tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post4020671119022453617..comments2024-03-18T10:05:26.015-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Belief Is Not a Norm of Assertion (but Knowledge Might Be)Eric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-68779436724657533092017-03-20T16:05:34.823-07:002017-03-20T16:05:34.823-07:00Hi Eric,
Fair enough on the knowledge norm claim ...Hi Eric,<br /><br />Fair enough on the knowledge norm claim — the literature is pretty large.<br /><br />I think your work on K -> B entailment is great and I can definitely see the appeal of applying those insights to these sorts of cases.John Turrihttp://john.turri.org/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-25152767688130745672017-03-20T14:45:54.865-07:002017-03-20T14:45:54.865-07:00Thanks John!
I don't want to commit on the kn...Thanks John!<br /><br />I don't want to commit on the knowledge norm claim (hence the "might"), though I am inclined to agree. (Part of my hesitation is the size and complexity of the literature on this topic, which I haven't mastered.)<br /><br />On whether the teacher believes -- well, that's complicated! As I know you know I believe, folk judgment about belief does not consistently respect the K -> B entailment relation, so I think there are cases in which a substantial portion of respondents will ascribe knowledge but not belief. Separably from that, I don't think we need to follow the folk in considering what the best way is to conceptualize belief and knowledge.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47727125784092318062017-03-20T14:41:36.603-07:002017-03-20T14:41:36.603-07:00John Turri writes:
I think that we can go beyond ...John Turri writes:<br /><br />I think that we can go beyond saying that knowledge "might be" a norm of assertion and, instead, just flat-out say that knowledge is a norm of assertion. All the evidence is presented in detail here http://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/397/knowledge-and-the-norm-of-assertion--an-essay-in-philosophical-science and a brief overview can be found here http://john.turri.org/research/compass_norms.pdf. Part of the evidence consists in work that directly tests how cases of "selfless assertion" are actually judged, which can be found here http://john.turri.org/research/selfless.pdf. Basically, people overwhelmingly judge that the teacher believes, knows, and should assert that humans evolved.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-46371956415324947772017-03-07T06:28:06.059-08:002017-03-07T06:28:06.059-08:00WRT the teacher case, I'm not sure that teachi...WRT the teacher case, I'm not sure that teaching something is the same as asserting it. Usually teachers present themselves to children as if they were asserting their propositions, but that can be read as a kind of performance. (I was struck by this today as a kind of <br />Your Juliet example still seems a bit problematic to me. You say her assertion has not gone wrong, but if she makes her assertion to Timothy, and Timothy has observed her behaviour over the years, he might well ignore her. Her assertion has gone wrong in that it cannot be appropriately understood by anyone familiar with her, because they just think, "Who on earth does she think she is, lecturing me on race, when everyone knows she treats her own students differently depending on the colour of their skin." And if anyone has pointed out to Juliet that her actions do not match her rhetoric, then she is in a position where she knows she should not make her assertion; or she ought to know. chinaphilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14572591745611690731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-74973044985632810412017-03-03T14:17:08.267-08:002017-03-03T14:17:08.267-08:00I have to say, I'm having trouble modeling wha...I have to say, I'm having trouble modeling what is supposed to be going on.Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-91367011521689495022017-03-01T10:45:54.169-08:002017-03-01T10:45:54.169-08:00Daniel: Yes, there is something normatively amiss ...Daniel: Yes, there is something normatively amiss in Juliet. But I wouldn't locate the problem in her *assertion*.<br /><br />Callan: I'm not thinking of these as akrasia cases exactly -- although people mean different things by "akrasia". I'm not sure that term has been helpful, on the whole, for philosophers in thinking about the dissonance between judgment and behavior.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-22332170733334223482017-02-28T17:39:13.068-08:002017-02-28T17:39:13.068-08:00Eric,
Sounds akratic? Even though I'd prefer ...Eric,<br /><br />Sounds akratic? Even though I'd prefer her going over to evolution, in many ways I'd prefer her going over to her faith than sincerely teaching something she doesn't believe in. I'd get speculatively teaching something 'Maybe this is real, somehow?', but sincerely??Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-28650106258096294502017-02-25T09:45:16.351-08:002017-02-25T09:45:16.351-08:00Got it, though I don't see how that leaves you...Got it, though I don't see how that leaves you in a position to think the knowledge norm of assertion might be in good shape. If yo uhave the capacity to deploy your true representation that P to guide your behavior, but it's only some of your behavior (and in particular, not the broadly linguistic stuff), shouldn't it be weird for you to nevertheless assert that P?Danielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17911116321628968901noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-29143393318309517172017-02-24T15:07:53.538-08:002017-02-24T15:07:53.538-08:00Thanks for the comments, folks!
Daniel: I accept ...Thanks for the comments, folks!<br /><br />Daniel: I accept in-between knowledge too, but I don't think it maps neatly onto in-between belief. One case I find intuitive is Juliet: She knows, but she only in-between believes. The theoretical architecture I steal from Ryle: knowledge is a capacity, belief is a tendency. You can have the capacity but not the tendency. Juliet has the capacity to deploy her justified true representation that P to guide her behavior, but she does not have a reliable enough tendency to do so to count as a straight-up believer.<br /><br />Callan: There are various ways to spin out the creationist case, but one that's compatible with knowledge and only in-between belief, in my view, is if she is ready and able to think and reason on evolutionist grounds, in that sincere-seeming way that most of us feel sincere when we do so (and its true and justified and what she epistemically should believe given her evidence), but when she stops and reflects and thinks about her faith she judges that evolutionary theory is false. I'm not confident of all of the details -- but something like that.<br /><br />Nora: The way you set it up is too on/off yes/no to capture the way I'm thinking about the case. To have a belief, on my view, is like having a personality trait, like extraversion. To believe all the races are intellectually equal is to have a wide range of behavioral, cognitive, and phenomenal dispositions characteristic of that belief -- like tending to assume certain things about people, tending to advance certain theoretical positions, tending to feel surprised in certain cases. Juliet has a mixed dispositional profile, like someone might have a mixed dispositional profile regarding extraversion. She might or might not realize that her profile is mixed in this way: self-knowledge doesn't map neatly into the picture one way or the other. Feeling like P is part of the dispositional profile constitutive of believing P, but it by itself is not sufficient. So that's the picture I have in mind!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-59684314264062166902017-02-23T20:29:57.852-08:002017-02-23T20:29:57.852-08:00The case you proposed puzzles me. Let’s say that J...The case you proposed puzzles me. Let’s say that Juliet is correcting Jamal’s paper. Could she believe something like “Jamal’s remarks are unexpectedly insightful for a black guy” without being aware she believes so? If she is aware she believes so, I don’t understand why you call her an implicit racist. If she is not aware she believes so, that means there are beliefs people hold without being aware of it. Could you make me some other examples of unconscious beliefs? I keep thinking about the following case. Let’s say I’m scared of Mr X because I was molested by him as a kid, but the experience was so traumatic that I forgot about it. When he is around, I usually tremble, sweat and feel uncomfortable. Do I <i> believe </i> he is dangerous? I believe I’m scared for some reason, or that he looks somehow scary. Maybe I have <i> the feeling </i> he is dangerous. But how can I believe that? Shouldn’t I believe p only when I have some reasons (maybe not conclusive, but still some relevant reasons) to believe p is true? Either I consciously believe he is dangerous because, for example, I trust my feelings or, it seems to me, I just <i> feel like </i> he is dangerous. But <i> feeling like </i> p isn’t believing that p, is it? <br /><br />Nora Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-26893927674557492492017-02-23T19:40:17.692-08:002017-02-23T19:40:17.692-08:00As I evaluate it, Juliet is rather like an alchoho...As I evaluate it, Juliet is rather like an alchoholic who can say 'Uncontrolled drinking is bad', but may acknowledge this even as they do it.<br /><br />But the creationist teacher - it would seem to require some quarantining 'These groups have come to some conclusions in regard to the origin of man, their conclusions are...'. The way it'd make sense is if it is like she is reporting the news, like you might report that there are climate change deniers without actually believing that position yourself.<br /><br />Knowing someone else's belief and reporting this information isn't the same as knowing but not believing. I can't really imagine someone being a creationist but teaching evolutionary theory as if its the real deal - it'd be like me teaching that climate change isn't real and that's an absolute fact, when I do believe it's real (side note: Though I grant it's minutely possible it could be incorrect)Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-52930018782250697492017-02-23T19:29:40.768-08:002017-02-23T19:29:40.768-08:00I'd think that the same considerations that mo...I'd think that the same considerations that motivate you to believe in "in between belief" should also motivate you to believe in "in between knowledge". Just take a case of in between belief that P, but make sure it's true that P, and make sure there's some non-accidental connection between P's truth, and the subject having those dispositions she has that are characteristic of belief that P.<br /><br />E.g., suppose Fred is not a good friend, and Selma has picked up on this to some degree; the straw that broke the camel's back was when he broke a promise to water her plants while she was traveling. Since then, she doesn't rely on him when it counts. But she's self-deceived--she'll sincerely say he's a good friend when asked, and if pressed to come up with examples in which wronged her, she won't be able to (though if reminded, she'll say "oh yes there was that...and that..."). Does Selma know Fred is a good friend? I guess you could give an unequivocal "yes" here, but that seems like a weird combination with your view about belief. I'd want to say it's an in between case. Moreover, it's an in between case in which it would seem odd for Selma to just go right ahead and assert that Fred is not a good friend--while she knows it in <i> some </i> sense (as manifested in her asking other people to water her plants from now on), I want to say she hasn't yet had the insight/realization that would make it permissible to assert it. <br /><br />So in sum, I think you should be just as queasy about an unqualified knowledge norm of assertion as an unqualified belief norm, and for essentially the same reasons. Danielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17911116321628968901noreply@blogger.com