tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post833963990223328085..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Materialism Is Not (or Shouldn't Be) a Metaphysical ThesisEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-74938305219303472792007-11-28T11:34:00.000-08:002007-11-28T11:34:00.000-08:00Thanks Anibal! I see the parallel now. In the le...Thanks Anibal! I see the parallel now. In the leap from premises about conception to conclusions about reality, Anselm and Chalmers have something in common!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-24948737538055234582007-11-28T08:31:00.000-08:002007-11-28T08:31:00.000-08:00The standard version of the ontological argument m...The standard version of the ontological argument made by St. Anselm of Canterbury says: that "nihil maius cogitare potest" in reference to God, and because you cannot think anything bigger (in the sense that God posses all and the best positive atributes) the only possible thing that God lacks is to "exist". <BR/>But if God lacks existence then he is not the thing by which you can think possess the best and all atributes.<BR/><BR/>In this sense St. Anselm made a fallacious move or transition from thought to reality. I can imagine a superbeing with all and the best atributes, but not for that reason it deserves to exist (I imagine a fly spaghetti monster but this is not guarrante of the existence of the fly spaghetti monster)<BR/><BR/>In similar fashion, Chalmers parallels the ontological argument because " metaphysical conceibility" does not mean "metaphysical REAL existence" so he does so too, a fallacious transition from thought to reality.Anibal Monasterio Astobizahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03121020811080165520noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-43558793384634253452007-11-26T13:29:00.000-08:002007-11-26T13:29:00.000-08:00Thanks for the continuing comments, folks!Anibal: ...Thanks for the continuing comments, folks!<BR/><BR/>Anibal: I'm not seeing the parallel to the ontological argument. Could you explain further?<BR/><BR/>Elvis: That's in the ballpark of what I'm saying. I have no problem with "Cambridge properties" per se -- they're perfectly fine properties, I just don't think they're likely to be very useful. So likewise, maybe one way of putting my thought is that a distinction between two properties that diverge only in naturally impossible worlds may capture a difference in properties, but it isn't going to be a scientifically useful distinction -- except for the science devoted to undestanding our concepts....Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-59504255617239732002007-11-26T12:44:00.000-08:002007-11-26T12:44:00.000-08:00Hi Eric,Is your fundamental point that Chalmers's ...Hi Eric,<BR/><BR/>Is your fundamental point that Chalmers's conceivability argument can't rule out that dualistic construals of phenomenal properties are Cambridge properties of some sort??https://www.blogger.com/profile/07587365520990930675noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1060824123226612882007-11-26T12:28:00.000-08:002007-11-26T12:28:00.000-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.?https://www.blogger.com/profile/07587365520990930675noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-47647475107166253212007-11-26T04:17:00.000-08:002007-11-26T04:17:00.000-08:00It seems that Chalmers reproduce the standard "ont...It seems that Chalmers reproduce the standard "ontological argument" but in this case to disprove materialism or to arguing in favour of non-concious beings instead to prove the existence of God.<BR/>The transition from thought to reality is always problematic, i think.Anibal Monasterio Astobizahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03121020811080165520noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-9653830813948721792007-11-23T07:55:00.000-08:002007-11-23T07:55:00.000-08:00Thanks, Tanasije! I agree with you about the meta...Thanks, Tanasije! I agree with you about the metaphilosophy. However, I think the concepts of "consciousness" and "matter" *can* be made clear -- or clear enough! -- even if they're a bit muddled in everyday language.<BR/><BR/>Chalmers doesn't do too much with "matter" (which I think is interesting to explore further), but I think he does pretty well with "consciousness". I don't think any helpful functional or analytic definition of consciousness is possible, but I do think one can make it clear through example and ostension, which is what he does.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79118863344914262992007-11-22T13:19:00.000-08:002007-11-22T13:19:00.000-08:00I tend to think this...Either something from the r...I tend to think this...<BR/><BR/>Either something from the reality falls under the concept, or it doesn't. And as much as something falls under a concept, the conclusions about the concepts are conclusions about that part of reality which falls under the concept.<BR/><BR/>Even if one accepts this, and says that arm-chair intuitions of mathematicians do tell us about any part of reality which falls under concepts of math, it is still open question if something similar can be done with notions of "matter" and "consciousness".<BR/><BR/>Do those concepts ("matter"/"consciousness")<BR/>a) succeed to be clear notions which metaphysician can handle as mathematicians handle mathematical concepts, or are they just vague ideas. and <BR/>b) how much from reality falls clearly under those concepts.<BR/><BR/>I'm under impression (which of course doesn't mean a lot given my ignorance) that there is generally no clear ideas (on par with mathematical notions) behind the terms "matter" and "consciousness", and that because of this, how Zombie argument or similar ones are accepted by people, is dependent a lot on personal vague intuitions about those terms.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-78753352034808789662007-11-22T10:26:00.000-08:002007-11-22T10:26:00.000-08:00Thanks for the comment, Tanasije!I do think Chalme...Thanks for the comment, Tanasije!<BR/><BR/>I do think Chalmers sees his arguments as revealing something about the fundamental structure of reality -- but that's not incompatible with your analogy to mathematical reasoning. While I (and maybe you?) think that mathematical reasoning is just about concepts, not about the mind-independent world, I don't think Chalmers sees it that way.<BR/><BR/>I don't think we should leave metaphysics aside -- but I do think that "metaphysical" facts are just facts about what our concepts are, or should be, rather than facts about a mind-independent reality that we tap into (somehow!) by armchair intuitions!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-31846177254444137212007-11-21T15:51:00.000-08:002007-11-21T15:51:00.000-08:00Hey Eric,You say "what has always struck me as str...Hey Eric,<BR/><BR/>You say "what has always struck me as strange about this argument is how it derives a conclusion about the fundamental structure of reality from facts about what we can conceive".<BR/><BR/>I think that you are overestimating Chalmer's argument when you say that it is a conclusion about "the fundamental structure of reality". What I see as a result of it is a purely negative claim, which simply points to an incommensurability of two notions - that of "matter" and that of "consciousness", both of which we are supposed to be able to "hold clearly before our inner eye". I think it is supposed to be analogous to how a mathematician clearly holds in his thoughts two mathematical notions, and figure out if they are commensurable or not, without having for a moment to test anything.<BR/><BR/>In my personal view, the meaning of both terms is far from clear. In light of Rylean type of criticism suddenly notions like "mind" , "consciousness" , "phenomenal experience", etc... loose that apparent clarity of things of which we are directly aware. It seems to me, we are not in better position about the concept of "matter".<BR/><BR/>Should we avoid metaphysics then, and leave the issue aside? Should we just work with the concepts which show themselves as pragmatically useful in science? We might, but it seems to me the resulting stance is not "materialism" any more than it is "dualism".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com