tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post4091099815379001245..comments2024-03-18T10:05:26.015-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Why Metaphysics Is Always BizarreEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger60125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-66271897029587171652021-11-20T09:01:03.492-08:002021-11-20T09:01:03.492-08:00I can meet all the criteria wished for in the OP. ...I can meet all the criteria wished for in the OP. Will anyone give my extraordinary evidence a hearing?Kaiser Basileushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03077465746192192716noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71994802819536692062014-02-20T04:28:13.844-08:002014-02-20T04:28:13.844-08:00It is expected right? new thought metaphysics will...It is expected right? <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00BPTXU1G" rel="nofollow">new thought metaphysics</a> will definitely be bizarre with all the possibilities that you can think off. If you will believe it, everything is possible. That's what most people say.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01480842843957779125noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-91663347771189128672011-10-24T04:43:29.946-07:002011-10-24T04:43:29.946-07:00Empiristic or pragmatic approach do not sopouse to...Empiristic or pragmatic approach do not sopouse to be unavoidably non-founded or incoherent to a methaphysicall view to the world. A contrary. They should serve to the metod of knowledge. The rational, scientific metod is the tool in that path. The major issue, I think,is the relation between mehaphysics and modern sciences.Southgatehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10140633294250427921noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-50997362346270572502011-10-03T15:35:44.845-07:002011-10-03T15:35:44.845-07:00Thanks for the link, Troy!Thanks for the link, Troy!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-14007342021308309552011-10-03T14:13:04.418-07:002011-10-03T14:13:04.418-07:00Perhaps Nietzsche's eternal recurrence isn'...Perhaps Nietzsche's eternal recurrence isn't all that crazy:<br /><br />http://evolutionaryaesthetics.blogspot.com/2007/11/iii-chaos-theory-umwelts-eternal-return.htmlTroy Camplinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16515578686042143845noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-12426234046518621662011-10-02T02:42:49.113-07:002011-10-02T02:42:49.113-07:00What Illya and Colin said reminds me of Nietzsche ...What Illya and Colin said reminds me of Nietzsche saying that the role of the philosopher is to create new concepts, which is also the priority of philosophers in the Deleuzian vein. It seems a neat example of how methodological naturalisism can include crazy bedfellows. As Leiter has been arguing for some time now, commonsense views of philosophy specialists about analytical and continental traditions look increasingly undefendable. So perhaps crazyism has important contributions for the sociology of philosophy on top of everything else.Richard Marshallnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-44748785910867990582011-10-01T22:47:04.913-07:002011-10-01T22:47:04.913-07:00Nice question!
I'm certainly with you on the ...Nice question!<br /><br />I'm certainly with you on the incoherence of common sense, though I think there are still a few steps that would need to be filled in to reach the conclusion that metaphysical systems must be necessarily *bizarre* (i.e. flagrant violations), rather than just modest revisions of common sense.<br /><br />But more importantly, I think you may be selling option #1 short. Someone who proposes a new metaphysical system is asking a lot of us; at minimum, they’re asking us to take on board some new fundamental conceptual structure, and often in the absence of any compelling practical justification. The violation of common sense at least promises that, by adopting the new system, we may come to see the world in a new way and transcend some previously widespread limits or errors of thought. In a sense, it’s a way for the author to up the stakes, to command our attention by pointing out what a big difference it will make if they turn out to be right. If a new system can’t offer that, then it’s hard to see why readers would be motivated to put in the time and effort required to understand it.<br /><br />(Plus, and relatedly, the counterintuitive claims then become a flashy badge of membership for new converts, and a lure for the intellectually curious …)Ilya Farberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17446242614556801331noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-84193489614330818142011-10-01T09:07:42.669-07:002011-10-01T09:07:42.669-07:00Couldn't your argue the same thing about moder...Couldn't your argue the same thing about modern physics. That looking at its history of finding surprising conclusions that violate common sense is empiracle evidence that physics actually does violate common sense? And in the case of physics wouldn't that be an entirely uninteresting argument?Colinnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79795546316878717002011-10-01T00:23:23.521-07:002011-10-01T00:23:23.521-07:00Eric
I guess there's a relationship between w...Eric<br /><br />I guess there's a relationship between what counts as crazy/common sense and expertise, so that perhaps philosophers tolerate more crazyism than non-philosophers. If so then perhaps common sense is responsive to strereotypes about what we expect to be told by different groups. So maybe we might ask whether metaphysically bizarre claims when produced by metaphysicians as metaphysically bizarre find acceptance easier than the same views expressed by non-metaphysicians? Maybe a principle like 'If it aint crazy, she aint a metaphysician' is a common sense guide to metaphysics that then allows for common sense people to expect the crazyism? So there's a scale of common sense to crazyism that runs in inverse proportion to whether its a metaphysician or lay person putting forward the ideas. After all, look at the blog string here - the metaphysicians seem quite happy with apparently quite crazyist ideas which I doubt would be quite so easily swallowed if we were all economists, say. (No disrespect to economists meant here!)Richard Marshallnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-63582104388001765402011-09-30T21:41:33.265-07:002011-09-30T21:41:33.265-07:00You made the right choice.
Sometimes common sense...You made the right choice.<br /><br />Sometimes common sense is just wrong.<br /><br />For example you deride the notion of an infinity of different universes. Why? This actually jibes with what physics seems to be telling us, and the main point of resistance seems to be nothing more than "we weren't used to thinking of thing that way."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-87115154722228667392011-09-30T18:22:08.808-07:002011-09-30T18:22:08.808-07:00Crankyprofessor, if you've ever bought anythin...Crankyprofessor, if you've ever bought anything online (at least from anything like a reputable place), you've paid homage to prime numbers: they are used everywhere in cryptography these days.<br /><br />As for the topic of the thread, when I did my tiny drops of work in metaphysics, I didn't regard common sense as a constraint at all. Why should one? One doesn't adopt the naive view(s) of stuffs in chemistry, the naive view of organisms in biology, etc. I basically regard science and metaphysics as continuous: the more general sciences are more metaphysics-y. Hypergeneral theories are the most metaphysical of all (like automata theory, one of my favourites), since they can even apply regardless of composition of the system.<br /><br />As for why metaphysical systems turn out bizarre, it is not because they conflict with common sense (and yes, I think they usually do, even Strawson's _Individuals_). It is because there are no additional constraints - which are admittedly very hard to articulate, and of course time dependent. Descartes, for example, did not know about conservation laws in the way we do today; hence he can be forgiven for postulating psychoneural dualism. Dualists today have no such luxury, and in my view until they can show that the conservation laws are wrong (and win a nobel prize in physics along the way), they can stand refuted.philosopher-animalhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16505629919126188962noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-60035870691310351042011-09-30T17:09:14.115-07:002011-09-30T17:09:14.115-07:00I think it is a pretty simple statement that prime...I think it is a pretty simple statement that prime numbers are NOT common sense. How do they have any applicability to every day life other than a certain joy in numbers? An initial commitment? Maybe. But you're already in the math game when you are lying in bed figuring primes.CrankyProfessorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03586787351738086368noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-66623856136877333072011-09-30T16:34:11.183-07:002011-09-30T16:34:11.183-07:00Anon 9:19: Right. The claim that common sense is ...Anon 9:19: Right. The claim that common sense is incoherent isn't new. For example, Kant seems to say something like it in the antinomies. And I agree that many, probably most, metaphysicians are okay with acknowledging that their views have aspects that conflict with common sense. And the methodological criticism that you advance is in the ballpark of what some recent foes of metaphysics say in the x-phi community.<br /><br />What I haven't seen, though, is the empirical argument I've set forward here. It starts with an empirical universal claim: All observed metaphysical systems are bizarre. And it concludes with an inference to the best explanation of that claim, that common sense is incoherent.<br /><br />The universal claim is somewhat bold, since it requires asserting that Aristotle is bizarre, Moore is bizarre, Strawson is bizarre, etc. I've been trying to look at all plausible candidate cases of broad-ranging metaphysicians who are able to thoroughly respect common sense. And I am making this strong universal claim on the basis of examining cases, not on a priori grounds like Kant's.<br /><br />Now it could be that someone else has put forward my argument before, the argument from empirical observation of the universal bizarreness of metaphysics to abductive conclusion about common sense. If you or any other reader can think of a precedent, I'd appreciate a reference!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71711746783533948432011-09-30T09:19:03.225-07:002011-09-30T09:19:03.225-07:00I don't think the claim that our common sense ...I don't think the claim that our common sense concepts might be incoherent is new, or even that the possibility frightens that many metaphysicians. What I think should be made explicit is that even those metaphysicians who proclaim not to care about whether common sense is incoherent--they still rely on common sense intuitions as evidence for a lot of their claims. And that reliance seems to presuppose coherence of common sense (unless they can locate which common sense claims are the true ones).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-4752816844313370862011-09-30T08:19:42.538-07:002011-09-30T08:19:42.538-07:00Pragmatism
[The Pragmatists] declared that philos...Pragmatism<br /><br />[The Pragmatists] declared that philosophy must be practical and that practicality consists of dispensing with all absolute principles and standards—that there is no such thing as objective reality or permanent truth—that truth is that which works, and its validity can be judged only by its consequences—that no facts can be known with certainty in advance, and anything may be tried by rule-of-thumb—that reality is not firm, but fluid and “indeterminate,” that there is no such thing as a distinction between an external world and a consciousness (between the perceived and the perceiver), there is only an undifferentiated package-deal labeled “experience,” and whatever one wishes to be true, is true, whatever one wishes to exist, does exist, provided it works or makes one feel better.<br /><br />A later school of more Kantian Pragmatists amended this philosophy as follows. If there is no such thing as an objective reality, men’s metaphysical choice is whether the selfish, dictatorial whims of an individual or the democratic whims of a collective are to shape that plastic goo which the ignorant call “reality,” therefore this school decided that objectivity consists of collective subjectivism—that knowledge is to be gained by means of public polls among special elites of “competent investigators” who can “predict and control” reality—that whatever people wish to be true, is true, whatever people wish to exist, does exist, and anyone who holds any firm convictions of his own is an arbitrary, mystic dogmatist, since reality is indeterminate and people determine its actual nature.<br /><br />Ayn Rand's definition at this link:<br />http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/pragmatism.htmlAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47554518597729243112011-09-29T09:18:30.782-07:002011-09-29T09:18:30.782-07:00Jackson: I'll settle for not-so-common sense, ...Jackson: I'll settle for not-so-common sense, if I can find it!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-49815900399421229142011-09-29T09:17:27.891-07:002011-09-29T09:17:27.891-07:00Benj: I agree, Moore's 1957 does resolve some ...Benj: I agree, Moore's 1957 does resolve some of his waffling, in part by repudiating earlier views. I find it odd, still, that he says that when someone points to a penny and says "this is a penny" she is referring to two things rather than one, a sense datum and a penny. Also his 1957 is less metaphysically broad-ranging than his 1953, so he can dodge troubles by narrowness (cf. my reaction to your stabbing example), e.g., in his 1953 he contemplates the continued existence of unexperienced sense data whereas in his 1953 he doesn't really address the ontology of sense data.<br /><br />The "it's difficult" response to the problem of mental-physical causation seems to me to have some merit. I suspect it's overly optimistic to suspect that we will solve it properly *and* do so in a way that fully respects common sense, but I can see how someone might disagree with me about this. It's a matter of judgment.<br /><br />Expressivism about causation doesn't seem very commonsensical to me. But that's just confession I suppose! I'd have thought people were realists at root and that they would deny that certain "normal" constant conjunctions (night/day? tar-stained fingers/lung cancer?) are causal. But maybe a lot of work is being done by "normal" in your claim?<br /><br />I feel a bit odd speculating about common sense in the armchair when clearly it's an empirical issue. But there you have it. That isn't to say that I think "common sense" is entirely straightforward to test.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-85342846775597959672011-09-29T08:53:38.903-07:002011-09-29T08:53:38.903-07:00Anon 9/28 2:02: I will differ from Wittgenstein, I...Anon 9/28 2:02: I will differ from Wittgenstein, I think, on how comfortable we should be with common sense and whether philosophers are developing its incoherent implications (as I think) or instead only taking words where they have no business going (as on a common reading of the language-on-holiday remark).Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-13718561534762230612011-09-28T22:00:10.856-07:002011-09-28T22:00:10.856-07:00Re: Inner vs. Outer
With regard to "sense-dat...Re: Inner vs. Outer<br />With regard to "sense-data", Ortega's metaphysics would hold that they are "outer" to "me", the sensing subject, but "inner" to "my life", which is the "radical reality" in the sense that all other realities occur or are "rooted" in it. "My life" includes both "I," the person that I am, and "my circumstance," which includes all the phenomena (including "sense-data") that are not "me", i.e., that are "outside" of me, but that occur to and coexist with "me," "inside" the "radical reality" that I experience as "my life". As to whether there is a "you" who lives within a "radical reality" that you also call "my life" along with a set of phenomena you also call "my circumstance," I can only speculate based on how "you" "occur" within "my life."<br />To me this was at first a "bizarre" metaphysics that, once I thought about it, made not-so-common sense.Jackson Davishttp://www.webspawner.com/users/ortegainus/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-75102802570543806522011-09-28T17:48:09.720-07:002011-09-28T17:48:09.720-07:00Anon 2:02PM -- some philosophers do agree with thi...Anon 2:02PM -- some philosophers do agree with this, others don't; others think there are no philosophical problems but that some problems philosophers worry about arise from language going on holiday. <br /><br />Anyway "hoc Zenon dixit" and all.Benj Helliehttp://individual.utoronto.ca/benjnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-91731132827265295212011-09-28T17:36:43.287-07:002011-09-28T17:36:43.287-07:00Schwitz -- Moore was agonized about whether the &#...Schwitz -- Moore was agonized about whether the 'sense-datum' (the direct object of perception) was inner or outer until his last published paper from 1957, where he came down on the side of 'inner'. The 'London dilemma' is the problem here: phenomenologically, the direct object of perception would seem to be outer; but considerations of illusion and the like seem to suggest it is inner. Here I note that considerations of illusion and the like really do not suggest this: Aristotle was a disjunctivist (read his stuff on dreams some time).<br /><br />Mental/physical causation is problematic but I'm of the view that here there are plenty of difficult conceptual issues to be resolved: maybe the problem is just hard and we lack the technology (although my view is that once we deploy the right technology the problem displays itself as insoluble -- because of incoherence considerations somewhat different from yours).<br /><br />I doubt that expressivism about causation is at odds with common sense. Students are pretty comfy with the idea that 'P because Q' means something like 'P and normally if Q then P' where the 'normally' and the 'if' express adventitious and subjective strategies for carving up the world.Benj Helliehttp://individual.utoronto.ca/benjnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-44750204356307643342011-09-28T14:02:11.025-07:002011-09-28T14:02:11.025-07:00I think Wittgenstein figured this one out a long t...I think Wittgenstein figured this one out a long time ago: "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday." That is to say, what appear to be metaphysical problems are really linguistic problems; they exist (and persist) only because philosophers try to do things with language that language isn't capable of. <br /><br />When, oh when, will philosophers finally take Wittgenstein to heart? My guess is never, because then they'd all be out of jobs.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-33229230414290734792011-09-28T02:21:59.914-07:002011-09-28T02:21:59.914-07:00If there can be a rational explanation for God, it...If there can be a rational explanation for God, it seems that even a Cartesian philosopher has to go against the bizarre side of it. It should be interesting:<br /> http://eternal-cartesian.blogspot.com/2009/08/heisenberg-and-god.htmlGod is bizarrenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-48740513384541665912011-09-27T18:43:01.591-07:002011-09-27T18:43:01.591-07:00To the things themselves = A return to common sens...To the things themselves = A return to common sense.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-60265265115161125422011-09-27T15:07:21.698-07:002011-09-27T15:07:21.698-07:00Thanks for the reply.
On how far abduction can ta...Thanks for the reply.<br /><br />On how far abduction can take us ... Far enough. I doubt abduction ever delivers decisive epistemic grounds for choosing among competing theories. But I doubt any method delivers decisive epistemic grounds for any theory. Rather than aiming for a method that delivers so much, we should aim for something that delivers good grounds for ranking theories one way or another. I think abduction often does that in metaphysics, no less than in physics, chemistry, criminal investigations, medical diagnosis, etc. Of course, there may be disagreement about which theory abduction supports. But the same holds for physics etc. In neither domain does disagreement show that abduction gets no epistemic traction. <br /><br />On pulling away ... I suspect that pulling away from commonsense deprives metaphysics of epistemic traction to exactly the degree that pulling away from commonsense deprives physics/chemistry etc. of epistemic traction. In all cases, although ceteris paribus it's good to respect commonsense, commonsense doesn't have the final say. I don't know just how much respect commonsense should get or exactly how it should figure into abduction--I suspect not much--but I see no obvious, compelling case for presupposing that commonsense gets more weight in metaphysics than in other domains, including physics, chemistry, criminal investigations, etc.<br /><br />One might say, "Look at the way metaphysicians proceed versus the way that physicists proceed! Clearly the former give commonsense more weight!" But it's pretty rare these days that commonsense is taken (explicitly anyway) to decide an issue in metaphysics. More often, one considers various theories, adduces considerations for and against each, and then offers a judgment about which theory best fits the evidence. Sometimes commonsense may be used to "pushback" on a theory. But, even when this pushing is taken seriously, it is rarely treated as more than one among many relevant considerations, some involving commonsense, others not. At any rate, I suspect that metaphysicians should rely on abduction even if they presently put too much weight on commonsense.Steve Biggshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01704973652108088735noreply@blogger.com