tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post4028626930598005600..comments2024-03-25T11:49:21.281-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Is a Blind Person's Consciousness Partly Contained in Her Cane?Eric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger19125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-89582765428000375322019-02-16T14:19:15.985-08:002019-02-16T14:19:15.985-08:00Sorry, 'unknown' is still me - Blogger kee...Sorry, 'unknown' is still me - Blogger keeps inviting me to use my google account, and then apparently can't actually do that when I accept. Anyway, if the claim is that externalists think the supervenience base does in fact (sometimes? often?) extend beyond the body, I guess I am somewhat in sympathy with Shelley in casting a very sidelong glance at why the discussion is focused specifically around disabled people. Either externalists think that the mind actually extends for abled people as much as it does for disabled people, in which cases it seems like wouldn't a more widely-shared sort of extending be a better example to focus on than one which only a minority have first-hand experience with, or they don't, in which case it looks like there are some pretty big assumptions about the nature of disability being made (e.g. that the social model of disability is false?).Luke Roelofshttp://majesticequality.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-8661412886749992552019-02-16T08:05:51.561-08:002019-02-16T08:05:51.561-08:00Thanks for the continuing comments, folks:
David:...Thanks for the continuing comments, folks:<br /><br />David: I think that might be a way of expressing what the vehicle externalist thinks. The conventionally recognized line between "internal" and "external" isn't especially important.<br /><br />Luke: I do think that most vehicle externalists want to argue that it's not just the case that the supervenience base *could* extend, but also that it some actual cases it does extend.<br /><br />Luke and Lee (/unknown): I think I agree with Luke's initial point, as clarified in the continued discussion with Lee.<br /><br />Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-67549381574400057842019-02-14T15:24:32.940-08:002019-02-14T15:24:32.940-08:00@Unknown...
"Whatever your ultimate metaphysi...@Unknown...<br />"Whatever your ultimate metaphysics, you need there to be something that makes it true that 'Luke experiences pleasure when he eats olives but some people don't cheerful', etc..." <br /> <br />Absolutely, the ontological distinction of Luke's experience of pleasure in contrast to someone else's experience of displeasure is determined by the structural, qualitative properties which underwrite the novelty of a given discrete system, along with the limited degree of self-determination that is also intrinsic to discrete systems. If canes, human limbs, nervous systems and brains are discrete systems running on the linear continuous manifold of consciousness, their relationships with each other are intrinsically linked through that manifold.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-27951913816541563232019-02-14T14:01:17.923-08:002019-02-14T14:01:17.923-08:00@Lee...
I'm not sure how far we may just be us...@Lee...<br />I'm not sure how far we may just be using the term 'consciousness' differently. But I think we can bypass that issue. You say 'there is no such thing as "your" consciousness or "my" consciousness because there is no separation of consciousness itself, there is only one. The distinction would occur at the ontological level of individual experiences...' Ok, but the distinction has to come somewhere. Whatever your ultimate metaphysics, you need there to be something that makes it true that 'Luke experiences pleasure when he eats olives but some people don't cheerful', etc. Whatever we call that distinction, it's the topic of the debate here about canes and brains. Luke Roelofshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05462649815665164176noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-43680524993572783882019-02-14T08:22:32.792-08:002019-02-14T08:22:32.792-08:00@Luke...
"It guarantees that the external pr...@Luke... <br />"It guarantees that the external prop is part of the supervenience base for *some* consciousness, but still leaves open the question of whether any of that consciousness should be thought of as part of 'my' consciousness..."<br /><br />If consciousness is seen as the hardware that the discrete systems (software) of appearance run on, then there is no such thing as "your" consciousness or "my" consciousness because there is no separation of consciousness itself, there is only one. The distinction would occur at the ontological level of individual experiences, the discrete experiences that are made possible and intricately linked through the linear, continuous manifold of consciousness itself. The intricately complex relationships which make up the diversity and novelty of our phenomenal realm are made possible through the linear, continuous manifold of consciousness, and those relationships do not occur in isolation.<br /><br />A very important ontological distinction needs to be made when discussing consciousness. According to my models, consciousness may indeed be a feature or attribute of the ontological primitive, but it is not the underlying qualitative property as such. So I am not an idealist. The phenomenon of consciousness as an objective reality needs to be divorced from the experience of consciousness or else one is left with a model where the tail ends up wagging the dog.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-85554715229871348582019-02-14T07:05:51.985-08:002019-02-14T07:05:51.985-08:00Eric, It was not unclear to me that you introduced...Eric, It was not unclear to me that you introduced the idea of tampering with the cane. ShelleyShelleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01993101465503950643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-40191710595123493992019-02-13T11:52:36.429-08:002019-02-13T11:52:36.429-08:00(quick edit: when I said panpsychism makes the can...(quick edit: when I said panpsychism makes the cane a supervenience base for *some* consciousness, I should probably have disjoined that with '...or makes it supervenient on *some* consciousness', to reflect more idealist versions. But the question of whether that consciousness is or is not part of 'this one here' still remains.)Luke Roelofshttp://majesticequality.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-31953478658888530902019-02-13T11:50:12.207-08:002019-02-13T11:50:12.207-08:00I'm wondering what exactly the thesis of activ...I'm wondering what exactly the thesis of active externalism is - that in principle, an external object could be part of the supervenience base of some being's consciousness (which is surely pretty hard to deny, and which your argument doesn't touch) or that this is sometimes the case for actual human beings? I can't directly access Vold's paper, but I get the impression she wants to defend something like a 'parity thesis': if we would think if of it as part of the base when it happened in the head, we should also think of it that way when it happens outside the head. But this principle seems less helpful with consciousness than with cognition, because we're so unsure what things to regard as part of the supervenience base for consciousness generally. Cognition's also hard, but I think a lot of people feel more confident in a pattern of functionalist-y intuitions for cognition than for consciousness. <br /><br />(Also, I'm not sure panpsychism, if that's the kind of thing Lee is suggesting, does actually affect the question much. It guarantees that the external prop is part of the supervenience base for *some* consciousness, but still leaves open the question of whether any of that consciousness should be thought of as part of 'my' consciousness, where that's something like the consciousness referred to when I introspectively demonstrate 'all of this'. It does raise the possibility that this demonstration might not determine a single unique precise boundary, though, any more than pointing and saying 'that space over there' does. Still, for most purposes I'm inclined to think of myself as both a panpsychist and a vehicle-internalist?) <br />Luke Roelofshttp://majesticequality.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-76176498957851746912019-02-11T14:38:34.206-08:002019-02-11T14:38:34.206-08:00I think the artificial-natural and internal-extern...I think the artificial-natural and internal-external distinctions are not useful here. If I suddenly have a stroke causing a focal deficit, let's say a specific agnosia, I could be unaware of that deficit until it reveals itself in specific environments. Until then, my conscious experience will remain unchanged. Consciousness will only alter after (probably repeated) learning experiences lead to an alteration in self image.<br /><br />And in the rubber hand perceptual experiments, "many people report that it feels almost as though they are directly feeling objects via the" hand. That is, consciousness immediately expands to include the extra hand.David Duffynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1854242817637062822019-02-10T13:12:32.708-08:002019-02-10T13:12:32.708-08:00Just wanted to point out that if you think of cons...Just wanted to point out that if you think of consciousness as certain <b><i>kinds</i></b> of processes, there is no issue here. You simply designate a system (Genesis with cane, Genesis without cane, Genesis’ brainstem), and ask of the system what consciousness-type processes it is capable.<br /><br />*James of Seattlehttp://jamesofseattle.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-15112243344860271972019-02-09T16:57:50.274-08:002019-02-09T16:57:50.274-08:00Also, Shelley, to be fair to Karina, she did not m...Also, Shelley, to be fair to Karina, she did not mention altering the cane.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-37243619053078338602019-02-09T16:55:09.304-08:002019-02-09T16:55:09.304-08:00Yes, Shelley, I see your point. I don't belie...Yes, Shelley, I see your point. I don't believe that Vold uses the cane example in her 2015 JCS article.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-87285598274718293632019-02-09T16:41:41.874-08:002019-02-09T16:41:41.874-08:00As I indicated to you in email, Eric, I think this...As I indicated to you in email, Eric, I think this use of a blind person is troubling. Such an incident amounts to abuse of a blind person. <br />ShelleyShelleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01993101465503950643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-90593884518268150162019-02-09T16:40:13.135-08:002019-02-09T16:40:13.135-08:00Eric,
I meant that references in the article to wh...Eric,<br />I meant that references in the article to which you link. I got the impression from your remarks that Vold uses the example in the article too. I was wondering if blind or other disabled authors had been cited in any way.<br /><br />ShelleyShelleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01993101465503950643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-9659019401111501802019-02-09T16:29:53.848-08:002019-02-09T16:29:53.848-08:00Thanks for the comments, folks!
Lee: Panpsychism,...Thanks for the comments, folks!<br /><br />Lee: Panpsychism, or some similar view, does seem to me to be among the possibilities.<br /><br />Unknown: I agree that the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" can look arbitrary, especially concerning the grounds of consciousness.<br /><br />Shelley: It was an oral presentation. I don't think it's circulating in written format, and I don't know about the references.<br /><br />SelfAware: Interesting way of expanding the examples. I agree that that way of developing it can help make the case seem somewhat less unintuitive.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-63802766088933112992019-02-09T10:20:20.440-08:002019-02-09T10:20:20.440-08:00The unintuitive nature of Genesis-1's consciou...The unintuitive nature of Genesis-1's consciousness being different than Genesis-2's can be somewhat ameliorated by considering a different scenario. Suppose both have a brain implant which conveys vision information directly into the pathways between their visual cortex and other brain centers, but Genesis-2's has been hacked to convey incorrect information similar to the cane scenario. <br /><br />In this scenario, her organic brain state, during the time between the hack and her discovery her interface is compromised, are identical to Genesis-1's. However, her *expanded* brainstate is now different. This seems to get around the bandwidth issue that Clark and Chalmers identified.<br /><br />If that still seems easy to dismiss, then consider identical clones Ingrid-1 and Ingrid-2, not carrying any notebooks or in need of any canes, at least not initially. Suddenly Ingrid-2 develops a lesion in her visual cortex that causes it to convey incorrect information similar to the above scenarios. The rest of her brainstate is identical to Ingrid-1's. Introspectively, Ingrid-2 hasn't noticed the issue yet. Consciousness identical or different?<br /><br />We might then say the only thing that matters is their introspective state, but that's adopting a pretty narrow conception of consciousness. And what do we do if the brain interface enhances introspection?<br /><br />All of which is to say, I'm not sure there's a fact of the matter here. All we have are views that may be more or less productive. In that sense, Clark and Chalmers may have a point about the bandwidth issue.SelfAwarePatternshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11856665627652130336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-30235382247752633042019-02-09T08:11:58.750-08:002019-02-09T08:11:58.750-08:00Eric,
I don't have access to the Vold article ...Eric,<br />I don't have access to the Vold article to which you link. Maybe you would be so kind as to send it to me. In the meantime, would you please tell me if there are any works in the References by disabled people or disability studies scholars? <br /><br />Best,<br />ShelleyShelleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01993101465503950643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-92158127350159676362019-02-08T11:49:23.527-08:002019-02-08T11:49:23.527-08:00Isn't externalism and internalism the same, ev...Isn't externalism and internalism the same, even though a cane is artifical, a brain is natural and seem a subject of a interacting mind, interacting with a unremembered third unacknowledged being, a self...<br /><br />Is dualism evolving to being presence...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-41768993198485673562019-02-08T11:19:42.393-08:002019-02-08T11:19:42.393-08:00These arguments are indeed cleverly crafted and cu...These arguments are indeed cleverly crafted and cute. But in spite of these clever anecdotal arguments, one must be compelled to consider the following. If consciousness is the linear continuous manifold which the discrete systems of appearances run on, then all of these arguments would correspond to that architecture. In short, both the cane, nervous system, brain, our own phenomenal self-model and every other phenomenon in our universe would be a discrete system that runs on the continuous platform of consciousness itself. <br /><br />According to this model, consciousness would be universal, and if consciousness is universal, then consciousness would be fundamental in explaining the complex relationships which coalesce into the diversity and novelty of the discrete systems which make up the expression. This simple and parsimonious explanation would be a viable model which could then be utilized to replace the archaic model of the laws of nature, a model which is grounded in mysticism.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com