tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post4947546263223613370..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: On Debunking Part Deux: Selective Debunking in Metaethics.Eric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-84283914091560009452009-05-27T17:50:53.587-07:002009-05-27T17:50:53.587-07:00Hi Alex,
I think the book you're referring to is ...Hi Alex,<br /><br />I think the book you're referring to is Neil Levy's Neuroethics (Cambridge UP, 2007).Tamlernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-65750121683614017532009-05-27T13:08:11.972-07:002009-05-27T13:08:11.972-07:00Hey Tamler,
Thanks for a really interesting post!...Hey Tamler,<br /><br />Thanks for a really interesting post! I suspect that as more and more evolutionary explanations are put forth for everything from our literary preferences to our mate preferences, issues concerning debunking or genealogical explanations will become more and more relevant/pressing.<br /><br />[Freud (I know, I know) actually has some interesting things to say about this sort of thing in 'The Future of an Illusion'.]<br /><br />On that note, could you or Neil point me towards the 2007 book you mention? And, if anyone has any additional suggestions for recent books/articles on genealogical explanations, I'd love to hear them!<br /><br />Thanks!alexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-63498128094611347972009-05-26T06:15:43.431-07:002009-05-26T06:15:43.431-07:00Hi Tamler,
Great posts! I am trying to disgest it...Hi Tamler,<br /><br />Great posts! I am trying to disgest it all. Important and tricky stuff.<br /><br />Just finished "Darwin’s Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness of Life", and I think that is on the same drift.<br /><br />Ah well, maybe not, but I really really liked it. I feel much more clearness in my head now. Mainly about the whole "doing good" community and their claims of importance.<br /><br />If you have any recommended readings I would like to know.<br /><br />Keep up the good work.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-10797291217579246212009-05-22T08:14:19.463-07:002009-05-22T08:14:19.463-07:00Neil, I don't think it's an odd criticism. Singer...Neil, I don't think it's an odd criticism. Singer concedes on p. 350 that that the "more reasoned" response may still be said to be based on an intuition. And then he calls it a "rational intuition" because it doesn't seem to trace back to our evolutionary past. <br /><br />Now it's one thing to call something a rational intuition. It's another thing to show that it really is derived from reason. I can't see any argument for the latter. If a principle is not intuitive and there's no argument to show that it's derived from reason, why should we consider it more reliable than a deontological principle?<br /><br />I'm not completely sure what criticism of Greene you're referring to. My point is NOT that moral intuitions need not backed up by reasons (although I can see how someone might intepret my original post that way). I had intended to be neutral on that front. My point is that whether or not moral intuitions need be backed by reasons, Greene and Singer haven't shown deontological intuitions to be any worse off than consequentialist ones. And so the selective debunking strategy is unsuccessful.<br /><br />I'll definitely check out the discussion in your book.Tamlernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-74485146220950019072009-05-22T02:33:20.959-07:002009-05-22T02:33:20.959-07:00Hey Tamler,
There seems to be a tension between y...Hey Tamler,<br /><br />There seems to be a tension between your claims wrt to Singer and Greene. You castigate Singer for putting forward a claim - that we ought to treat everyone as equals - on the grounds that it is not intuitive (which is an odd criticism, because Singer's point is that it is not intuitive: it is reached by reason, he claims). Then you criticise Greene for putting forward a claim on the grounds that moral intuitions need not be backed up by reasons.<br /><br />I discussed these debunking strategies in my 2007 book, btw.Neilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12586131772199247420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-13972581473355632142009-05-20T21:03:21.449-07:002009-05-20T21:03:21.449-07:00Dan, that's true. But if moral intuitions are supp...Dan, that's true. But if moral intuitions are supposed to be backed by reasons then I don't see how their debunking strategy accomplishes the second aim: not throwing the consequentialist baby out with deontological bathwater. The intuition "I ought to favor my child's welfare over the welfare of strangers" doesn't seem any worse off than the intuition "I ought to prevent as much suffering as possible."Tamlernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-4127738051638601762009-05-20T14:16:38.373-07:002009-05-20T14:16:38.373-07:00It looks like you're trying to take the height fet...It looks like you're trying to take the height fetish analogy a step farther than Greene intended, and that step only makes sense if we assume emotivism (or something similar). Attraction doesn't depend on anything more than the person's attitudes/evaluations, so explaining away her stated reasons for her attraction doesn't debunk the attraction itself. If there's nothing more to morality than the person's attitudes/evaluations, then (analogously) explaining away their stated reasons for their moral views won't debunk the moral view itself. But if there is something more to morality (e.g., if it's supposed to be backed by reasons), the analogy doesn't go through for that step and we may have a debunking.Dannoreply@blogger.com