tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post6724988083094053511..comments2024-03-28T19:14:33.619-07:00Comments on The Splintered Mind: An Objection to Some Accounts of Self-Knowledge of AttitudesEric Schwitzgebelhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-23080507303821073432013-02-27T09:50:50.605-08:002013-02-27T09:50:50.605-08:00Thanks for the thoughtful comment, Anibal! I'...Thanks for the thoughtful comment, Anibal! I'm also updating the post with a reply from Carruthers himself.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-22401023063870885862013-02-27T06:33:34.197-08:002013-02-27T06:33:34.197-08:00To my lights Carruthers´model of introspection and...To my lights Carruthers´model of introspection and his division (introspection for perceptual states and not for cognitive states like judgements and decisions)is counterintuitive. <br /><br />I can´t explain why evolution shapes organisms that only can introspect its affective states, but not its cognitive ones. Monitoring and assesing cognitve states seems to me adaptive because allow organisms to change behaviour to attain a goal.<br /><br />Furthermore, i believe he is confusing consciousness with introspection. That confusion leads him to suggest that because we can´t introspect judgements and decisions then judgements and decisions are unconscious.<br /><br />With respect to apply "mindreading" mechanisms to know about oneself sounds odd to me. I know introspection as classically conceived fails (Schwitzgebel 2008) but we are not so strange to ourselves tat we need to "mindread" our own minds as if we are "the other whithin us" Anibal Monasterio Astobizahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03121020811080165520noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-4261558167101543492013-02-26T08:49:43.893-08:002013-02-26T08:49:43.893-08:00Ted: Thanks for the thoughtful comment!
I'm n...Ted: Thanks for the thoughtful comment!<br /><br />I'm not sure about "most often". In fact, the whole thing is a bit hypothetical, given my concerns about the representational-storage/belief-box architecture. That's part of why it's framed more as an objection to Carruthers and Nichols & Stich than as a positive account. They're more Belief-Boxy in their cognitive architectural commitments than I am. The extension to the non-Belief-Box architecture is pretty hand-wavy!<br /><br />Your defense of the dedicated mechanism view might work better for someone like Hill than for Nichols & Stich. Nichols & Stich are committed to its being a substantial piece of cognitive architecture, different in kind from ordinary reasoning, that can break or double-dissociate from other types of mechanisms. Some other views, like maybe Hill's, seem open to having a lighter touch about how independent the "mechanism" is from other types of thinking.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-23181844362859672222013-02-25T19:01:03.980-08:002013-02-25T19:01:03.980-08:00Hi Eric,
I'm a big fan of the pluralism paper....Hi Eric,<br />I'm a big fan of the pluralism paper. Yet given your pluralism, how seriously are we to take the view you offer here? Pluralism means that self-knowing does not always work this way, but it's not very interesting to say that there is at least one instance of such self-knowing. Would you say that this is how we most often self-know? <br /><br />Also, I think you have a point against Carruthers, though I'm less sure about the dedicated mechanism view. With the belief-box metaphor, there is talk of belief as "ready to be accessed," and of "calling up" a desire... Without the belief-box metaphor, there is still the claim that "Whatever _mechanisms_ allow me to reach conclusions and act, based on my beliefs and desires, should also allow me to reach conclusions about my beliefs and desires" (my underline). <br /><br />If a mechanism allows me to reach conclusions/act "on the basis" of what I believe/desire, isn't that a mechanism which at some level tracks what I believe/desire? And isn't that essentially what the dedicated mechanism view says?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-63870886732226323312013-02-25T17:35:38.875-08:002013-02-25T17:35:38.875-08:00Thanks for the thoughtful comment, Gary! I agree ...Thanks for the thoughtful comment, Gary! I agree with Carruthers that we can do interpretation, and often do in fact do interpretation as an important part of the process. And you're right that speaking strictly the fact that we could hypothetically do what I describe is no knock on Carruthers' view if it can be shown that we don't in fact do what I describe.<br /><br />But I do think that the considerations I raise make a strong prima facie empirical case that Carruthersian interpretation isn't the whole picture. As a matter of empirical fact, we can deploy the belief that P to ground all sorts of inferences and actions. If he is going to say, "but not this one particular form of inference!" he's going to need a darn compelling empirical case, which I don't think he has.<br /><br />Carruthers does nicely review empirical evidence that suggests that we can make mistakes in patterns that suggest that self-interpretation is an important part of the self-attributive story. I think he deserves a lot of credit for highlighting how big a part of the story it is, in contrast with almost all other recent philosophers. But it's a big leap from that to the anti-pluralist conclusion that processes like the ones described in the post can play no role.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-4057628364091166872013-02-25T17:18:18.129-08:002013-02-25T17:18:18.129-08:00Hi Eric,
You say:
"I can go straightaway, i...Hi Eric,<br /><br />You say:<br /><br />"I can go straightaway, in normal cases, from pulling up P to the conclusion "I believe that P". If that's how it works, no dedicated self-scanning mechanism or self-interpretation is required"<br /><br /><br />I don't really see how this is an argument against Carruther's view. After all, he wouldn't deny that it'd be <i>possible</i> to do some theoretical creature construction and design a cognitive system that works without heavily relying on a self-interpretation mechanism. But Carruther's view is not that cognition necessarily has to involve a self-interpretation mechanism but that that we *in fact* have such a mechanism, and he uses a variety of evidence to support the view (mainly from studies on confabulation). At the very least, one would have to challenge his empirical case in order to argue against his position, which is a factual claim about human cognition actually works. That is, it doesn't seem enough to say "I can imagine human cognition works like X" when Carruthers claim is "As a matter of contingent fact, cognition works like Y". Carruther's seems to acknowledge that we'd be more rational/efficient cognizers if we didnt always have to go through the hassle of self-interpretation of sensory images. But for contingent evolutionary reasons, this is what humans are stuck with for better or worse.Gary Williamshttp://philosophyandpsychology.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-60936135634152177622013-02-25T15:53:15.481-08:002013-02-25T15:53:15.481-08:00Bearistotle: That seems to me basically right. Ju...Bearistotle: That seems to me basically right. Just as I will ascribe Joe the belief that P when he says "P" and there are no countervailing considerations, so also for very similar reasons in my own case.Eric Schwitzgebelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11541402189204286449noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26951738.post-79753206420677388712013-02-25T15:18:16.057-08:002013-02-25T15:18:16.057-08:00Is it right to understand Carruthers as proposing ...Is it right to understand Carruthers as proposing that we have testimonial evidence of our own mental states, where we are the source of that testimony?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com