tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post707487765051409862..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: In Recruiting Members, the APA Doesn't Appeal As Effectively to Self-Interest As Do Other Academic Disciplinary SocietiesEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-9370725659227607342009-08-12T10:03:52.073-07:002009-08-12T10:03:52.073-07:00I'm not sure about non-moral rights and obliga...I'm not sure about non-moral rights and obligations in the sense you seem to intend, Josh; it could be that you're using the term "moral" more narrowly than I. But I agree with your larger point that not all actions are motivated either by morality or by self-interest.<br /><br />So maybe the conclusion should be that it's some combination of self-interest and/or other sources of dues-paying behavior that the APA appears not to effectively induce.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-82716807675261072252009-08-12T08:13:57.207-07:002009-08-12T08:13:57.207-07:00"among professors who said they saw membershi..."among professors who said they saw membership in their discipline's main society as morally neutral -- professors presumably motivated mainly by self-interest in their decision whether or not to be members -- philosophers' membership rates were considerably lower (68.0% vs. 84.5%, p = .02)."<br /><br />When our actions (e.g. professional membership) are not explained by moral considerations, must that action be explained by appeal to self-interest? <br /><br />Margaret Gilbert and especially John Searle entertain the possibility of non-desire and non-moral based reasons for action. While there are moral and prudential reasons for why I grade my students' papers, it may just be that I grade these papers because that is part of what it is to be a professor. Otherwise put, there are certain institutional statuses (professor, husband, citizen, etc.) which entail clusters of non-moral rights and obligations. If I attend a staff meeting, perhaps I do so less from moral reasons and more from a recognition that this is among the institutional obligations entailed by having the particular status that I do. Along these lines, perhaps it's the case that professional membership is less central to what it is to be a philosophy professor, as compared to other kinds of professors (at least among those who don't think that professional membership is also a moral obligation).<br /><br />Indeed many of the questions we asked in the survey walk the line between moral obligations and institutional obligations: do I vote in virtue of a moral obligation or in virtue of the institutional obligations entailed by my status as a US citizen? Perhaps an increased sensitivity to this distinction might also explain why philosophers, in general, tend to rank actions closer to neutral than do other professors. On this reading, philosophers who act but rank the act as morally neutral can't be assumed to act merely from prudential considerations.Joshua Rusthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11929951349182716394noreply@blogger.com