tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post2566532885289639524..comments2024-03-25T11:49:21.281-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Two Roles for Belief AttributionEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-10403789602781812212017-11-08T17:42:29.920-08:002017-11-08T17:42:29.920-08:00Is that a trend you're seeing, Eric?
I was th...Is that a trend you're seeing, Eric?<br /><br />I was thinking of asking if there are any statistics, but I guess this is kind of an invisible thing.Callan S.https://brokenmarrow.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-14634734826883160752017-11-07T09:46:01.825-08:002017-11-07T09:46:01.825-08:00Yes, something like that seems right to me, Callan...Yes, something like that seems right to me, Callan -- though probably not quite as starkly as you sketch it, in real life cases. There's not as much self-monitoring as there should be; and part of that might be due to an (implicit?) model of the mind on which one's behavior in such matters reliably reflects one's sincerely expressed opinions, without further work required.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-15929032352058118782017-11-06T06:49:44.479-08:002017-11-06T06:49:44.479-08:00How does his assertions work? It seems like it'...How does his assertions work? It seems like it's just virtue signaling, with no actual self monitoring going on. Does he self monitor? Does he self monitor but fail to detect how he's going against his own professed position? Indeed the outcome where he now thinks women and men are equal seems to not find this self monitoring important. Somehow he just becomes that way.<br /><br />If we were to draw a diagram, it seems something like this : His deeper feeling mind (circle A) commands his speaking/thinking mind (circle B) to say he believes in equality. <br /><br />But this is a one way street, just going straight out with arrows from A to B, then from B out into the world. There is no command that instead of just saying he does X, to actually self monitor as to whether he does X or not. It's just a one way street right out to the lips - I do X.<br /><br />Why have we got an example with so little said about his own state of self monitoring?<br /><br />I could propose a reason: The speaking/thinking mind thinks it is in charge - that it is all there is to the equation. And yet it faces the anomaly of the scenario, where the fellows thinking mind says he does X, but he does not do X.<br /><br />That anomaly would be better explained that the thinker is not in control in the way it thinks it is. Indeed in the way it is told to think it is in control.<br /><br />Beyond the issue of sexism, could the character also be said to have fallen into a fallacy of self control - a fallacy that actually makes them more out of control, more stampeding off into directions that aren't to do with what they profess they believe?Callan S.http://philosophergamer.blogspot.com.au/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-61768435043746154592017-11-03T09:28:27.461-07:002017-11-03T09:28:27.461-07:00You might ascribe your stick figure of a professor...You might ascribe your stick figure of a professor's twig like dispositional split to sociological roles, to further cloud the picture. Sociologists speak of a habitus for instance.<br />The reason might not lie in the stars or in our genes or dendrites but in the hat we wear and with whom we hang out<br />Just a stray thought to shower you withhoward bnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-23574761466216485522017-11-02T12:23:06.285-07:002017-11-02T12:23:06.285-07:00Thanks, Michael. Interesting. Looking back at EP...Thanks, Michael. Interesting. Looking back at EPM, it's true that he does shift from talking about beliefs to talking about thoughts in his Rylean ancestors section. I appear to have glided over a nuance in his view. I'll check out the Parsell. Thanks for the heads up.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-50195513227888958482017-11-02T11:55:51.463-07:002017-11-02T11:55:51.463-07:00About Sellars -- in EPM you will not find the acco...About Sellars -- in EPM you will not find the account of belief-talk that you attribute to him. What you will find is an account of thought-talk. I think this matters. No time for explanations now (although there is an interesting discussion in a paper by Mitch Parsell, "Sellars on Thoughts and Beliefs," Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2011): 261-275 -- one point is that thoughts are occurrences and beliefs are dispositions to have thoughts).<br /><br />Michael KremerMichaelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01218661718228745361noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-28598102244945600802017-11-02T11:24:43.074-07:002017-11-02T11:24:43.074-07:00Thanks for the thoughtful question, Anon 11:07!
I...Thanks for the thoughtful question, Anon 11:07!<br /><br />I'm inclined to think that the folk metaphysics of belief -- while not entirely developed and self-consistent -- tends to favor the idea that there is a single deep-down state that is the cause of the outward behavior, both the utterance "P" and the other belief-that-P-ish behavior. Cases like Ralph's create a prima facie challenge for this folk metaphysics of belief. There are ways of trying to resolve that challenge and say that either he really believes that P or really fails to believe that P. But my own view is that those resolutions don't entirely succeed and the folk metaphysics is mistaken.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-19000584251102366702017-11-02T11:07:09.652-07:002017-11-02T11:07:09.652-07:00Do you think that there being two roles for belief...Do you think that there being two roles for belief attribution is ultimately an indication that there are just two different dispositional states at work? I know that in past papers, you've gone more for the view that there are simply in-between belief states rather than multiple conflicting states (as in your Juliet case), but it seems strange that someone could so vehemently attest to having certain views while clearly acting against those views if there were simply one half-baked state underlying it all. The "what do you *really* believe?" question gets at this idea, I think. There is a sense in these cases that while some dispositional state is responsible for the person's testimony, there is, as you say, a "deep-down" state responsible for their behavior which is the "real" belief at work. <br /><br />In general, I'm curious about what you think the relation is between the roles and practice of belief attribution and belief states themselves, especially whether that relation (whatever it is) permits us to take the roles of attribution as evidence for a certain metaphysics of belief.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com