tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post3321310311796095956..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: A Memory from Grad SchoolEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger77125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-81714309845803318672013-01-26T14:24:21.029-08:002013-01-26T14:24:21.029-08:00I know it's very hard to comrehemd for someone...I know it's very hard to comrehemd for someone like you but still here is a useful link:<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-53373001866289114092013-01-26T14:06:06.638-08:002013-01-26T14:06:06.638-08:00Actually I don't know where to begin. you last...Actually I don't know where to begin. you last post reads pretty weird to me. You write sentences that are from my perspective complete nonsense and still you say that it is me who talks nonsense. You don't really listen to what I'm talking about you only go on talking about things you assume to be right. <br /><br />"That is knowing the meaning of a word."<br /><br />No, this is knowing the <i>use</i> of a word. And this makes pretty clear that we define things very different.<br /><br />"Sidetracking? I'm going to reduce your nonsense here to oblivion first, and then I'll bury you there. There's no rush for me.<br /><br />I'm losing my patience, though, so I'll give you one chance to admit that you're wrong here, and then move on to the next horn, or you'll just have to guess at the answer for yourself."<br /><br />The only thing you reduce here is my faith in your intelligence, even though your blog gives me reason enough for this. You know what the funny thing is? Even if you were right and I would be wrong in this special point you STILL keep sidetracking and even begin to put ridiculous words in my mouth I didn't say. There is no reason for not answering my question except that you don't WANT to answer it or can't.<br /><br />dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-6368182375457874822013-01-26T13:19:18.846-08:002013-01-26T13:19:18.846-08:00"Do you think that's no problem? That the..."Do you think that's no problem? That there might be a world where it is impossible to define such a basic word."<br /><br />No, it's not a problem. I've taken you through the steps to show you how it's not a problem.<br /><br />"On this topic I would suggest for you to read some Russell, Carnap or Quine."<br /><br />Christ on a cracker! You apparently haven't noticed how I've been dropping quotations and paraphrases from the likes of those aforementioned people, latter-Wittgenstein, Austen, Putnam, Rorty, and so forth.<br /><br />Maybe we should take some time to discuss Quine's piss-poor comprehension of lexicography (in "Two Dogmas...") or failures in comprehending modal logic. Don't assume that I'm illiterate on this topic because I argue that it's empty.<br /><br />"That's not what we were talking about. All things that are blue are also triangles (in Wc), not 'all and only.'"<br /><br />It doesn't matter, I've shown that Wc allows for P's for Lc that in La mean "non-blue triangles," and there are just as many where I can show that Wc would allow P's for Lc that in La that mean "blue non-triangles." (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agnosia" rel="nofollow">Some people in Wa cannot discern shapes correctly, but can see colors.</a> Also, if it's at all possible to magnify into blue triangles in Wc without actually hurting the ability of it to reflect color, then they could have a predicate for blue_La things.)<br /><br />"I'm not sure 'logically incoherent' was the right word. But that's what I meant with it."<br /><br />Neither Tarski nor Gödel argue that Classical logic or Peano arithmetic was logically incoherent. Incompleteness is not a proof of total logical incoherence. An indefinability theorem is not a proof of total logical incoherence. Now I'm beginning to doubt whether you really understand the writings of the authors that you namedrop.<br /><br />And if you had read your Tarski, you would have known that <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ClaLog" rel="nofollow">he's proposed a very adequate solution to the liar's paradox</a>, as many others have done.<br /><br />"The people who get comprehensible input don't know the meaning or definition of a word they only guess at it and it still works."<br /><br />That <i>is</i> knowing the meaning of a word.<br /><br />Amazingly, in one sentence, you've only demonstrated a complete lack of knowledge of the empirical science (specifically in lexicology and cognitive semantics) which says that you're dead wrong on this front. How many links do you need to set you straight?<br /><br />Here's a first hint: Knowing an exact <i>definiens</i> to any term, given semantic shift and the ability to infinitely analyze and coin new terms for new observations, is not feasible, and knowing the meanings of terms in natural languages has <i>never, ever</i> required that level of precision.<br /><br />Your issue apparently arises from a severe misunderstanding of language. Sound like anyone you could namedrop?<br /><br />"Are we finally ready for this or do you want to continue sidetracking?"<br /><br />Sidetracking? I'm going to reduce your nonsense here to oblivion first, and then I'll bury you there. There's no rush for me.<br /><br />I'm losing my patience, though, so I'll give you one chance to admit that you're wrong here, and then move on to the next horn, or you'll just have to guess at the answer for yourself.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47113755314329749922013-01-26T12:23:09.175-08:002013-01-26T12:23:09.175-08:00"There's a typo in the Chinese sentence. ..."There's a typo in the Chinese sentence. It should read, "給我球!""<br /><br />No problem I can't read it anyway on my computer and if I could I wouldn't mind ;-)dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-70355923893314190562013-01-26T12:21:06.722-08:002013-01-26T12:21:06.722-08:00"Since Wc is just some world that you're ..."Since Wc is just some world that you're imagining and that I'm entertaining, in principle, you could illustrate this world such that it is impossible."<br /><br />Do you think that's no problem? That there might be a world where it is impossible to define such a basic word. Again, you said this is kids game and still you seem to struggle. Shouldn't you maybe think over you methods for definition? On this topic I would suggest for you to read some Russell, Carnap or Quine. You don't really seem to think about the consequences of what I'm saying and aren't open to the possibility that you aren't right.<br /><br />"But assuming that, ceteris paribus, the facts of Wc insersect with the facts of Wa, <b>except that all and only blue things be triangles in WC</b>, then yes, because there will still be red, black, yellow, etc. things."<br /><br />That's not what we were talking about. All things that are blue are also triangles, not "all and only".<br /><br /><br />"Can you name or construct a logically incoherent language that works?"<br /><br />Any language where the liar paradox is possible. I'm not sure logically incoherent was the right word. But that's what I meant with it. Here my suggestion would be Tarski and Gödel.<br /><br />"In fact, one driving hypothesis of language acquisition is literally "comprehensible input.""<br /><br />Thank you for helping me prove my point. See what I wrote before:<br /><br />"Noone needs to know the meaning of a words to communicate, only how it is used. Knowing the meaning of a word is good but not necessary."<br /><br />The people who get comprehensible input don't know the meaning or defintion of a word they only guess at it and it still works. <br /><br />Are we finally ready for this or do you want to continue sidetracking?<br />Which measurable data makes the sentence 'Measurable data is needed to argue about sentences like 'x is good'.' true? <br />dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-36206564913929855322013-01-26T11:30:33.808-08:002013-01-26T11:30:33.808-08:00There's a typo in the Chinese sentence. It sh...There's a typo in the Chinese sentence. It should read, "給我球!"Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-48263589521563169392013-01-26T09:26:52.054-08:002013-01-26T09:26:52.054-08:00"Could it somehow be possible in Wc to define..."Could it somehow be possible in Wc to define a predicate P which in La means 'x is blue'?"<br /><br />Since Wc is just some world that you're imagining and that I'm entertaining, in principle, you could illustrate this world such that it is impossible.<br /><br />But assuming that, <i>ceteris paribus</i>, the facts of Wc insersect with the facts of Wa, except that all and only blue things be triangles in WC, then yes, because there will still be red, black, yellow, etc. things.<br /><br />If there were Lc-speaking blind people in Wc, then "is blue" would just mean "is a triangle" to them.<br /><br />If there are certain scanners in Wc which don't allow for color resolution, then Wc is only macroscopically different from Wa, and there would be a way to see things such that they were triangles, but not blue.<br /><br />Those two data sets would suffice to show that we could describe Wc's so-said "blue" things with two distinct predicates. They could even use the x-eme "blue" to refer to it, as well.<br /><br />You say: "Languages as a whole don't need to make sense, by which I mean that they don't need to be logically coherent, in order to work."<br /><br />Can you name or construct a logically incoherent language that works?<br /><br />"I can speak English with a child even if neither me nor the child agreed on a language. I say 'Give me the ball.' and the child hears the words 'give', 'me', 'the', and 'ball' and knows how to respond to them. Where does anyone agree on something here?"<br /><br />First, unless you have presented a child with some initiation rituals to get children to guess the meanings of utterances, the child will have no idea what a "ball" codes. Go to a kid who doesn't speak Mandarin and only command, "給我求!" over and over, miles away from the nearest ball, and you'll see just how ineffective it will be.<br /><br />Agreement doesn't have to be explicit, but <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pidgin" rel="nofollow">sometimes it is.</a><br /><br />In fact, one driving hypothesis of language acquisition is literally "comprehensible input." <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BA7FfdNeAp4" rel="nofollow">Here's the main guy who proposes that hypothesis illustrating exactly how you need to indicate references so that people will make sense of your utterances.</a><br /><br />You may notice how the audience didn't start questioning him in his lesson or react to him as if he were wrong. That's because they were accepting his claims at face value, accepting his authority in the language to teach it to them.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIAoJsS9Ix8" rel="nofollow">Children are similarly slavishly obedient.</a>Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-53307121157609826142013-01-25T09:06:30.519-08:002013-01-25T09:06:30.519-08:00"That's a problem where your definitions ..."That's a problem where your definitions lead to."<br /><br />I hope you don't take this literally, it was meant more like: "Me? No YOU!" ;-)dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-77319642360535957742013-01-25T07:29:17.971-08:002013-01-25T07:29:17.971-08:00Could it somehow be possible in Wc to define a pre...Could it somehow be possible in Wc to define a predicate P which in La means 'x is blue'?<br /><br />"Communication only works when people agree on a language, which they do so that the messages will make sense for them. Language that doesn't make any sense to someone doesn't work."<br /><br />Languages as a whole don't need to make sense, by which I mean that they don't need to be logically coherent, in order to work. I can speak English with a child even if neither me nor the child agreed on a language. I say 'Give me the ball.' and the child hears the words 'give', 'me', 'the', and 'ball' and knows how to respond to them. Where does anyone agree on something here?<br />Noone needs to know the meaning of a words to communicate, only how it is used. Knowing the meaning of a word is good but not necessary.<br /><br />"And yet you don't suffer this problem?"<br /><br />That's a problem where <i>your</i> definitions lead to.dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71070133255987779472013-01-25T06:05:44.355-08:002013-01-25T06:05:44.355-08:00@dietl
"So you think it would be impossible ...@dietl<br /><br />"So you think it would be impossible to distinguish between the form and the colour of a 'blue' object?"<br /><br />Why do you think such an imagined state of affairs implies that? If in Wc (counterfactual world) all and only blue things were triangles, "blue" in Lc (counterfactual language) coded them, and if people could not alter that state of affairs, or if the community refused to let "blue" in Lc refer to just blue things like Wa and La (actual world and language), then the predicate "is blue" in Lc means "is a blue triangle" in La (actual language).<br /><br />"I don't think I need to reliably 'trust even the most basic terms' meanings' of a language to be able to speak it. Communication only has to work, it doesn't need to make sense."<br /><br />Communication only works when people agree on a language, which they do so that the messages will make sense for them. Language that doesn't make any sense to someone doesn't work.<br /><br />I speak three languages proficiently, so if you don't read Mandarin or Spanish fluently, I can give you plenty of messages that won't make sense or work, since you won't be a member of at least one community for whom their language's sentences do make sense.<br /><br />"So the answer to the second question is also two."<br /><br /><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6vgoEhsJORU" rel="nofollow">And yet you don't suffer this problem?</a>Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-16927510961980625342013-01-25T00:53:56.181-08:002013-01-25T00:53:56.181-08:00" If all and only blue things were triangles,..." If all and only blue things were triangles, and it were impossible to devise an instance of non-blue triangles (e.g. with paint) or blue non-triangles (e.g. with hammers), especially if the linguistic community insisted on it, then "blue" means just that."<br /><br />So you think it would be impossible to distinguish between the form and the colour of a "blue" object? Even if this distinction would be no problem with other colours?<br /><br />I speak two languages fluently and I don't think I need to reliably "trust even the most basic terms' meanings" of a language to be able to speak it. Communication only has to work, it doesn't need to make sense. So the answer to the second question is also two. <br /><br />dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-66267775496252308152013-01-24T21:02:33.663-08:002013-01-24T21:02:33.663-08:00I think that I need to chase you to the end of the...I think that I need to chase you to the end of the rabbit hole on the first line of questioning before I tell you the answer for the second. If all and only blue things were triangles, and it were impossible to devise an instance of non-blue triangles (e.g. with paint) or blue non-triangles (e.g. with hammers), especially if the linguistic community insisted on it, then "blue" means just that.<br /><br />Just out of curiosity, how many languages do you speak? How many do you think you would speak if you couldn't reliably trust even the most basic terms' meanings?<br /><br />Your phrase of the day should be "à la mode."<br /><br />If you can stand the sight of blood, I can go on to show you that not all and only mammals that have hearts have kidneys.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-88826362936547457852013-01-24T17:16:59.629-08:002013-01-24T17:16:59.629-08:00"To get those measurements, you round up a sa..."To get those measurements, you round up a sample of native English speakers, instantiate those things x that you're checking for blue, and map out the range of shades of colors that people are statistically likely to say are blue."<br /><br />What follows from your reasoning is that a thing x is blue relative to what different statistics say about it. So it is possible for an object x to be blue at a given measurement and not blue at another. <br /><br />Also this:<br />"instantiate those things x that you're checking for blue"<br />What if all the things you provided for checking are not only blue, but also share a triangular form. <br />Then if you say "x is blue", people might think that you were refering to a blue and triangular object.<br /><br />Okay enough with the "kid's game".<br />Which measurable data makes the sentence 'Measurable data is needed to argue about sentences like 'x is good'.' true?<br />dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-84747440453340948522013-01-24T15:56:19.043-08:002013-01-24T15:56:19.043-08:00I should clarify and remark that "blue" ...I should clarify and remark that "blue" is a term, in the sense "any word or group of words considered as a member of a construction or utterance," but isn't a term in the logical sense, which we usually designate to mean a constant or variable which serves as the argument within an ordered n-tuple in the construction of atomic sentences.<br /><br />In the latter case, "is blue" is a predicate.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71341197675138738712013-01-24T15:39:30.633-08:002013-01-24T15:39:30.633-08:00@dietl
Do you really not have a way, or do you no...@dietl<br /><br />Do you really not have a way, or do you not want to attempt to tell me a way? I have a lot of arguments, and backhanded suggestions from unestablished authorities don't counter them.<br /><br />You ask: "Which measurable data makes sentences like 'x is good' true?"<br /><br />You can start by showing what you mean by the word 'good', which most people do by giving extensional cases.<br /><br />"Eight hours of sleep is good." (healthful?)<br />"Delicious food is good." (enjoyable?)<br />"Coen Brothers movies are good." (entertaining?)<br />"Charity is good." (helpful?)<br /><br />Then, whatever you mean by 'good' is whatever those things have in common. Thus far, if I had to take all of those into consideration, I would surmise that "x is good," means something like many people seem to want x (but maybe you've read my blog post on this).<br /><br />But we could play this kid's game with any term: How do we know that "x is blue," is true?<br /><br />First, provide some extensional cases to train him to associate the phoneme or grapheme 'blue' with those cases, have him roughly guess at some <i>definiens</i> (somewhere in the intersect of all of those things that you're training him to refer to as "blue").<br /><br />"Bluejays are blue."<br />"The sky is blue."<br />"Blueberries are blue."<br />...<br /><br />But how do we measure whether "x is blue" is true? Well, the measure for truth is usually probabilistic or Boolean.<br /><br />To get those measurements, you round up a sample of native English speakers, instantiate those things x that you're checking for blue, and map out the range of shades of colors that people are statistically likely to say are blue.<br /><br />Then the statistically relevant intersects of measurable features are what 'blue' is for English speakers at the time of that study, and it's as blue as blue-ness is.<br /><br />Disappointing? Think how I feel to watch philosophers agonize over this stuff.<br /><br />Your own comment on Sun Jan 20, 05:19:00 AM PST suggests that you actually agree with my approach for the most part.<br /><br />Or we could not do any of that, and just hand-wave at the "Form of the Blue," or whatever jargon gets your gander, and get no closer to an answer. I prefer desert landscapes.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-4283991856360187752013-01-24T12:42:50.148-08:002013-01-24T12:42:50.148-08:00You write:
"You write: "That's your ...You write:<br />"You write: "That's your dogma. I don't think you can point to measurable data that supports this claim [that terms and relations must code for things that we could observe in order for us to evaluate their truth].""<br /><br />Sorry, but I don't think I meant want you wrote here. What I wanted to say is the following:<br />I don't think you can point to measurable data that supports this claim [that if someone wants to argue about concepts like "goodness," or "obligations," or whatever, he'll have to point to measurable or reproducible instances of them, first].<br /><br />Which measurable data makes sentences like 'x is good' true? Furthermore which measurable data makes the sentence 'Measurable data is needed to argue about sentences like 'x is good'.' true?dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-19113370844860332492013-01-24T11:49:30.797-08:002013-01-24T11:49:30.797-08:00"That's an empirical matter, not a defini..."That's an empirical matter, not a definitional one."<br /><br />I have to disagree with you here, but I see no way and no reason to convince you now since you seem to be stuck in you thinking about what philosophy is.<br /><br />"I feel that it's an unfortunate fluke that logic is still housed in philosophy departments, when it really belongs in the mathematics and computer science departments at this point, seeing how most of the greatest logicians of the past hundred years were/are mathematicians and computer scientists, not philosophers."<br /><br />I think you have lot of research to do concerning the history of sciences. I'm not here to lecture you on this, but if one day you want to stop making up facts to create you own reality I would definitely suggest reading some wikipedia articles about the topic for a start, even though they might be too wordy. <br /><br />dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-23053991927473200472013-01-24T09:54:56.159-08:002013-01-24T09:54:56.159-08:00You also write: "You make it pretty easy to d...You also write: "You make it pretty easy to dismiss philosophy if you define everything that philosophy does that isn't nonsense as belonging to other disciplines."<br /><br />That's an empirical matter, not a definitional one. I can walk into any department and find people arguing rationally about their arena of expertise, even publishing those arguments to recommend directions of empirical research, establish hypotheses for testing, etc.<br /><br />You write: "How did you get to your answer? through <i>philosophical</i> reasoning."<br /><br />I got to my answer through an argument and through a fixed method which uses (self-?)proclaimed philosophers' sentences as survey data. None of the methods nor any particular conjunction of those methods is unique to philosophical study.<br /><br />I feel that it's an unfortunate fluke that logic is still housed in philosophy departments, when it really belongs in the mathematics and computer science departments at this point, seeing how most of the greatest logicians of the past hundred years were/are mathematicians and computer scientists, not philosophers.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-6068355197362269882013-01-24T09:53:56.903-08:002013-01-24T09:53:56.903-08:00@dietl
You write: "That's your dogma. I ...@dietl<br /><br />You write: "That's your dogma. I don't think you can point to measurable data that supports this claim [that terms and relations must code for things that we could observe in order for us to evaluate their truth]."<br /><br />I think that's a fair challenge. Empirical data to show that you must be able to meaningfully refer to the things in questions in order to evaluate their truth (beyond vacuous truth) is straightforward enough. Consider this model. Introduce this question to subjects:<br /><br />Q: 現在的法國國王是不是光頭的?<br /><br />Now, we can wait until someone actually performs this test, but here's how I suppose it will play out (with subjects John and Wang).<br /><br />Let's assume that John can't read Mandarin. He doesn't have a clue what the sentence reads, but can guess that it's a question because he can identify the "?" in the sentence.<br /><br />He can't match any of the terms or predicates to any things that he's observed or not observed, and so simply can't provide a coherent answer to the question. It's strictly meaningless to him.<br /><br />Wang, however, does read Mandarin (and translates English in the parentheses). He phones his French Embassy to discover that France is a Republic, and that there is no "現在的法國國王" ("present King of France").<br /><br />Next, teach John and Wang the relevant fundamentals of logic and set theory.<br /><br />Wang can now illustrate the problem. The present King of France codes for all of the things that are in the empty set -- ∅. Therefore, whether "__是不是光頭的?" ("Is __ bald?") is vacuously true, because the false antecedent allows for the truth in both answers.<br /><br />We get:<br />(x∈∅)⇒(P(x))<br />(x∈∅)⇒¬(P(x))<br />¬(x∈∅)<br /><br />Some other arguer can try to change the semantics of '⇒,' which has been done, but not in a way that overturns this matter, or you can opt to negate (or if you allow DNE in your logic, un-negate) one of those premises. Good luck to him!<br /><br />The philosophical question that I dissected is not different from this. Philosophers have yet to show that the elements of "obligations" label one observable element. Once they do, they can have their battles, except they will be redundant, because at that point scientists could do the research more quickly and efficiently once technology and resources allowed them to investigate there.<br /><br />You also write: "How do you know what 'most of the work of philosophers' is, if you complain about novels being to wordy? I suspect you didn't read most of the work of philosophers."<br /><br />Your suspicions are correct if you mean that I haven't read over 50% of all of the books, articles, etc. that philosophers associate with their profession. But neither has anyone else.<br /><br />However, I do know enough about the ingredients of "philosophical" argumentation (by reading plenty of philosophers' books, some of which are too wordy) to show where to undercut them and deny them relevance or import.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1434613773697581732013-01-23T17:26:03.837-08:002013-01-23T17:26:03.837-08:00"If someone wants to argue about concepts lik..."If someone wants to argue about concepts like "goodness," or "obligations," or whatever, he'll have to point to measurable or reproducible instances of them, first. He has to make the terms and predicates of his language code for things that we observe, or at least could observe in a controlled setting."<br /><br />That's your dogma. I don't think you can point to measurable data that support this claim.<br /><br />"most of the work of philosophers is strictly nonsense, and what isn't nonsense is already a part of the standard practice of empirical sciences, mathematics, and maybe economics,..."<br /><br />How do you know what "most of the work of philosophers" is, if you complain about novels being to wordy? I suspect you didn't read most of the work of philosophers. You make it pretty easy to dismiss philosophy if you define everything that philosophy does that isn't nonsense as belonging to other disciplines. I think if you had a deeper understanding of the roots of empirical sciences you would have a bigger respect of philosophy. <br /><br />"Is my answer above not the answer that I showed?"<br /><br />How did you get to your answer? trough <i>philosophical</i> reasoning. So saying "Philosophers can't answer the question" is wrong. A different answer than what the question suggest is not no answer. <br />dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-54939744801780212272013-01-23T17:01:27.003-08:002013-01-23T17:01:27.003-08:00@dietl
I figured that the original question, whet...@dietl<br /><br />I figured that the original question, whether empirical science could answer that philosopher's questions better, had an obvious answer:<br /><br />No, questions with unjustified basic assumptions (in Amp-2, terms without demonstrated referents) cannot be investigated by empirical means or mere argumentation. Philosophers can't answer the question that I used in the example, and neither can scientists, so in terms of the probability of satisfactorily answering such questions, ~(0% > 0%).<br /><br />If someone wants to argue about concepts like "goodness," or "obligations," or whatever, he'll have to point to measurable or reproducible instances of them, first. He has to make the terms and predicates of his language code for things that we observe, or at least could observe in a controlled setting.<br /><br />I use sentences like that philosopher's to provide data points to demonstrate that most of the work of philosophers is strictly nonsense, and what isn't nonsense is already a part of the standard practice of empirical sciences, mathematics, and maybe economics, which leads me to question the legitimacy of calling any academic exploration particularly "philosophical."<br /><br />Is my answer above not the answer that I showed?Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-50932589771949714372013-01-23T13:32:23.391-08:002013-01-23T13:32:23.391-08:00It seems to me that you fear that a novelist, just...It seems to me that you fear that a novelist, just as a philosopher is trying to trick you into believing something. But that's not the point of philosophy or of a story. <br />One thing you have to keep in mind is that philosophy and other disciplines are academic battlegrounds. Every theory gets "attacked" by other philosophers and the things you criticize most likely have already been criticized by other philosophers. With philosophy you don't learn to convince people but to avoid mistakes. I'm not saying that you have to believe every one of them, but you don't seem to consider that they <i>might</i> be right and dismiss them to fast.<br /><br />In your post "Philosophical Amputations 2" you write the following:<br />"Not too long ago, a philosopher handed me some sample questions and asked me whether empirical science could answer them better than philosophy could.(...)<br /> <br />1. Are there any genuine ethical obligations beyond the obligations to maximize the happiness and preference satisfactions of present or future beings?"<br /><br />In this post you deconstruct this question with you logical methods but you fail to answer the original question (because you don't want to answer it?). Anyway, what did is <i>show</i> (without realising?) what the better answer is.<br /><br />It's quite ironic, that every post you label anti-philosophy contains no "anti", but a lot of philosophy.dietlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-75046708056529755612013-01-23T07:14:43.502-08:002013-01-23T07:14:43.502-08:00@dietl
I don't mind telling you my dispositio...@dietl<br /><br />I don't mind telling you my disposition.<br /><br />I can't enjoy novels because I can't stand to read overlong make-believe narratives and quotes from mouthpieces who, in fictional settings where novelists control the imagined circumstances of their mouthpieces, steer their own fictitious plots to confirm whatever arguments they prop up via those mouthpieces. I don't mean to muddy that with so many clauses, but that's what makes novels unbearable.<br /><br />That, and they're too wordy.<br /><br />It's not mere fiction that bothers me. Zhuangzi discusses Liezi's legendary ability to float on the clouds, and then states that people falsely assume that he is "真正自在" ("truly self-subsisting"), because he still relies on the clouds to float. But we can see the premises to his arguments clearly. Also, it's easy to substitute his fanciful analogy with a concrete one which lends evidence to its truth.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wb10QvaHpS4" rel="nofollow">Daniel Dennett made some comments about William Lane Craig</a> that I think capture an analogous distrust that I have of most philosophers who I've read. (I reposted this to get the URL to work.)Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-8072710674464428902013-01-23T07:01:51.341-08:002013-01-23T07:01:51.341-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-62341878566605430662013-01-23T03:00:47.574-08:002013-01-23T03:00:47.574-08:00I'm sorry, Anonymous (if you're the same o...I'm sorry, Anonymous (if you're the same one), but you've succumbed to a few straw men, forging an ethical "problem" from a sentence that I did not write:<br /><br />I never wrote, "maximize 'the ability to direct people to certain behaviors and actions'" implicitly or explicitly, anywhere. CTRL+F is your friend.<br /><br />You did this in the same post that criticizes me for not attending to the details of what I claim.<br /><br />I guess it was a wise move for you to remain anonymous.Joshua Harwoodhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03144269488507187427noreply@blogger.com