle with delight, at least part of the time.<br /><br />The thought of Rajan's attention ... trickier ground. If the book flops, Matthew thinks he will commiserate and grow closer to Rajan. Maybe. Or Rajan could become suicidally depressive and end any further chance of this relationship progressing. After all, Rajan does not have much experience dealing with failure.<br /><br />But if Matthew helps Rajan with his book, the possibility exists that Rajan might one day be chairing a faculty search committee ... Yes, on balance I'd say Matthew wants the book to succeed. <br />clasqmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12812785541545674276noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-67191143379230454952013-10-09T03:18:51.183-07:002013-10-09T03:18:51.183-07:00I tingle with delight at the memory of chocolate c...I tingle with delight at the memory of chocolate cake. The memory of chocolate cake captures my attention. I dream of chocolate cake every night. Merely seeing the word chocolate on your website caused my blood pressure to rise by fifteen pints. My children are named Mars, Hershey and Galaxy.<br /><br />However, I have developed a rare allergy that means that the slightest hint of theobroma cacao extract across my lips will mean a prolonged and agonising death. I therefore do not seek out chocolate cake, nor do I choose chocolate cake over other desserts.<br /><br />Do I desire chocolate cake?clasqmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12812785541545674276noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-69266760033386344092013-10-09T03:07:40.399-07:002013-10-09T03:07:40.399-07:00A little off the point, but If I recall correctly ...A little off the point, but If I recall correctly it was Spinoza who first pointed out that the western mindset has a concept for relishing another's failure (we generally use the German Schadenfreude in English) but none for relishing another's success. In Buddhist philosophy of mind, however, there is such a concept (mudita).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-76035613400721464822013-10-08T19:54:43.546-07:002013-10-08T19:54:43.546-07:00Desires(Agent A, proposition X) & ~Desires(Age...Desires(Agent A, proposition X) & ~Desires(Agent A, proposition X) is a contradiction. Desires(Agent A, proposition X) & Desires(Agent A, proposition ~X) is not a contradiction. Indeed, it's quite common.Carlnoreply@blogger.com