tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post3184340350160444505..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: "Reliability" in EpistemologyEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-52018491758846104922007-04-11T09:55:00.000-07:002007-04-11T09:55:00.000-07:00There is a relativist quality to memory, just as t...There is a relativist quality to memory, just as there is a relativist quality to the knowedge base of humanity. Custom may be the great guide to life, but at some point we need to stand up and acknowledge the variances with each person. Memory is a form of reasoning, one based on previous experience. When we turn on a light switch, we reason that the bulb will turn on because our memory tells us that is what happened last time we hit the switch. We trust our memory implicitly until we come to the concious realization that we cannot.The Irreverent Seraphhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14461329573171237045noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-86286215201639404272007-03-27T15:09:00.000-07:002007-03-27T15:09:00.000-07:00I agree with you, Clark, that we often expect too ...I agree with you, Clark, that we often expect too much of memory. But I don't think it's unreasonable to expect *something* of it. Then, on my view, we get unreliability-type-1 if it yields nothing instead of what's properly expected. We get unreliability-type-2 (Goldman-type) if it yields the wrong answer (whether it should properly be expected to yield and answer or not).<BR/><BR/>I was thinking that what-I-had-for-dinner-two-hours-ago would be in the category of what can legitimately be expected of memory without holding it to too high a standard; but I'm not attached to that particular example.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-40999529744043867782007-03-26T15:50:00.000-07:002007-03-26T15:50:00.000-07:00Eric, the problem of memory is that we're expectin...Eric, the problem of memory is that we're expecting memory to be something it was never intended to be - an absolute recording in some sense. Whereas it is at best rough notes we then have to interpret a whole out of with the notes being rewritten both when we re-remember and probably when we dream.<BR/><BR/>i.e. I don't think the memory example is a good one since it is less an issue of reliabilism than simply making a demand that memory be something it's not. It's akin to saying a car is unreliable because it can't cross the ocean.<BR/><BR/>Now my short term memory is very unreliable where my long term memory is surprisingly reliable. But I don't see that as a "system crash" kind of fault but merely the applicability of a function towards a given task. In the way that perhaps a kitchen towel isn't reliable as a paint brush but can be used as such.<BR/><BR/>The problem is our expectations of memory and the perhaps unrealistic <I>telos</I> we put it to. (And I'd argue most of the unrealistic expectations were ushered in by Descartes)Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-53249924046889741062007-03-24T19:08:00.000-07:002007-03-24T19:08:00.000-07:00Thanks for the interesting comments, Clark and Jon...Thanks for the interesting comments, Clark and Jonathan!<BR/><BR/>Clark: Epilepsy would be a general crash, but I think individual systems can crash or fail without everything crashing -- as when someone attempts to remember what they had for dinner two hours ago and simply doesn't come up with anything. That's a failure of the reliability of memory (as a failure to remember what you had for dinner Aug 16 is not) because it's something memory *should* be able to deliver. This kind of crash is common in introspection, I think, if one is sufficiently skeptical about it to let go of our general tendency to irresponsible glibness in matters introspective!<BR/><BR/>I don't pretend that this is a, or the, fundamental flaw in reliabilism (if there is a fundamental flaw) -- but I do think it's at least an infelicity.<BR/><BR/>(I should also mention Goldman's concept of "power" -- the ability of a system to generate beliefs. He can say at least some obvious things, in his vocabulary, about tradeoffs between power and reliability....)<BR/><BR/>Jonathan -- Yes, maybe Goldman could go that way, though my impression is that he wouldn't call that a failure of reliability, though he might call it a matter of having poor power. (See the parenthetic remark above.)Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-23503287624941278272007-03-23T20:07:00.000-07:002007-03-23T20:07:00.000-07:00Hi Eric, yes, what you say sounds basically right....Hi Eric, yes, what you say sounds basically right. I wonder whether we can make sense of it under the traditional understanding, though. The Goldman criteria do include "tends to produce belief"; this will admit of degrees, and maybe it's plausible to say that if it doesn't produce belief often enough, it fails to be reliable.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-77837086197275718222007-03-23T14:47:00.000-07:002007-03-23T14:47:00.000-07:00That's a really interesting take on one problem of...That's a really interesting take on one problem of reliabilism that I'd never considered. I wonder though in the context of epistemological reliabilism what a "system crash" would consist of? After all running an old buggy version of WindowME and Excel with tons of cruft might be unreliable yet I can trust the results Excel gives me.<BR/><BR/>So what is the mental equivalent of this situation? Epilepsy? And does it really have any epistemological ramifications?<BR/><BR/>It seems like you're just using in terms of introspection and suggesting that the failure isn't a failure in process (i.e. the process only works 70% of the time) but rather a failure in the sense that the equipment isn't working. But while this may be a critique for Cartesian internalists I'm not sure it really gets at what is both right and wrong in reliabilism.<BR/><BR/>(I'm sympathetic to the general approach of reliabilism - and especially this form captures our need to have trust in our judgments - but reliabilism overall just also misses what is essential in the question about knowledge in my mind - that is in terms of providing justifications)Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.com