tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post2970907133126371145..comments2024-03-18T23:49:35.716-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Should Ethics Professors Be Held to Higher Ethical Standards in Their Personal Behavior?Eric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger23125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-80068669598759345202017-02-16T08:28:10.078-08:002017-02-16T08:28:10.078-08:00Interesting idea. There was a Big 5 test of profe...Interesting idea. There was a Big 5 test of professional philosophers several years ago, but sadly the data disappeared. I would be very interested to see it. I did get a look at some preliminary results and ethicists seemed to be higher on C. My guess is that philosophers in general will tend to be high in O, but I don't have a specific memory of seeing those results.<br /><br />There are questions within C and A that seem to be self-reports of ethical behavior. I once went through the Big 5 and tried to pull out those questions specifically, but I haven't done anything with that.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-24256333908754189242017-02-16T08:19:17.704-08:002017-02-16T08:19:17.704-08:00Here's a reductionist idea: using the big five...Here's a reductionist idea: using the big five, conscientiousness might predict ethical behavior and proclivity for ethical behavior: perhaps ethicists are driven by orderliness or have an openmidnedness for ideas but aren't open to new experiences, which heeding new ethical standards would bring.<br />Make sense?howard bnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-22237910414269001522017-02-15T22:35:39.150-08:002017-02-15T22:35:39.150-08:00Surely one can muse on the idea of morality reflec...Surely one can muse on the idea of morality reflecting upon itself - while a bit of an out there notion, it's not that out there, surely?Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-7510429093233952462017-02-14T11:47:18.106-08:002017-02-14T11:47:18.106-08:00Thanks for the continuing conversation, folks!
Am...Thanks for the continuing conversation, folks!<br /><br />Amod: Getting rid of blame is pretty radical. (Of course, there are lots of respects in which the Buddhist tradition is radical.) Rather than take that radical path, I prefer that we aim (a) to be not overly harsh in our blaming practices, and (b) work on being able to regard ourselves as morally blameworthy in what I think of as a mature, subtle way, that is, accepting the real sting of it (so not just saying "morality, who cares?") but also not being paralyzed or terrified by that sting.<br /><br />Callan: I think one can teach ethics hoping that people will be moved to change their behavior for the better without being a preacher in any negative sense. For example, someone could teach the arguments for and against vegetarianism in a fair and responsible way, while hoping that students will see that the arguments on one side really are more compelling, and then change their behavior accordingly. I don't think you always have to put in to practice the ethical issues you discuss -- e.g., the death penalty. I'm not quite sure what you mean by your last question.<br /><br />Alan: Thanks for the kind comment. Yes, I do think this will relate to Frankfurt on addiction -- though perhaps not entirely neatly.<br /><br />Howard: I prefer to look profession by profession rather than trying to have a general theory about all professions. Some professions do plausibly influence choices in daily life, e.g., nutritionist and investment advisors probably eat and invest on average differently from others. I agree with your last point: It's hard to change moral habits. That can be the source of some of the difficulty and of the weaker-that-you-might-have-expected relationship.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-59187067558871383682017-02-14T07:49:26.592-08:002017-02-14T07:49:26.592-08:00To look at the issue psychologically, your cases s...To look at the issue psychologically, your cases speak of how either knowledge itself does not lead behavior or that something resists change in moral habits in the real world- which provokes wonder at the exact place of ethicshowardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-24686288998788607412017-02-14T07:32:06.329-08:002017-02-14T07:32:06.329-08:00An analogy, perhaps instructive, though a side poi...An analogy, perhaps instructive, though a side point: would you expect lawyers or legal scholars or cops to act legally?<br />How is your case different?howardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-60606669933767705262017-02-14T07:25:42.501-08:002017-02-14T07:25:42.501-08:00Eric:
A further thought: would you argue that exp...Eric:<br /><br />A further thought: would you argue that expecting ethicists to behave ethically is like expecting designers of cars to be good drivers or designers of computers to be great programmers?<br />So can it be looked at from the perspective not of consistency but applying ideas, like any scientific ideashowardnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-53948451134611350822017-02-12T13:34:39.032-08:002017-02-12T13:34:39.032-08:00"every failure to be less than morally ideal ..."every failure to be less than morally ideal is a moral failure"<br /><br />Morality doesn't really self reflect much on whether it itself is moral, does it?Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47632096956195233022017-02-11T08:32:17.130-08:002017-02-11T08:32:17.130-08:00Thanks for the reply Eric.
Your distinction falls...Thanks for the reply Eric.<br /><br />Your distinction falls along the lines of Frankfurt's willing and unwilling addicts, and when it comes to this issue (moral eating habits), I'm somewhere on the spectrum toward the unwilling side. Gleeful addicts might exist (though probably not many), but there are tons of gleeful carnivores for sure. (Ted Nugent, e.g.) I've stopped eating any form of veal for over 25 years--I even avoided buying veal-labelled cat food. I buy only cage-free eggs. But I am omnivore, and I certainly cannot misrepresent myself in class while presenting the arguments.<br /><br />Again, thanks for a thoughtful and challenging piece.V. Alan Whitenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-60296851160179240632017-02-11T04:20:13.136-08:002017-02-11T04:20:13.136-08:00It also seems to be being convinced by a set of et...It also seems to be being convinced by a set of ethics so that one wants to teach them, but not convinced to practice them? What would convince someone to just teach them as the only set of professed ethics to learn, but not practice them?<br /><br />It'd be like a music teacher teaching only one type of music as if you never have to learn or even have a vague knowledge of any other music, but never playing out that music on an instrument themselves.Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47149848350934970452017-02-08T18:17:19.976-08:002017-02-08T18:17:19.976-08:00Surely there's a difference between A: the ant...Surely there's a difference between A: the anthropological study of ethics and B: trying to argue ethics in a way as to convince others? Is the latter a professor or a preacher?<br /><br />Does B even happen? And if it does, is it much different from people who cherry pick from their religious text of choice as to what they press must be done and what they just kind of overlook and don't mention but the text could easily be taken to be saying must be done?Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-76307720030357822312017-02-08T11:17:35.265-08:002017-02-08T11:17:35.265-08:00Eric, good points. I wonder if what's at issue...Eric, good points. I wonder if what's at issue there is the concept of blame itself? And perhaps relatedly of shame (as with the tendency on social media in recent years to criticism of "x-shaming"). I've argued that <a href="http://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2015/02/goodness-as-preventing-suffering/" rel="nofollow">Śāntideva's ethics intentionally tries to dispense with blame entirely</a>, and musters a hard-determinist attack on free will in order to do so. I am tempted by this account - that the very idea of blame is a thing we should move away from. <br /><br />Something along those lines seems especially important when we say that "every failure to be less than morally ideal is a moral failure". I don't know anybody who's morally ideal. I don't know <i>of</i> anybody who's morally ideal. (Didn't Susan Wolf write something saying she didn't <i>want</i> to know anybody who's morally ideal?) It seems then important to <i>come to terms with the fact of moral failure</i> as an ineradicable feature of the world and its moral landscape, and I wonder if blame is a hindrance in doing so. Doug Berger had an interesting recent Facebook post about pessimism which pushed my thinking further along those lines. Badness is <i>there</i>. Let's try to fix it, in ourselves and others, when we can. But should blame even play a role in that process?<br />Amodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15978621252917667363noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-73320795639912966002017-02-08T11:04:33.810-08:002017-02-08T11:04:33.810-08:00Thanks for the continuing comments!
Michael: Yes,...Thanks for the continuing comments!<br /><br />Michael: Yes, I think that the relationship between explicit moral judgment and chosen moral behavior is generally only small to moderate -- for ethicists as well as for non-ethicists. So it's just part of the human condition, and I favor not being too harshly judgmental about it. I reserve my right to be mildly disappointed, though! (In myself, too.)<br /><br />Amod: I confess to being kind of negative about the concept of supererogation and the use to which it is put when applied to one's own moral choices. (I'm contemplating a post on this topic in the near future.) I prefer a scalar very bad to very good, along with a frank (but not too harsh) recognition that every failure to be less than morally ideal is a moral failure. The concept of supererogation, I'm inclined to think, leads to moral self-excuse (at least I didn't cross such-and-such line, so I'm not really blameworthy) and unrealistic attachment to a picture of yourself as nearly morally flawless (as long as your standards are low enough you can preserve the idea that you almost never actually do anything wrong).Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-81704721787152594262017-02-08T06:46:45.366-08:002017-02-08T06:46:45.366-08:00Eric, I think you raise a key point here (one I...Eric, I think you raise a key point here (one I've talked about a bit in <a href="http://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2015/08/of-demands-and-obligations/" rel="nofollow">another related post</a>). Part of the question is what we mean by "ethical" and "unethical" behaviour. To say we are <i>obliged</i> not to do such a thing - or that we are forbidden to do it - seems to me to imply a demand. But to simply say that something is <i>bad</i> - well, we do bad things all the time. If our ethics professor says that vegetarianism is not an <i>obligation</i> but merely good and praiseworthy, then there's no serious problem if the professor eats meat - just as there would be no problem, in the professor's view, if someone <i>else</i> ate meat. (Relatedly I think ethicists should be <a href="http://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2015/08/the-superogatory-acts-are-the-ones-that-matter/" rel="nofollow">recognizing a lot more supererogatory acts than they do</a>, and putting less thought into obligation and more into supererogation.) Amodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15978621252917667363noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-32284493370902066622017-02-07T17:58:22.593-08:002017-02-07T17:58:22.593-08:00When I think about the cheeseburger ethicist, I sh...When I think about the cheeseburger ethicist, I share your disappointment in her insulation. At the same time, I'm not surprised. Many of us profess moral beliefs that we don't live up to.<br /><br />I think I would feel differently about an ethicist whose sole research focus was on applied moral self-improvement. This ethicist takes as her primary locus of research the methods an individual can use to successfully improve their moral behavior. It would seem not just disappointing, but outright strange if she didn't take her own views on moral self-improvement seriously in her personal life.<br /><br />It seems to me that there is generally a weak relationship between one's moral beliefs and one's behavior. The vast majority of ethical philosophy I've seen focuses on exploring correct ethical beliefs. If ethical philosophy studied moral pedagogy or moral self-improvement, I would expect different things from ethicists.<br /><br />As it stands, though, I give ethicists wide latitude in their personal lives because of the weak relationship, in general, between correct beliefs and good behavior.<br /><br />Michael Pershanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17046644130957574890noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-56495250019417323922017-02-07T16:03:41.751-08:002017-02-07T16:03:41.751-08:00Tim: I don't think ethics is special in that w...Tim: I don't think ethics is special in that way. But maybe an even closer analogous would be a nutritionist who eats badly!<br /><br />Anon 09:31: Yes, at a first pass I meant to be agreeing with that. That's what I think is correct about the reasoning in #1.<br /><br />Amod: Interesting to phrase it as "demand". I'm inclined to think that if I demand that others be vegetarians then (barring some reason I am exceptional) then I should hew to that standard myself. But I feel less clear when it's phrased in terms of a factual conclusion that such-and-such behavior is unethical and that all things considered you should not do it. Somehow that seems milder. Interesting observations in your second two paragraphs. I tend to agree.<br /><br />Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47691580332418282162017-02-07T15:58:48.237-08:002017-02-07T15:58:48.237-08:00Thanks for the comments, folks!
Anon 03:36: Yes, ...Thanks for the comments, folks!<br /><br />Anon 03:36: Yes, I agree that it more concerns the amount of time and sophisticated reflection, and the conclusion that it is definitely wrong. I would expect, empirically, that professional ethicists would tend to give much more time and sophisticated reflection to ethical issues, since they make a career of it. For example, the average ethicist will be able to talk in more a sophisticated way about the pros and cons of the case for vegetarianism compared to the *average* non-ethicist of similar social background. On #3, it's not that I want to assume that strict is better than lenient; it's just that I don't want to create any more self-interested pressure than there already is to answer that question in favor of lenient. I do agree with your concern, though, that there's something potentially worrying (maybe not fatally worrying) about moral views so strict that even their advocates don't choose to live by them.<br /><br />Howie: I'm kind of glad that philosophers can be merely scholars rather than kings, saints, and role models. But I also feel that there's something wrong in trying to insulate one's scholarly career from one's practical life. Hence all my multi-dimensional waffling, I suppose!<br /><br />Alan: Someone who is simply cheerfully akratic, "I should do X but I just can't oh well, hm, let me enjoy some sin now!" triggers my suspicions that there's something inauthentic going on. The anxious, self-critical akratic, who strives and fails and is disappointed in herself -- that I understand better. Also I understand the person who honestly says, "well ethics is important to me but not *that* important and all things considered I'd rather have my cheeseburgers". What do you think?<br /><br />Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-31708407761910333522017-02-07T14:04:59.135-08:002017-02-07T14:04:59.135-08:00I think the biggest question for me is: do ethics ...I think the biggest question for me is: do ethics professors <i>themselves have</i> higher standards for conduct than other people do? It's pretty hard for me to imagine not holding people to their own standards. If you demand that other people be vegetarian, damn right they're entitled to demand that you be vegetarian too. <br /><br />Regarding freedom to experiment: I think that's where the point gets interesting (as in <a href="http://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2013/11/the-obligation-to-live-as-one-teaches/comment-page-1/#comment-27953" rel="nofollow">Ben's old comment on my related post</a>). There I think the question might be "what do we actually mean to hold a standard?" If I'm trying to explore the question of whether to be vegetarian, I may well keep flipping back and forth on the subject, and it does seem unnecessarily demanding if (say) I think about the question in the morning and suspect we probably are obliged to be vegetarian so I am obliged to be vegetarian at lunch, but then think about it again and suspect we probably aren't so obliged, and then I'm no longer obliged to be vegetarian at dinner. <br /><br />I think that's a problem in part because the effort of trying to <i>be</i> a good person is exhausting in its own way - especially at times of personal crisis. I've tried to think some about the question of how to act at times when one is really undecided (perhaps in what MacIntyre would call an epistemological crisis). I tend to say "stick with your preexisting beliefs until you're fairly confident in the new ones". Obviously "fairly confident" is a gray zone, but I think there's a certain benefit to be gained from erring on the conservative side with respect to practice - your previous reflection took you to this point, it's ingrained, let it stick until you are really feeling the alternative.Amodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15978621252917667363noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-63915887778171594972017-02-07T09:31:23.075-08:002017-02-07T09:31:23.075-08:00Re: #1, I don't think ethics professors are be...Re: #1, I don't think ethics professors are being held to a higher standard because of their chosen profession. Rather, other factors (like their knowledge of moral truths) is what brings the higher standard. For people in general, regardless of profession, that they know something is wrong but choose to do it anyway is worse than if they didn't know it was wrong and did it. Ethics professors just happen to have a lot more moral knowledge than others (in part because of their choices, yes, but so what? A person who educates themself about morality would also have more moral knowledge because of their choices, yet we wouldn't say they get a special exception for that).<br /><br />It's nothing to do with the employment contracts or special role-based duties of ethicists and everything to do with the fact that they know better, and so should be expected to act better.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-74205326242039702852017-02-07T04:09:19.034-08:002017-02-07T04:09:19.034-08:00I don’t know if that is a concern of yours, but I’...I don’t know if that is a concern of yours, but I’m very much interested in exceptionalism/non-exceptionalism: Are ethicists exceptional in that regard or is there a general authenticity demand in play? Here is my favourite analogy: Suppose I run a shop for runners selling shoes and other equipment. Secretly, I hate running and don’t do it myself, I believe that running is unhealthy and that runners are all neurotic men in mid-life crisis, I can’t stand people bragging about their latest marathon on facebook, and so on. It seems to me that all of your points apply here as well: It’s unfair to demand something of me we don’t demand of others. We should demand more of ourselves. We want us to be openminded and not believe that running is great just because it’s part of our job description. To gain insight into our customer we should be runners ourselves. I guess my question is what you think about this analogy: Is ethics special?Timnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-31426863348822159802017-02-06T18:25:57.002-08:002017-02-06T18:25:57.002-08:00Brutally honest piece--thanks so much.
Philosophe...Brutally honest piece--thanks so much.<br /><br />Philosophers are no less susceptible to akrasia than anyone else. But akrasia in academia is at least self-analyzable: just because one has weak-will with respect to idealized action entails nothing about one's reflective acumen about those ideal moral assessments.<br /><br />When I present Singer's arguments I concede their strength given consequentialist assumptions--which I also readily admit as reasonable. But then I present myself as a model of akrasia, but in contrast to my late colleague Helene Dwyer, who taught Singer but then also changed her life to live it as well--in not just practice but advocacy. She's my archetype of life plying the tossed seas of reason with a steady rudder. Students need to see an example of praxis glued to theoria: I'm just not it--but at least I get her ideal example to offer to students with the potential to avoid my own embarrassment of an imperfectly aligned life.V. Alan Whitenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79774864801992548872017-02-06T18:14:57.089-08:002017-02-06T18:14:57.089-08:00To me the crux is simple- knowledge of what is rig...To me the crux is simple- knowledge of what is right is not enough- one need have the social skill and wherewithal to overcome personal and situational pressures that mitigate against doing what is right- you allude to this somewhat- but even very smart people with clever arguments have trouble resisting social pressures- perhaps what is needed is one half saint and one half entrepreneur<br />The other thing is that as far as society si concerned public intellectuals are sidelined and have the role of teachers and thinkers and not leaders. The problem is the old line of Plato- philosophers are far from Kingshowie bermannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-14981466614809422322017-02-06T15:36:14.261-08:002017-02-06T15:36:14.261-08:00I think the main issue is not her being an ethicis...I think the main issue is not her being an ethicist but rather her having considered the issue at length and having concluded that it is definitely wrong. There is something about these two things that certainly makes it worse. Her response being so in-your-face has an impact as well; if she responded that even as an ethically imperfect omnivore she still considered vegetarianism to be morally right, it would seem much less objectionable.<br /><br />As for #3, I do see a problem with charges of hypocrisy around every corner but not with it inducing leniency. Why assume that stricter ethical beliefs are better than lenient ones? One might argue that beliefs so strict that an ethicist would refuse to adhere to them for that reason alone are also perhaps too strict to inflict on the rest of the population and too far removed from practice or, to be symmetrical, that creating ethical systems one has no intention of actually following is an inducement to make them unnecessarily strict. (In any case, this very much depends on the issue, i.e. how morally objectionable non-adherence is and how much effort adherence would take etc.: the worse the infraction and the less effort avoiding it would take, the more likely and the better-founded the charges of hypocrisy.)<br /><br />As for #4, it seems it always helps if you act upon your convictions, especially if convincing other people is your trade, but this is not unique to ethicists.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com