tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post114909016257611664..comments2024-03-25T11:49:21.281-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Why Does "Believe" Have No Present Progressive?Eric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-58626357540767928152008-05-29T12:34:00.000-07:002008-05-29T12:34:00.000-07:00Thanks for the comment, John! I'm afraid I don't ...Thanks for the comment, John! I'm afraid I don't find the example in your first paragraph compelling from an ordinary language perspective. If anyone is still reading the comments on this old post, I'd be interested to hear if you do. The latter instances of "believing" in the example are not the present progressive (as you may recognize), so your point really hangs on the first paragraph, I think.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-80235828856885192502008-05-29T08:24:00.000-07:002008-05-29T08:24:00.000-07:00Here's an example:I show the bank my credit detail...Here's an example:<BR/>I show the bank my credit details -and while they are believing them, I run off with the money.<BR/><BR/>So, there was a period when the bank comes to a position of believing them - a realisation phase; this is followed by the state of "believing". aka "my opportunity"!<BR/><BR/>When they see the money gone and realise my details are phoney, they go through a state of re-aligning their beliefs, and finally they are in a state of believing they've been had.<BR/><BR/>A similar (and maybe with more flux) example is when a magician makes the audience believe something.<BR/><BR/>I'll step away again - I just landed here on the wing of a Google bird, found it intriguing but must now get on with my task.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1149645619686496702006-06-06T19:00:00.000-07:002006-06-06T19:00:00.000-07:00I agree with you, Brad, that believing is not an a...I agree with you, Brad, that believing is not an activity that takes place over time -- that (with Wollheim) we should think of belief as a disposition that can manifest itself in various occurrences.<BR/><BR/>However, it's interesting to consider some cases close to belief. "Judging", "thinking", "wanting", "intending". We do use all of these forms in the present progressive (with varying frequency) to refer to mental occurrences. Are *they* activities that elapse over time, with which we can be busy? Maybe so, but in a relatively attenuated sense.<BR/><BR/>Why does it matter whether belief can be an occurrence? Here's why: If you say, when I occurrently judge something to be the case, that I am occurrently *believing* it, then it sounds like I believe it full stop -- and thus that (on my and Wollheim's and many others' view) I have the belief-dispositions of which the occurrence is merely a manifestation. But I think we often *don't* believe what we occurrently judge to be the case (as in my racism and God and Heaven posts).Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-1149552869174671092006-06-05T17:14:00.000-07:002006-06-05T17:14:00.000-07:00Some thoughts:(1) I am not sure this tells against...Some thoughts:<BR/><BR/>(1) I am not sure this tells against your suggestion, but I would think the lack of a present progressive results from the fact that believing is not something that takes time; it is not a process or an activity in which we engage.<BR/><BR/>Reading and running, on the other hand, are both processes or activities in which we engage - they are actitivities or processes that fill time, so to speak. I can say 'Jolie runs' and thereby assert that she has a disposition to run (or maybe just that she has run in the past.) The thing which she has a disposition to do (or which she has done in the past) is to engage in a process. <BR/><BR/>While she is engaged in that process, i.e. during the time in which she is engaged in the activity , I can meaningfully say "Jolie is running," and "Jolie has been running since time t1, and I suspect she will keep doing that until t2." Afterward I can say "Jolie was busy running from time t1 to time t2"<BR/><BR/>(2) I suspect that we do not say "Jolie is believing" because believing is not an activity or a process in which we engage. Since it is not an activity in which we engage, it cannot compete with other activities as an optional way to fill our time. Imagine I get an email chat from a friend and he writes, "Hey, Brad. Are you busy? Can you chat?" and I write back, "Sorry, I can't chat now; I'm busy believing what I am typing."<BR/><BR/>That is nutty in part because you can't be "busy" believing something. Why not? I bet it is in good part because believing is not an activity or process. (Of course trying to figure out that to believe is an activity)<BR/><BR/>(3) I note that the other uses mentioned above in the running case can't be applied to 'believe' any more than the present progressive can. These all seem odd:<BR/><BR/>"Jolie is believing that P."<BR/>"Jolie has been believing that P since time t1, and I suspect she will keep doing that until t2."<BR/>"Jolie was busy believing that p from time t1 to time t2."<BR/><BR/>(4) I am tempted to follow Wollheim and say that beliefs are dispostions which are manifest (but usually not expressed) in certain occurrant states. Would occurrant state theorists reject the suggestion that occurrant-beleif talk is just talk about states in which our beliefs are manifest?Brad Chttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12698027539432083841noreply@blogger.com