tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post3647881615019019992..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: The Instability of Philosophers' Judgments about Hypothetical Moral ScenariosEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-92121318038467251042011-03-22T12:15:43.202-07:002011-03-22T12:15:43.202-07:00@ Badda: That was a pretty condensed statement, I ...@ Badda: That was a pretty condensed statement, I admit! What I mean is philosophy that takes as a starting point the philosopher's intuitions about hypothetical scenarios. Not all philosophy does that, presumably: Some is more scientifically grounded, some grounded in more abstract judgments. And a blanket prohibition of intuitions about hypothetical scenarios seems too strong (as Williamson has argued and Weinberg has granted), since there are presumably some cases in which we could reasonably expect our intuitions about hypotheticals to be well-grounded. E.g., I feel secure in my intuition that, hypothetically, had I not slept at all last night I would feel a little tired or otherwise funny right now.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71440044266528813222011-03-21T20:59:52.940-07:002011-03-21T20:59:52.940-07:00> At stake, perhaps, is the reliability of &quo...> At stake, perhaps, is the reliability of "armchair philosophy" as a research method.<br /><br />Do you mean as opposed to some other kind of philosophyBadda Beingnoreply@blogger.com