tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post4917007762768286494..comments2024-03-25T11:49:21.281-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: Performative Belief: The Blurry Line Between Acting As If You Believe and Really BelievingEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-78925692003650012062020-04-27T10:20:02.855-07:002020-04-27T10:20:02.855-07:00You might find Hans-Georg Moeller's and Paul D...You might find Hans-Georg Moeller's and Paul D'Ambrosio's "Genuine Pretending" book on the Zhuangzi very interesting. Bao Puhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03170595347995655777noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-44893630719467708422020-04-26T20:29:44.377-07:002020-04-26T20:29:44.377-07:00The examples of performative belief remind me of P...The examples of performative belief remind me of Plato's belief/knowledge distinction in the Protagoras (350s), at least as I understand it, mostly following Penner: A belief acquires knowledge status when it is "strong" or stable enough to be maintained across contexts. The usual goto examples are things like believing you should refrain from indulging in much cake when away from it, but the belief doesn't stick around in contexts with cake. I'd take performative belief to be a species of Plato's not-strong belief, the relevant contextual factors being social.<br /><br />Also, some people seem to only have these beliefs. Whether that's a mere seeming and defect of introspection and observation or psychologically real. Do you take it to be conceptually possible for someone to have only performative beliefs? If it is, then there seems to me to be a nice causal story to tell explaining some of BPD's symptoms in terms of trauma configuring the mind to overrely on performative beliefs or even fail to develop other belief-making mechanisms. If not, then their introspection must be incorrect, which requires a rather different set of solutions.Nichi Yeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08657162697069022996noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-71643500252853006812020-04-25T13:40:21.106-07:002020-04-25T13:40:21.106-07:00I’m in complete agreement professor. Furthermore ...I’m in complete agreement professor. Furthermore as is sometimes the case I’d like to take your post a great deal further. <br /><br />I am a moral relativist, which is to say that I consider standard moral notions to exist as social tools from which to manipulate us to whatever dogma that we happen to be subjects of at a given point in our lives. My central thesis is that value itself does not exist as what’s moral, but rather as something which is produced in the head. Thus we’re all self interested products of our circumstances in the quest for this head based value stuff, though as such we tend to formally deny this nature in order to better conform with the social tool of morality. Here we tend to praise notions like “altruism” in order to benefit from the approval of others. Maintaining such a façade tends to increase the potential for our heads produce what’s actually valuable to us. <br /><br />The problem however seems to be that psychologists are thus tasked with grasping our nature, though as subjects of these social dynamics have been unable to yet break free of the need to pacify group doctrines. I suspect that this helps explain why the field has not yet been able to develop any broad generally accepted theory regarding our function. If I’m right then such a theorist would tend to be vilified as a common hedonist! Thus it may be that the field of philosophy will need to help psychology harden up by means of developing a community of respected professionals which is armed with something like my single principle of axiology. It states: <br /><br /><em><strong>It’s possible for a machine which is not conscious (like a brain), to produce a punishment/ reward dynamic from which to drive the function of something that is conscious (like yourself). </strong></em><br /><br />Such a community should help clear the way for psychologist to finally explore their domain amorally, which is to say in the manner that harder forms of science are able to. Recently my friend Liam interviewed me about a post I did on the matter for his YouTube channel. Beyond being way too nervous, I guess for a first try I didn’t do all that poorly. <br />https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQZSHif1CA8 Philosopher Erichttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11126076811765843302noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-46657873676548248202020-04-25T13:38:22.615-07:002020-04-25T13:38:22.615-07:00Is our believing and reasoning a use of energy...
...Is our believing and reasoning a use of energy...<br /><br />Can we extract a value in the way our energy is used...<br /><br />Are our use of energies possible values here on this planet...Arnoldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02580641063222662041noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-34536026779727247032020-04-25T06:42:43.909-07:002020-04-25T06:42:43.909-07:00It strikes me that a lot more of our beliefs are e...It strikes me that a lot more of our beliefs are either performative, or have performative origins, than most of us are comfortable with. And I'm not confident this is an area where introspection reliably tells us the difference. It may just be telling us a useful social story.SelfAwarePatternshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11856665627652130336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-945030379804552020-04-24T19:17:38.464-07:002020-04-24T19:17:38.464-07:00This all seems right, but are you taking the upsho...This all seems right, but are you taking the upshot to be that there's a third category to recognise ('performative beliefs') distinct from belief and performance, or that there's a distinctive type of belif here ('performative'), or that this is a class of cases indeterminate between belief and performance (lying on the 'blurry line')? <br /><br />Luke Roelofshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05462649815665164176noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-61491472160084286012020-04-24T12:09:52.347-07:002020-04-24T12:09:52.347-07:00Both aspects. You're right that it's wort...Both aspects. You're right that it's worth thinking a bit more carefully about difference between the social conditions under which you'd express deeply held beliefs vs those under which you'd express performative belief. There's social contingency in both, and probably a good range of gray cases, but somehow there seems to be more or different contingency as one tends toward the performative end.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16274774112862434865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-90800234520794929522020-04-24T10:22:32.694-07:002020-04-24T10:22:32.694-07:00Is what makes it "just an act" the fact ...Is what makes it "just an act" the fact the the performative Monstro-denouncer doesn't have the corresponding internal dispositions? Or is it that their external dispositions only manifest in a suitable social context? If it's the latter, then there's a sense in which every belief is just an act. One only says anything in suitable social contexts, and there are other social contexts in which one would keep quiet or say something else.P.D. Magnushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07799239684943144310noreply@blogger.com