tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post4634638779209482848..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Being Thirsty and Thinking You're ThirstyEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-2742518122615388002009-01-03T09:02:00.000-08:002009-01-03T09:02:00.000-08:00It seems I missed a few words..In the first query,...It seems I missed a few words..<BR/><BR/>In the first query, rather than "Why do you that...", I mean, "Why do you think that...".<BR/><BR/>Later, I write, "not because of the increased attention on said thirst, or the fact that, ...", but intended to finish that second clause: "not because of the increased attention on said thirst, or the fact that the thirst may have been exaggerated by the imposed thoughts, ...".Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03347329240131914567noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-20151971927013249252009-01-03T08:58:00.000-08:002009-01-03T08:58:00.000-08:00Two queries to your queries:2) "Does mental activi...Two queries to your queries:<BR/><BR/>2) "Does mental activity require a motive? If an image of a Jim wearing a duck-hat comes to mind unbidden as I talk to Jim, need there be a motive?"<BR/><BR/>Why do you that, just because you are unable to see a motive instantaneously, there is no motive? It seems most sensible from a neurological point of view that every action in the brain (and as a consequence, the representation of each in consciousness) should have a neurological basis: each thought you have surely must be a response to a stimulus, be it internal or external. I venture that, with appropriate technology, the stimuli that cause thoughts such as your apparently random and spontaneous "image of a Jim wearing a duck-hat" could be ascertained as having a firm neurological basis.<BR/><BR/>3) "If I suggest to subjects that think about whether they are thirsty, then set them free, will they be more or less likely to stop by the fountain on their way out than subjects I invite to think about something else? I'm pretty sure which way this one will turn out. Now I suspect this test wouldn't be fair to Velleman for some reason. (Maybe the suggestion will also affect thirst itself and not just reflection on it?) So if one of you is sympathetic to him, maybe you can help me out...."<BR/><BR/>Indeed, I posit that the reason the subjects constrained to thinking about [their] thirst would be more likely to visit the fountain than those whose minds are free to digress is not because of the increased attention on said thirst, or the fact that, but owing instead to the desire to be free of the mental constraint.<BR/><BR/>Or am I misinterpreting? It seems what you write could also be interpreted to mean that there is no constraint, but only a suggestion. (In fact, rethinking about this now, it seems this is the most likely reading...). In this case, I would change my words to agree with you. I would be tentative however, because I would not like to be naively certain about the action of the suggestion in the brain.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03347329240131914567noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-78565075508537889012008-12-09T11:26:00.000-08:002008-12-09T11:26:00.000-08:00Thanks for the comments, CWH and Brad!CWH: I agree...Thanks for the comments, CWH and Brad!<BR/><BR/>CWH: I agree that we shouldn't take accurate perception of thirst, hunger, etc., as a given; and I agree that that makes the whole thing more complicated. Your article on the ontogeny of these sounds interesting. I'll look it up!<BR/><BR/>Brad: I feel the pull of what you're saying, and maybe that's part of what Velleman has in mind. I think it's a mistake, though, to think that attention always has to divide between targets (as I discussed in my old post "Attention, Objects, and Aims"). It can also nest, so that one attends to one thing in part <I>by</I> attending to another. I'm inclined to think that's what's going on when we attend to the fact that we're thirsty.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-12301877138827210482008-12-09T09:20:00.000-08:002008-12-09T09:20:00.000-08:00Hi Eric,An attempt at understanding Velleman's poi...Hi Eric,<BR/><BR/>An attempt at understanding Velleman's point of view:<BR/><BR/>RE (1): Maybe he is starting from the thought that when you are reflectively thinking about yourself and your being in a state of thirst, you are not thinking about drinking water (or whatever) or being in a future satiated state. <BR/><BR/>The idea might be that our attention is focused on one thought at a time and to think about oneself being thirst is one thing while to thinking "thirsty thoughts" is another. This suggest that we gloss "thirsty thoughts" as thoughts about imbibing liquid, enjoying the experience, and the ensuing state of being satiated.<BR/><BR/>Does that much make sense to you?Brad Chttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12698027539432083841noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-8228393335751348862008-12-08T13:05:00.000-08:002008-12-08T13:05:00.000-08:00I think that your prediction is correct. As a psyc...I think that your prediction is correct. As a psychologist I find Velleman's ideas on this subject (per your summary), difficult and incoherent.<BR/><BR/>If you add into the equation the fact that the perception or correct identification/ understanding of thirst is not necessarily an epistemic given, the situation becomes fairly complicated.<BR/><BR/>(I recently wrote a review on the ontogeny of hunger, thirst and satiety, by the way, that is in the current issue of Developmental Review, that you might find interesting.--Sorry for the plug).<BR/><BR/>I am also becoming a fan of some of Damasio's ideas, which seem to be exactly opposite Velleman's with respect to the subject-object-consciousness relationship.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-61489328075632024282008-12-08T12:38:00.000-08:002008-12-08T12:38:00.000-08:00Yes, maybe so. However, if he limits what he mean...Yes, maybe so. However, if he limits what he means by "mental activity" or "thought" to a relatively narrow class, that takes some of the bite out of the latter parts of the essay where he endorses the idea of spontaneous action without thought. If he means to embrace something like Csikszentmihalyi's view of flow (which he cites and appears to endorse), then I think at least Csik's idea is that there isn't even thought in the broader (but still phenomenological) sense of "thought".Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-64417212371016689492008-12-07T12:24:00.000-08:002008-12-07T12:24:00.000-08:00Are Velleman´s reasons and distinctions on mental ...Are Velleman´s reasons and distinctions on mental action- acting or feeling X- like Galen Strawson´s mental upcomings, intrusions, or "mental balistics": thoughts that burst spontaneously not necesarily connected to action?Anibal Monasterio Astobizahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03121020811080165520noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-49846710876234910422008-12-07T12:10:00.000-08:002008-12-07T12:10:00.000-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anibal Monasterio Astobizahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03121020811080165520noreply@blogger.com