Abstract:
Rationalization, in our intended sense of the term, occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory epistemic relevance, if that factor then biases the person’s subsequent search for, and assessment of, potential justifications for the conclusion. Empirical evidence suggests that rationalization is common in ordinary people’s moral and philosophical thought. We argue that it is likely that the moral and philosophical thought of philosophers and moral psychologists is also pervaded by rationalization. Moreover, although rationalization has some benefits, overall it would be epistemically better if the moral and philosophical reasoning of both ordinary people and professional academics were not as heavily influenced by rationalization as it likely is. We discuss the significance of our arguments for cognitive management and epistemic responsibility.
Full paper here.
Thoughts and comments welcome, as always -- either in the comments field of this post or by email to me or Jon.
...statistical knowledge verses self knowledge...in the discoveries of the meta-world...
ReplyDelete...(reading) your draft does verify rationalizations today can only to be written...
...satisfying comparisons for epistemitive understandings...
...unsatisfying comparisons for cognitive comprehensions...