tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post6348967417871287772..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Philosophical Skepticism Is, or Should Be, about Credence Rather Than KnowledgeEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-5101915240554211442018-10-01T10:24:44.778-07:002018-10-01T10:24:44.778-07:00I've been thinking along these lines recently ...I've been thinking along these lines recently as a way to deflate Gettier cases. Say every morning you roll a 100-sided die and choose to believe that whatever number comes up is the temperature outside and then dress accordingly. This is a very bad way to assess the weather, and even if you roll an 83 and it does happen to be 83 degrees outside, you wouldn't call your true belief justified. <br /><br />Alternatively maybe you check a weather app on your phone, and in your experience this app has been very reliable: displaying temperatures below freezing when there's snow out, in the 90s when you see neighbors frying eggs on cars, etc. So you're pretty justified in believing its numbers. But what if there's a bug in the program such that every once in awhile (1% chance per day, say), it says the temperature outside is 99 degrees? If it does happen to be 99 out, I think you've got a Gettier case--a justified true belief that we don't want to call knowledge.<br /><br />But if you squint, I think the weather app and the d100 only differ by degree (oops, pun) and not kind (justified vs. not). In both cases you have an algorithm for reporting the temperature, but the reliability of one algorithm is much better than the other. The weather app gets its information from some weather service, which uses observations and modeling to spit out numbers. It being accurate means the distribution of numbers will cluster around the true temperature, but there's still some probabilistic distribution. The 100-sided die also has a distribution, but it's flat across a wide range and consequently very inaccurate. But it's still better than a million-sided die, which we can say confidently because we're familiar with terrestrial temperatures.<br /><br />So as you suggest, instead of talking in terms of knowledge and justified true belief, we can talk in terms of credences. Your credence in the d100 is very low, but your credence in the weather app is very high. Even if you know about the bug in the weather app, you're still going to trust its results or bet on it. There will sometimes be funny results (wrong temperatures, or right temperatures for the wrong reasons), but you expect that for any credence other than 1. In other classic Gettier cases, we can have credences based on the reliability of the method for gathering evidence; eyes usually do a very good of telling us what's on the side of the road, even if sometimes there are fake barns.Ori Vandewallehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804391682393947159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-771839123189057092018-10-01T08:47:22.180-07:002018-10-01T08:47:22.180-07:00I may have meant to say, philosophers could compar...I may have meant to say, philosophers could compare--"allowing propositions" with resisting propositions, when considering credible conscious living...<br /><br />This point of view about beliefs, that beliefs can simply be seen, may become our best example/experience supporting the pursuit of truth and wisdom, they are who we are...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-43440897695765215842018-09-28T20:13:17.719-07:002018-09-28T20:13:17.719-07:00Is skepticism still just certainty, and in the cer...Is skepticism still just certainty, and in the certainty of Being, is the allowance of propositions keeping us from waking up, to ourselves as knowledge...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-14571409160989149822018-09-28T11:37:34.159-07:002018-09-28T11:37:34.159-07:00Perfectly reasonable positions, I think, even thou...Perfectly reasonable positions, I think, even though my own credence in them is < .5!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-91069968227953095112018-09-27T15:51:56.271-07:002018-09-27T15:51:56.271-07:00Actually Eric, I'm a sixty-five year old incor...Actually Eric, I'm a sixty-five year old incorrigible noumenalist, as well as a micro-panpsychist for two simple reasons. First, those two paradigms are the most parsimonious explanation of things, and second, due to my childish, pre-prejudicial nature, the one that pre-dates common sense, I believe that it's best to stick with the simplest explanation of things unless there is compelling evidence to suggest otherwise. Having said that, my models also correspond to the Parmenidean reality/appearance distinction by stating that consciousness in all of its forms is the appearance and not the reality, and idealists just hate when I say that. My models also do not accommodate the paradigms of magic or solipsism. No, I'm no skeptic, I'm willing to take a risk by setting the bar higher, but to each their own.......<br /><br />C’est la vieAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79013822479496546782018-09-27T14:01:54.115-07:002018-09-27T14:01:54.115-07:00Sounds... skeptical?Sounds... skeptical?Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79023074482825130512018-09-27T11:17:28.683-07:002018-09-27T11:17:28.683-07:00Eric,
There is no ontological or epistemological ...Eric,<br /><br />There is no ontological or epistemological distinction between a skeptic or one who believes with certainty in an intellectual construct, because skepticism itself is just that, an intellectual construct. Both are badges of honor worn with pride, for honor itself is nothing more that a gift that one gives to themselves. Outside of any exclusive circle of definition and agreement, we really don't know anything, and I'm not certain that is something to be proud of. I suppose one could call our paradigm of reductio ad absurdum credence, what do you think?<br /><br />Thanks.....Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com