tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post3436499057065508626..comments2024-03-25T11:49:21.281-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Choosing to Be That Fellow Back Then: Voluntarism about Personal IdentityEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger36125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-41757037220358660682015-09-15T03:23:18.139-07:002015-09-15T03:23:18.139-07:00Following on from the debates elsewhere about inte...Following on from the debates elsewhere about intellectualism, beliefs and actions, I'd guess that how Swampman acts, and how the rest of society acts, have a much greater impact than how Swampman volunteers to believe about his situation.<br /><br />Whatever Swampman volunteers to believe the rest of society will either treat him as the same (original) person or not. Or both - he could be denied his father's fortune as an inheritance because he was not the same person yet also be expected to pay taxes on the previous earnings of the original person. Legal definitions do not always match metaphysical definitions but the legal definitions are generally more pragmatic. DiscoveredJoyshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05300239909689336895noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-51144229531559703152015-09-08T08:33:11.877-07:002015-09-08T08:33:11.877-07:00David: Derek Parfit nicely shows (in my view) how ...David: Derek Parfit nicely shows (in my view) how our intuitions start to break down when we think about enough of these weird science-fictional cases. One difference between the Swampman case and the doppelganger-elsewhere case is that the Swampman case is so unlikely, so that if you ran the thing elsewhere forward, it almost certainly would not involve the re-emergence of a Swampman from the swamp -- though if you have an infinitude of worlds to play with, there will be such cases. Not sure if that quite addresses your point....Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-89631366722977822742015-09-06T06:00:38.216-07:002015-09-06T06:00:38.216-07:00"running backward" - for your teleportat..."running backward" - for your teleportation and SwampPerson examples, I see the two trajectories around the creation-destruction event in a time-invariant way. The thought experiment is swapping the metaphysical entities before and after "collision" and asking if the physics is changed. The alternative thought experiment of a population of two possible worlds running forward - one where A continues and the other where A' continues might also be useful. In both cases, the total history (joint distribution) looks the same. I want to avoid the case where copies coexist and interact with one another, as exchangeability usually assumes *independent* and drawn from an identical distribution - that one has appeared many times in SFnal contexts.David Duffynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-68356819558526277402015-09-01T14:46:59.142-07:002015-09-01T14:46:59.142-07:00Thanks for the continuing comments, folks!
Callan...Thanks for the continuing comments, folks!<br /><br />Callan: "it only matters because some people can't see the magic trick as a trick and think it matters perse. We, the ones who can see the trick as a trick, only think it matters because we think the people who can't see the trick, matter - but now we're in a kind of paternalistic role toward them. I'm not sure that turns out well at all."<br /><br />I suspect it will depend on the details of the case, how it turns out. I don't think it has to be problematically paternalistic.<br /><br />David: I'm not sure I'm getting this -- for example the running backward. Could you unpack that a little? For a radical case of exchangeability, maybe consider the Boltzmann continuants case in my blogpost of that name.<br /><br />chinaphil: I'm glad you see the connection to the Mnemonist (aka Oligarch) story. The larger project here is trying to problematize our intuitions here by presenting a wide range of cases that it's hard to tell a consistently intuitive story about. I'm also working on a multiple-selves/same-body story featuring a conscious AI toy dragon whose memories are wiped back to "Factory Settings" several times.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-57683266141581248952015-09-01T01:24:52.101-07:002015-09-01T01:24:52.101-07:00"Enough indeterminacy..."
Yes. I'm j..."Enough indeterminacy..."<br />Yes. I'm just trying to think through what those cases might be. Thinking of a older story of yours, the one with the immortal oligarchs. I think that captured something about memo memory.I think we have a very strong intuition that first person memory is a clear indicator of identity. If you have first person memories of an event (in that story mysteriously conveyed by the recorders), then I don't think society will admit that you are not that same person. <br />So I don't think swamp man or teleport will create any space for voluntarism. The one which might could be multiple selves in single body - a problem which we already deal with sometimes in patients with psychiatric problems.chinaphilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14572591745611690731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-50359984267145016372015-08-28T01:46:00.390-07:002015-08-28T01:46:00.390-07:00I sometimes wonder if the statistical idea of exch...I sometimes wonder if the statistical idea of exchangeability offer another way of looking at these problems:<br />"a number n of units [entities] is termed exchangeable in [value of a property] X if the joint probability distribution p(X1..Xn) is invariant under permutation of the units". <br /><br />Instead of asking if a difference between X1 and X2 is indiscernible, it looks at the notional population of both together. Under this approach, I guess we place Swampman before the lightning bolt and run him backwards, expecting him to uncapitulate his history; his antecedent we allow to continue forward and tell him he is a mere copy...David Duffynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79043427296620074182015-08-27T17:40:16.836-07:002015-08-27T17:40:16.836-07:00Chinaphil,
In part, the reasons for this would be...Chinaphil,<br /><br /><i>In part, the reasons for this would be consequentialist: if one could shed one's old identity by going into a swamp or a teleporter, that would allow for too easy escape from the consequences of one's actions.</i><br /><br />Too easy an escape? As in the actual person is dead, so they've escaped by death?<br /><br />Reminds me too much of Bane's origin in the Batman comics - doin' time for someone elses crime. Inexplicably.<br /><br /><br />Eric,<br /><br />Yeah, but you say it matters.<br /><br /><i>Yes, I think the ignorance can in some cases matter. The feeling that is important vs. unimportant or not even knowing about it can create or be constituted by other psychological (and social) attitudes that are partly constitutive of (what's worth calling) identity.</i><br /><br />I think such 'mattering' creates an us and them divide - it only matters because some people can't see the magic trick as a trick and think it matters perse. We, the ones who can see the trick as a trick, only think it matters because we think the people who can't see the trick, matter - but now we're in a kind of paternalistic role toward them. I'm not sure that turns out well at all.Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-15687641241732690652015-08-27T13:44:00.927-07:002015-08-27T13:44:00.927-07:00Pete: I think I would agree that it's a differ...Pete: I think I would agree that it's a difference in degree, but I'm still willing to hold on to some fixed points here, rigidifying the current (I assume) consensus that I could not become a coffee cup.<br /><br />Uziel: Yeah, I'll have to check out the Aaronson -- haven't had a chance yet. Thanks for the tip!<br /><br />Callan: Yep, it's like seeing the magic trick. If anyone thought it was *really* magic, they'll be disappointed. But they should be.<br /><br />chinaphil: I suspect it depends on the social structures -- which is probably your point. I could imagine a set up, say, where there's a high-res videorecording of the swamp and a later-discovered corpse in which a segment of society might say you aren't really the same person (maybe especially if there would be some advantage to their saying that, e.g., they want to inherit from the deceased or not let you assume the deceased's political office), and those people might even become the dominant voice. Same, of course, for the other scenarios. The voluntaristic part only matters where there's enough indeterminacy in such matters that one's commitments could be the difference maker -- yes?Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-88340359562406051502015-08-26T20:12:01.806-07:002015-08-26T20:12:01.806-07:00Just to expand a bit on how the social space might...Just to expand a bit on how the social space might constrain us:<br />"...one biological organism went in, but a different one came out...the recently congealed being ran to a certain parked car, pulling key-shaped pieces of metal from its pocket that by amazing coincidence fit the car's ignition, and drove away...So you're Swampman."<br /><br />In this case, the chances of anyone accepting that I'm not the Phil who went into the swamp seem very slim. I would not be allowed the option of choosing to be or not be that Phil - I drive his car, I remember his life and friends. In the case of the teleport, too, there isn't really any going to be any space for voluntarism. If, for some reason, Swampman or teleportman felt alienated from the Phil who went in, that would be ascribed to normal feelings of alienation. In part, the reasons for this would be consequentialist: if one could shed one's old identity by going into a swamp or a teleporter, that would allow for too easy escape from the consequences of one's actions.<br /><br />Perhaps that idea of continuity is what will condition social responses most. In one-for-one body swaps, the new body has to be the same person as the old body, because that is the only conceptual way to maintain continuity. Of course, concepts could change, particularly in the light of...<br /><br />One-for-many body swaps: I am perfectly copied, so two Phils exist. Perhaps both would accept responsibility for everything that Phil did before; they would now live separate lives, but they would both accept punishment for a crime I committed before; they would both have to deal with any emotional entanglements that I was involved in. That would create the beginnings of a split between continuity of person and unity of body.<br /><br />Many-for-one body swaps: perhaps two people could be uploaded into the same body. There would be some obvious problems: do I now love wife 1 or wife 2? But these problems don't seem to be obviously more insurmountable than the issues which individuals can get themselves into. chinaphilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14572591745611690731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71218104222588576862015-08-25T21:30:32.677-07:002015-08-25T21:30:32.677-07:00Eric,
The feeling that is important vs. unimporta...Eric,<br /><br /><i>The feeling that is important vs. unimportant or not even knowing about it can create or be constituted by other psychological (and social) attitudes that are partly constitutive of (what's worth calling) identity. </i><br /><br />Yeah, but the same can be said of superstition.<br /><br />Besides, it's also like seeing a magic trick from where you can see how it's done, vs being in the audience. You're just not part of that audience anymore when it's attitudes and constitutions.Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-64439151147453112592015-08-25T20:45:41.958-07:002015-08-25T20:45:41.958-07:00Aaronson uses QM to reach physical conclusions abo...Aaronson uses QM to reach physical conclusions about these thought experiments.uzihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16844598686217997643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-30304818894148192662015-08-25T13:05:25.235-07:002015-08-25T13:05:25.235-07:00Eric, I would treat “water” differently, but see t...Eric, I would treat “water” differently, but see the difference as one of degree instead of kind. Because (in part) of the high degrees of difficulty in getting high degrees of consensus about “person,” I lean more towards the volantarism about it. In contrast, there’s been comparative ease (not that it was wholly without difficulty) in getting consensus on water. I wouldn’t rely here on a binary distinction between those things about which there is a fact of the matter and those about which there isn’t, but on a continuum having to do with degrees of ease in achieving consensus.Pete Mandikhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10952230864825600992noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-59671545332120384062015-08-25T11:45:05.993-07:002015-08-25T11:45:05.993-07:00Unknown: It was more a general suspicion than a pa...Unknown: It was more a general suspicion than a particular one.<br /><br />Uziel: On 1 & 2: Aaronson is interesting, so I should check that out. First reaction is that it puts the cart before the horse. Hard to see how we could reach physical conclusions about quantum mechanics from thought experiments of this sort. Why not go broadly Parfitian instead, say? On 3 & 4: I think these kinds of cases are fascinating to think through, though I am a skeptic about our ability to do so well, partly for reasons articulated a couple of weeks ago in my post on how "weird minds" might destabilize ethics.<br /><br />James: Nice case. My intuitions are that social identities are much more easily changeable than personal identity and that people sometimes blur these together, so to get my own intuitions into the gray zone, I'd want to add some more to the John/Joanna case. But that might make it more science-fictiony. For example, there might be enough brain change and memory loss that people are torn about whether to hold Joanna responsible for John's crimes, etc.<br /><br />Callan: Yes, I think the ignorance can in some cases matter. The feeling that is important vs. unimportant or not even knowing about it can create or be constituted by other psychological (and social) attitudes that are partly constitutive of (what's worth calling) identity.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-31912116781195768162015-08-25T11:33:07.486-07:002015-08-25T11:33:07.486-07:00I think our views about this are pretty close, Sco...I think our views about this are pretty close, Scott, but probably there’s still a bit of daylight between them. My inclination is to think that there are facts about personal identity that are grounded in a combination of psychological facts within the person (or people), social facts (as emphasized by you and others in the earlier comments), and scientific/logical facts underneath, e.g., about species and neurons and the transitivity of literal yes-or-no token identity; plus, as theorizers we have a bit of stipulative liberty, within confines. Maybe this mirrors what I suspect is our disagreement about “belief”: You, I think, want to go more eliminativist (yes?), and I want to say it’s a mushy mess but we can make sense of it as long as we’re restrained about how seriously to take it and not expecting clear, sharp answers for problematic cases.<br /><br />On the empirical: I agree that the relevant psychological and social facts are empirically explorable, but I would downplay standard x-phi-ish answers to survey questions. The deeper facts (again, consonant with my view about belief and attitudes generally) will be less straightforwardly surveyable – issues like, does the husband still feel regret and embarrassment about what he did before the war and does the wife still credit and blame him for that stuff?<br />Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-81107517677848435662015-08-25T11:16:52.004-07:002015-08-25T11:16:52.004-07:00Eric ...Is hearing, then observing in time, that i...Eric ...Is hearing, then observing in time, that instinct sensation emotion mentation are volunteered by It, not me, and could It be employed as verification from a part (empirical) needed for oneself to Be (attitude) as a part of a seen or observed life, useful ...<br /><br />like photos without the possibility of editing because they were seen then in value...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-80247594400687525322015-08-25T04:45:04.710-07:002015-08-25T04:45:04.710-07:00Eric: "I broadly agree about the “crash space...Eric: "I broadly agree about the “crash space”, I think – but I’m not sure that anything goes, if society says it goes. I’m inclined to think that folk usage points toward a space of possibilities, but if you stray *too* far – like in the coffee mug case – you’re not really talking about personal identity anymore."<br /><br />The point is that almost nothing goes, basically. Intuitions regarding personal identity have very few degrees of cognitive freedom, all of them practical. Is this the husband I sent to war? Is this the son that contracted that fever? (If the husband or son are loving, you can bet the answer is, 'Yes,' and if they are dangerous, you can bet the answer is, 'No' (unless they were dangerous to begin with!)). As soon as we pose these questions *theoretically,* I would argue that we've leapt into crash space. Perfect X-phi territory, if you ask me (framed in a way that obviates Deutch's critique?).<br /><br />The point is, the question, it seems to be, is empirical: How do we personally identify? How do we typically cognize breaks in personal identity? I just don't see there being any facts of the matter beyond answers to questions like these. There just no issue for voluntarism to settle... How could there be?<br /><br /> Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01149191617296817611noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-14063067292757732202015-08-25T02:33:58.167-07:002015-08-25T02:33:58.167-07:00Callan: Ah, but the tags, too, look the same! They...<i>Callan: Ah, but the tags, too, look the same! They were just printed somewhere else.</i><br /><br />That's not actually possible - sure, it's possible for us to not have tags to go by. But unless we're destroying and creating matter here, matter A and matter B are matter A and matter B, not matter A.<br /><br />It feels like you're trying to say our ignorance on what it is matters to what it is, somehow?<br /><br />I think it's just crossed wires - a bit like sitting on ones arm before masturbating makes it seem someone else is doing it. Here, it's just the sense that thinking the swampman is X is in itself somehow important. Why's it feel important? Because of a numbness between the feeling of that importance and the thing that's designating it as important. Feels like it's something else/someone else doing it/the universe that is saying it's important.<br /><br />Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-38973871997932658532015-08-24T17:06:24.740-07:002015-08-24T17:06:24.740-07:00Callahan: yes, the person will feel a loss of self...Callahan: yes, the person will feel a loss of self-determination if he knows he won't be listened to, undermining his voluntarism. Also:<br /><br />Eric: here's a real world correlate. Suppose John wants everyone to know how manly he is, and wants to be treated only and always as a man. And suppose John says, "look, this is weird, but if I ever get a sex change, that's not me! I'm a man! I will always be a man!" Because this is a thought experiment, John of course eventually gets a sex change and becomes Johanna. Johanna asks that when we refer to her, we use female pronouns, even when referring to what she did prior to the sex change. But John specifically asked us not to! Johanna can tell us that she (in the John days) was just overcompensating, and please use "she" when referring to her on that fishing trip ten years ago, but still, is this disrespectful of John's clearly stated wishes? And yet, shouldn't we respect Johnanna's wishes, as she's the current inheritor of all that John had, including his stories and reputation? Or isn't she? I'm with you in that there's not a clear yes-or-no answer here, but I thought we could use a slightly less sci-fi case.<br /><br />I'm taking up some of these issues in my writing now: thanks for the conversation! Your voluntarist approach is definitely fruitful and there isn't much in the literature like it!James DiGiovannahttp://popularmetaphysics.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-14796802319920780052015-08-24T16:21:46.007-07:002015-08-24T16:21:46.007-07:00Thanks Eric, another good one. A few comments:
1) ...Thanks Eric, another good one. A few comments:<br />1) In his blog Scott Aaronson finds the paradoxes that result from the copying (Bostrom) of persons, gradual and destructive uploading (Chalmers), fission and others (even Lewis’ version of the sleeping beauty paradox in which actualization is indexical), to be so baffling that the only way to deal with them is to show that they are impossible even in principle. This leads him to conclude that the physics of the brain must rely on quantum mechanics that forbids such scenarios because of the ‘No Cloning’ theorem. That still leaves open teleportation scenarios which are a form of destructive uploading but those have their own problems.<br />2) The voluntarism option is a bit strange (I think that today I am going to be a horse ) but compatible in some sense with strongly non-deterministic approaches to QM such as closed system measurements and the one that Aaronson relates to volition.<br />3) These scenarios are great tools for exploring the self. Consider the next ‘Turing Test’, you ask a computer whether it is willing to undergo destructive uploading. What kind of an honest computer (ideal reasoner that reaches its own conclusions) would refuse to be uploaded? That is, what kind of architecture would possess it to refuse? How do you design such synthetic subjectivity? I think that these operational questions are less intractable than the ones attempting to capture the essence of the self directly and yet hard enough to teach us something important about this thing we call the self.<br />4) If you land on a planet with kind and intelligent organometallic creatures and not a single one refuses destructive uploading, watch out! If you design the computers that will design the singularity scenario computers that will run this planet (Chalmers’ AI+ machines) and you install software safeguards ensuring that AI+ will love us and only act in our interests, make sure it understands our reluctance to be destructively uploaded as well as we do. <br />Uzi.<br />uzihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16844598686217997643noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-69647355932075600282015-08-24T15:56:03.004-07:002015-08-24T15:56:03.004-07:00"I have a hunch that you’re referring to some..."I have a hunch that you’re referring to some particular person’s work on those issues, but I’m not sure who. Could you explain a bit<br /><br />Love to know more about your hunch; thank you for keeping track of so many commentors..<br />I have been working with others in Gurdjieff's ideas for exercise and work on myself;<br />been at fifty years, am retired and through work like yours have found I may have some things<br />in common with philosphy as entertaiment...I wish you guys were less dicriptive some times...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-90596186477917235322015-08-24T14:10:01.681-07:002015-08-24T14:10:01.681-07:00Thanks for the terrific comments folks – and sorry...Thanks for the terrific comments folks – and sorry for the slow reply to some of them.<br /><br />Pete: Would you take the same attitude toward “water”? If someone says, by “water” I mean to include deer, pencil sharpeners, and decomposing banana peels, have they got something factually wrong? You could say “use the word however you like, and good luck!” – but still there’s something that the ordinary use of the word “water” is getting at that doesn’t include those things. *Maybe* similarly with “same person”?<br /><br />James: “it's not just what the person in question decides, but what has been socially determined to be the case” Yes, that seems right to me! I regret not adding more of a social angle to the original post. On your conflicting pre- and post-Swampers – I’m good with that, in fact I like it, because it breaks the yes/no dichotomy that is a problem in most of the literature. For me it will be an almost immovable desideratum of a final account of personhood that it doesn’t force a simple “yes” or “no” on every case. I’d love to see a copy of your forthcoming paper, if you don’t mind!<br /><br />Kathleen: I confess to leaning toward something like a psychological account, though with social dimensions too (as James nicely emphasizes in his comment above). What do you mean by a “network model” – forgive me for not knowing!<br /><br />Callan: Ah, but the tags, too, look the same! They were just printed somewhere else.<br /><br />David: Yes, I agree with that – and also with the point about society, which now a few people have made.<br /><br />Chinaphil: “Voluntarism will only work if (a) the laws of nature do not decide these questions for us; and (b) we are able to create a social space in which voluntarism can function.” Yes – I agree with that. Not so such about statutes of limitations and expats. I suspect that in the most common sense of “person” used in Anglophone countries there is no literal change of personhood here, though there’s probably a minority sense in which there is. I take the common sense to roughly track the acceptable use of “I” (bracketing some complications like about what to do with “me” after I am dead), so that if I say, “I used to live in Boston” that creates a default presupposition that I regard the person in Boston as the same person as the person now.<br /><br />Scott: “The social function of identity will be as blind to your sentiments on the matter as it would be to metaphysical matters.” Yes, lots of people bringing up versions of this point. I allow that the social decisions of those around us will also matter, maybe even matter more (depending on the case). I broadly agree about the “crash space”, I think – but I’m not sure that anything goes, if society says it goes. I’m inclined to think that folk usage points toward a space of possibilities, but if you stray *too* far – like in the coffee mug case – you’re not really talking about personal identity anymore.<br /><br />Unknown: I have a hunch that you’re referring to some particular person’s work on those issues, but I’m not sure who. Could you explain a bit?<br />Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-76687811444479786642015-08-24T02:42:57.879-07:002015-08-24T02:42:57.879-07:00Interesting one, James! And the bracketed part - a...Interesting one, James! And the bracketed part - are you saying the person (before being swampmanned) will feel his wishes wont be listened to and thus feel a loss of control/self determination?Callan S.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15373053356095440571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-11714174329837676652015-08-22T17:49:35.999-07:002015-08-22T17:49:35.999-07:00Quick one: suppose a man knows he's gonna be s... Quick one: suppose a man knows he's gonna be swampmanned, and tells people that the future swampman is not to be treated as him, and he refuses to identify with this coming swampman. But then the swampman demands to be treated as continuous with the man. We can only respect the voluntaristic self-determination of one of them, so we have a voluntarism conflict. (We can assume that if this happens enough a pre-swampman person might know that he'll be disrespected in this regard and thus feel the absence of self-determination even before the swampman appears.)Jameshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14283934167817397007noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-50137126780111137352015-08-22T10:45:06.692-07:002015-08-22T10:45:06.692-07:00Eric...Your, 'Here are two thoughts in support...Eric...Your, 'Here are two thoughts in support of voluntarism about personal identity'<br /><br />(1.) 'it seems to 'me' that I can, to some extent, choose how to conceptualize these cases.'<br /><br />(2.) 'And since important features of personhood depend in part on the person in question ......thinking of the past or future self as 'me'---'<br /><br />These thoughts turn some of us toward Identity, in... the activity of Me...the passivity of Personhood...the neutrality of Meaning...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-69961001707366351952015-08-21T18:12:21.754-07:002015-08-21T18:12:21.754-07:00Very interesting continuing comments, folks! This ...Very interesting continuing comments, folks! This is very helpful. I spent the day in a flurry of writing, and I try to prioritize the family on weekends -- so more specific reactions on Monday. Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.com