tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post1169386804734255656..comments2024-03-25T11:49:21.281-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Betelgeusian BeeheadsEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-65976484693617496332012-06-05T15:11:09.774-07:002012-06-05T15:11:09.774-07:00Todd: That's an interesting thought, that to c...Todd: That's an interesting thought, that to consciousness attribution really involves a kind of implicit comparison to what we discover in ourselves through introspection. Would that rule out the possibility of completely alien consciousnesses altogether? How about bat echolocation or magnetic senses? I guess I'm inclined to be more realist and humanocentric....Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-55837256906347683882012-06-03T22:53:46.331-07:002012-06-03T22:53:46.331-07:00The better our physical descriptions of consciousn...The better our physical descriptions of consciousness--or at least, what seems give rise to consciousness--the easier it is to see similar patterns in traditionally non-conscious systems. Like anthills or the United States.<br /><br />For what it's worth, I think you're right. Heck, maybe down the road people will look back and say, "Of course the United States was conscious! Anything with traits XYZ is a conscious entity, and the U.S. had 'em". <br /><br />For them, 'pushing the envelope' might entail arguing the same for the large-scale structure of the observable universe, or something spacey like that.<br /><br />At the same time, I think that when we say something is 'conscious' we really just mean that we think we can understand (at least roughly) why it does whatever it does by introspecting ourselves.<br /><br />We use 'conscious' as if it really meant 'like us'--and that's just a purely subjective relation. It doesn't hold in virtue of how something is organized, however much that organization might be analogous to our embodied minds, but just insofar as we recognize ourselves in that thing.<br /><br />So...I feel like arguments for X being 'conscious' on the basis of how its parts relate to each other, or how it relates to its environment...that's really just a homonym for what I recognize as consciousness.<br /><br />It's not the same thing.Toddnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-83572707297044775762012-05-30T09:29:02.036-07:002012-05-30T09:29:02.036-07:00Clasqm: Cheating? Maybe. But my intention is tha...Clasqm: Cheating? Maybe. But my intention is that the statement about people agreeing be understood as a claim about what would empirically, sociologically be the case in this hypothetical condition. Metaphysicians are of course welcome to say that the folk consensus would be wrong.<br /><br />The U.S. doesn't pair bond, of course. And it doesn't answer my phone calls. But rabbits also don't answer my phone calls either and they're conscious. (Aren't they?) And pair-bonding seems optional. And the U.S. does all other kinds of cool stuff!Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-78580319711306705532012-05-29T06:45:50.450-07:002012-05-29T06:45:50.450-07:00I went on a date with the US a few years back but ...I went on a date with the US a few years back but she stopped returning my calls...<br /><br />Seriously though you should write some sci fi!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-3579613986623385672012-05-29T04:15:39.230-07:002012-05-29T04:15:39.230-07:00Cheating, Eric! You pre-empted the consciousness i...Cheating, Eric! You pre-empted the consciousness issue when you said "Everyone agrees that Betelgeusians are conscious, of course." Which implies that consciousness is identified functionally, by interacting with living, breathing (? Betelgeusians. A Turing test for meat computers, as it were.<br /><br />Then, you turn around and try to base the determination of consciousness on an analysis of its putative subcomponents. But you've established its existence already, so this is a red herring.<br /><br />So let's apply the same test to the United States as to the BetelGeusians, shall we? Enter into a conversation with it, explore the possibility of a pair-bond ... I think you'll find the relationship a little one-sided.clasqmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12812785541545674276noreply@blogger.com