There's a story about Max Scheler, the famous early 20th century Catholic German ethicist. Scheler was known for his inspiring moral and religious reflections. He was also known for his horrible personal behavior, including multiple predatory sexual affairs with students, sufficiently serious that he was banned from teaching in Germany. When a distressed admirer asked about the apparent discrepancy, Scheler was reportedly untroubled, replying, "The sign that points to Boston doesn't have to go there."
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That seems like a disappointing answer! Of course it's disappointing when anyone behaves badly. But it seems especially bad when an ethical thinker goes astray. If a great chemist turns out to be a greedy embezzler, that doesn't appear to reflect much on the value of their chemical research. But when a great ethicist turns out to be a greedy embezzler, something deeper seems to have gone wrong. Or so you might think -- and so I do actually think -- though today I'm going to consider the opposite view. I'll consider reasons to favor what I'll call Schelerian separation between an ethicist's teaching or writing and their personal behavior.
Hypocrisy and the Cheeseburger Ethicist
A natural first thought is hypocrisy. Scheler was, perhaps, a hypocrite, surreptitiously violating moral standards that he publicly espoused -- posing through his writings as a person of great moral concern and integrity, while revealing through his actions that he was no such thing. To see that this isn't the core issue, consider the following case:
Cheeseburger Ethicist. Diane is a philosophy professor specializing in ethics. She regularly teaches Peter Singer's arguments for vegetarianism to her lower-division students. In class, she asserts that Singer's arguments are sound and that vegetarianism is morally required. She openly emphasizes, however, that she herself is not personally a vegetarian. Although in her judgment, vegetarianism is morally required, she chooses to eat meat. She affirms in no uncertain terms that vegetarianism is not ethically optional, then announces that after class she'll go to the campus cafeteria for a delicious cheeseburger.
Diane isn't a hypocrite, at least not straightforwardly so. We might imagine a version of Scheler, too, who was entirely open about his failure to abide by his own teachings, so that no reader would be misled.
Non-Overridingness Is Only Part of the Issue
There's a well-known debate about whether ethical norms are "overriding". If an action is ethically required, does that imply that it is required full stop, all things considered? Or can we sometimes reasonably say, "although ethics requires X, all things considered it's better not to do X"? We might imagine Diane concluding her lesson "-- and thus ethics requires that we stop eating meat. So much the worse for ethics! Let's all go enjoy some cheeseburgers!" We might imagine Scheler adding a preface: "if you want to be ethical and full of good religious spirit, this book gives you some excellent advice; but for myself, I'd rather laugh with the sinners."
Those are interesting cases to consider, but they're not my target cases. We can also imagine Diane and Scheler saying, apparently sincerely, all things considered, you and I should follow their ethical recommendations. We can imagine them holding, or seeming to hold, at least intellectually, that such-and-such really is the best thing to do overall, and yet simply not doing it themselves.
The Aim of Academic Ethics and Some Considerations Favoring Schelerian Separation
Scheler and Diane might defend themselves plausibly as follows: The job of an ethics professor is to evaluate ethical views and ethical arguments, producing research articles and educating students in the ideas of the discipline. In this respect, ethics is no different from other academic disciplines. Chemists, Shakespeare scholars, metphysicians -- what we expect is that they master an area of intellectual inquiry, teach it, contribute to it. We don't demand that they also live a certain way. Ethicists are supposed to be scholars, not saints.
Thus, ethicists succeed without qualification if they find sound arguments for interesting ethical conclusions, which they teach to their students and publish as research, engaging capably in this intellectual endeavor. How they live their lives matters to their conclusions as little as it matters how research chemists live their lives. We should judge Scheler's ethical writings by their merit as writings. His life needn't come into it. He can point the way to Boston while hightailing it to Philadephia.
On the other hand, Aristotle famously suggested that the aim of studying ethics "is not, as... in other inquiries, the attainment of theoretical knowledge" but "to become good" (4th c. BCE/1962, 1103b, p. 35). Many philosophers have agreed with Aristotle, for example, the ancient Stoics and Confucians (Hadot 1995; Ivanhoe 2000). We study ethics -- at least some of us do -- at least in part because we want to become better people.
Does this seem quaint and naive in a modern university context? Maybe. People can approach academic ethics with different aims. Some might be drawn primarily by the intellectual challenge. Others might mainly be interested in uncovering principles with which they can critique others.
Those who favor a primarily intellectualistic approach to ethics might even justifiably mistrust their academic ethical thinking -- sufficiently so that they intentionally quarantine it from everyday life. If common sense and tradition are a more reasonable guide to life than academic ethics, good policy might require not letting your perhaps weird and radical ethical conclusions change how you treat the people around you. Radical utilitarian consequentialist in the classroom, conventional friend and husband at home. Nihilistic anti-natalist in the journals, loving mother of three at home. Thank goodness.
If there's no expectation that ethicists live according to the norms they espouse, that also frees them to explore radical ideas which might be true but which might require great sacrifice or be hard to live by. If I accept Schelerian separation, I can conclude that property is theft or that it's unethical to enjoy any luxuries without thereby feeling that I have any special obligation to sacrifice my minivan or my children's college education fund. If my children's college fund really were at stake, I would be highly motivated to avoid the conclusion that I am ethically required to sacrifice it. That fact would likely bias my reasoning. If ethics is treated more like an intellectual game, divorced from my practical life, then I can follow the moves where they take me without worrying that I'll need to sacrifice anything at the end. A policy of Schelerian separation might then generate better academic discourse in which researchers are unafraid to follow their thinking to whatever radical conclusions it leads them.
Undergraduates are often curious whether Peter Singer personally lives as a vegan and personally donates almost all of his presumably large salary to charitable causes, as his ethical views require. But Singer's academic critics focus on his arguments, not his personal life. It would perhaps be a little strange if Singer were a double-bacon-cheeseburger-eating Maserati driver draped in gold and diamond bling; but from a purely argumentative perspective such personal habits seem irrelevant. The Singer Principle stands or falls on its own merits, regardless of how well or poorly Peter Singer himself embodies it.
So there's a case to be made for Schelerian separation -- the view that academic ethics and personal life are and should be entirely distinct matters, and in particular that if an ethicist does not live according to the norms they espouse in their academic work, that is irrelevant to the assessment of their work. I feel the pull of this idea. There's substantial truth in it, I suspect. However, in a future post I'll discuss why I think this is too simple. (Meanwhile, reader comments -- whether on this post, by email, or on linked social media -- are certainly welcome!)
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Follow-up post:
"One Reason to Walk the Walk: To Give Specific Content to Your Assertions" (Sep 8, 2023)
I think a work of ethics should be evaluated independently of how the author lives unless it bears on understanding the author’s intent.
ReplyDeleteNormally you don’t need to know the biography of an author before picking up a book.
On the other hand, if the principles espoused seem to be blatantly violated by the author you may reevaluate your interpretation.
Did Thomas Jefferson’s owning slaves violate his stated principles (“All men are created equal”) or did it show that they didn’t apply to black people?
You can be disappointed in Jefferson on either interpretation.
Suppose we imagine a person who is completely devoted to the practice of yoga. This person deeply believes that not only is their daily yoga routine good for their body, but also that yoga is the path to an enlightened existence, up to and including moral excellence. As it turns out, this person acts, on the whole, morally better than your average person.
ReplyDeleteWe could then sit and wonder whether the practice of yoga is effective in making people behave morally better, but I think that would be to miss the point. What is doing the work in this imaginary case, I would argue, is the belief that yoga makes one morally better and the commitment and work the person puts in to follow the outputs of that belief and try to make it a reality. It has nothing to do with the yoga itself. Yoga could be anything. (note that I do think certain things might be better than others at actually helping people act morally better, but that is besides the point I am trying to make.)
I think this is easier to see here since, at least on the face of it, yoga doesn't have a strong or "obvious" (whatever that means) connection to morality, but I think the same thing is happening with the study of ethics. You can study, teach, and write about ethics all day long, but it won't do a bit of good for making you act morally better if you don't both believe it will and then work very, very hard to actually follow out the conclusions of your ethical thinking. Why would it? Just as we wouldn't expect your average yoga enthusiast to behave any better.
The difficulty is that it just SEEMS like ethicists should behave better since the subject and the behavior appear to be so closely related (they even share a name!). But I have really come around to the idea that in order to behave morally better you (generally) have to want to and try. Usually paired with a belief that the method you are using to try and be morally better is actually a viable way to do it. Doesn't seem to me any longer, sadly, that studying ethics alone would ever reliably get anyone to living a more moral life.
(I still think narrative is an effective way of changing people's moral beliefs and possibly making them WANT to be morally better, for what it is worth!)
Thanks for the comments, folks!
ReplyDeleteDan: Yes, good point! I agree that interpreting intent, or more generally assessing the content of an ethical claim, can sometimes depend on looking at the person's life; and Jefferson is a great example. (I've used that exact example myself elsewhere: http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2021/03/love-is-love-and-slogans-need-context.html). In general, one of my main thoughts on the other side of Schelerian separation is that ethical slogans tend to lack content without a context that makes it clear how they apply to particular cases, and one's own life is an opportunity to provide such a context.
Chris: Interesting thought and example about yoga. I'm inclined to think that ethics can or should have a somewhat tighter connection to behavior than that. Maybe it's necessary that one want and try to become morally better, and that one think that the practice of studying ethics will help in that; but I'm inclined to think that ethics is not just a generic X that can serve that role. The specific content of ethics (unlike the specific content of yoga on the understanding of yoga you are employing in your example) is intimately connected to the ethical improvement. So I'd suggest that more is probably going on -- or at least could be going on, when ethics is done in a way that actually leads to moral self-improvement.
That makes sense to me and is fair enough! I do think that "Ethics ... is intimately connected to the ethical improvement" sounds like it should be obviously right but might not be. Also, I think "when ethics is done in a way that actually leads to moral self-improvement" is smuggling in a lot of motivations and beliefs and other stuff that might be closer to my line of thinking.
ReplyDeleteEither way, fun stuff! At the end of the day I do desperately want you to be right, though.
It helps I think to distinguish between more extreme cases, like Scheler or the hypothetical blinged-out, Maserati-driving Singer, and less extreme ones, like the real Singer or the rest of us who fail, to one degree or another, to live the lives we believe we ought to. In the extreme cases we seem forced to conclude that the author just doesn't believe what they write. It raises an interesting question: In evaluating philosophical work, of what significance is it that the author actually believes? It's true that the arguments are still there, and may be sound. At least in many cases, though, I think it would make sense to re-evaluate the work if we discovered that the author in no way believed.
ReplyDeleteThe less extreme cases are I think much easier to deal with. Rival approaches to ethics seem to agree on at least one thing: Living a good life is hard. Ethicists are built from the same crooked timber as other humans. We should not be surprised when they fall short in the ordinary ways that people do, and it shouldn't I think diminish our estimation of their work.
This view has probably already been expressed, either explicitly or implicitly. It seems to me that if one is going to wear the label, one has some obligation to wear the clothing. I think, in order to be considered ethical, one need also have a sense of honor, honesty and integrity. If that is not abundantly present, in deed as well as word and demeanor, then the emperor has no clothing. Ergo, it is nobody's fault but his own. I have elsewhere written on arrogance, ignorance, narcissism and pride. These attitudes may compete with one another, such that one end of the continuum overwhelms the other. Now then, ignorance may be held harmless. It is only the inability to pay attention after all and many good people exhibit ignorance. Still, is is the company of the other lesser angels. Association is inevitable.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the continuing comments, folks!
ReplyDeleteJim: Yes, I agree that it makes sense to distinguish more radical misalignments from smaller ones, with the latter being much more readily explainable and less telling. One possible comparison for the radical cases is a scientist who doesn't believe their own conclusions. It's not *directly* telling, but one might wonder why. (More on this in a future post.)
Paul: That's a bit strongly put, by my way of thinking. There's something to the Schelerian separation idea and the idea that ethicists needn't model themselves as saints. And yet, I agree that some connection with personal life is reasonable to expect.
You've referenced metaphysics last post and metaphilosophy this post...
ReplyDelete...Ethically your view on their meanings might help with some the world's problems...
My view, metaphysics is presence in knowing or being...
...metaphilosophy is explaining presence, knowing and being...
In today's encyclopedias, it's as though Aristotle never meant...
...metaphysics to be part of philosophy then or now...
That I am here too, can be a question...
Hi, Eric. See my comment on Philosophy Talk, re: making a more moral world. Yes, I read a lot of blogs. It is free. Mostly. In any analysis, making a moral world depends on the actors. Roads go right, left, or not at all. None of us are either good, bad or indifferent, save those who lack responsive consciousness. They are just not 'there' yet. If, and only if, we do get, *there* is marginally important. No one can,have it both,ways, because of interests,motives and preferences. The inherent conflict between competition and cooperation...
ReplyDeleteThis took a long time ,because of AI misinterpretation. How quaint is that?
ndeterminate
Some philosophers distinguish between morality and ethics, where morality is what is right to do handed down from an authority. The key point isn't whether ethicists should be moral; rather as with your typical undergraduates, violating morality handed down by an authority is hypocrisy while violating ethics is a character flaw,
ReplyDeleteSo Scheler is both a hypocrite, as judged as an authority in a social situation and lacking character, from an ethical point of view
And as a final minor point, violating ethics may differ based on what ethical theory you use: I presume Scheler is a virtue ethicist whereas Singer is Utilitarian (I think) That would make a difference
I guess I understand drawing a distinction between virtue and utility, although I don't really see where/how that makes a difference that MAKES a difference, unless equivocation is justifiable? From a pragmatic viewpoint, I don't think it is. Perhaps this is one reason, if not THE reason some moral philosophers are saying morality does not much matter. If morality has degenerated to a level of nihilism, then those moral philosophers are absolutely right, yes? Or, failing that deduction, Mill's utilitarianism was right, a priori? Scheler is not guilty, by default, because we can *explain his culpability away*? Sorry, I just don't agree with that reasoning.
ReplyDeleteI like the academic detachment argument. And I think it does offer a reason to suppose that ethicists might not necessarily be more personally ethical than other people. But I think it does carry an implication: if these ethicists are doing all this theoretical research, freed from the constraint of having to live the ethical values they investigate, then we would still want that research to pay off at some point. We would want progress on ethics in the real world.
ReplyDeleteI think we have ethical progress - in the form of democracy and advanced legal systems and controls on war and generally improving treatment of minorities - so I think the condition is fulfilled. I just wanted to point out the condition: saying that ethicists' work is theoretical, rather than personal, gets them off the hook for "practicing what they preach"; but it puts them on another hook for preaching well enough to make it worth keeping them around.
Thank you, Phil!
ReplyDeleteI could not frame this.
You did.
Pragmatism is not dead yet.
"The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals"...Wiki
ReplyDelete...A book where in 'Darwin explores the animal origins of such human characteristics as the lifting of the eyebrows in moments of surprise and the raising of the upper lip in an aggressive sneer.'...
Then ethics for philosophy, today ethics for metaphysics...
...learning walking the walk is the material of matter...
And just so.
ReplyDeleteKen Wilber.
Last millennium.
Consciousness bothers us. Arnold's comment on Darwin's pronouncements is illustrative, I think. Though it represents what was suspected at the time, it does not; could not represent what we know now...which is part, at least, why consciousness bothers us. Much has been written of Darwin's intuition and genius. He clearly got some things right, for which we owe him much. The animal expressions, as they do or do not relate to our own, are signal. But primary consciousness was a beginning. Did/do our frowns, sneers and other *body language* emanate from primary consciousness? Historiographically, it is important. However, many other factors have entered the picture, since Darwin and his genius. It is more difficult to be responsively conscious now. We are just too frigging busy. Monitoring our devices for spelling and context takes far too much time.
ReplyDeleteJust two quick thoughts. 1, this brings to mind the debates over the amoralist, the person who makes moral judgments but is not motivated by them. E.g.,
ReplyDeletehttps://philpapers.org/browse/amoralists
2, I can't help thinking of the LaFollette and May paper on child hunger. In talking about the purpose of morality, they write, it sits between "Milquetoast expectations which merely sanctify what people already do" and excessively demanding expectations. Morality should help us grow and mature, they say. As goals, then, moral judgments "must be within reach, but not easily reachable." Is this right? If so, shouldn't we often fail? (And I want to add, maybe each in our own ways.)
A big, perhaps Freudian question about Professor Scheler.
ReplyDeletePerhaps for this poor fellow he wasn't good enough to be good.
We see being good as an obligation or a hardship, as it is for many,
Or perhaps he felt he did enough by pointing out what is good. Or perhaps as in certain places, some of which I've lived in, there is no abstract notion of good applying to all equally but roles we play and the authority who doles out the law, gets a little slack in return
A good point, Howie, I think. That there are people who lack ethical/moral awareness,which begs a question about arrogance, ignorance, narcissism and pride. (See: my remarks @ Values of the wise, VOW, by Merchey). People are overwhelmed by selfishness, as the arrogant,ignorant,narcissistic and prideful may be,then anything getting in the way of THAT sort of *selfness* is short-circuited. Whether society at large,frowns upon this, is immaterial to the self-indulgent. In his own tunnel vision, all ends are justified by whatever means necessary. I don't mind Freud, or those who praise or criticize him. Did not have to read it. Have lived through it all and more. The notion of a disgraceful public official,yet being allowed to run for office is outside my comprehension. But,hey,in January of 1969, I never expected to live here again either. No lo contendre...
ReplyDeleteThanks for the continuing comments, folks! I'll just add one thought on Walter's point: There's something a bit odd about seeming to decide in advance that one's moral conclusions will be somewhat demanding but not too demanding. Why not follow the arguments where they lead, whatever level of demandingness results?
ReplyDeleteYou're getting to the meat on the plate, Eric. My own version of this says people participate in contextual reality: by this I mean they make it up as they go. It is not new. Every despot and tyrant has had a version. In polite conversation, it is dubbed, *ideology*. Or, it may be called belief, under the blanket of matters of faith. It was never solely the aim and intention of despots and tyrants. However, now, in a free-for-all world, it spills into all aspects of common discourse. End of rant.
ReplyDeleteI have a paper under review arguing that we don't like hypocrites because they are people who signal (through pronouncements and blame) their commitment to norms they are, in fact, not sufficiently committed to. Allowing dishonest signalling to proliferate unchecked can make it hard to know what norms particular agents can be counted on to follow (ie who we can cooperate with and rely on), and enables people to gain reputational benefits from being seen as a member of particular moral tribes without paying the costs of entry. Interestingly, deontologists (well, people reporting more deontological intuitions) are preferred as cooperative partners (even by consequentialists!) because they are seen as being more morally predictable; when consequentialists are made to seem more predictable, the preference reverses.
ReplyDeleteI think the tension arises from uncertainty about whether academic talks or firm opinions should be considered in the same category as e.g. religious sermons and outrage at norm violations. My theory-laden intuition is that in most contexts, asserting everyone should P comes quite close to signalling one is committed to the norm, raising worries about hypocrisy, but that when the cheeseburger ethicist makes clear that they can't be counted on to be vegetarian, and is not disposed to blame other meat eaters, that they aren't being hypocritical.
Adam:
ReplyDeleteA phrase you used got me thinking about another heard through the philosophy grapevine. The term you wrote was dishonest signalling. As framed in your comment, it sounds a lot like virtue signalling, which has been happening for at least a couple of decades.I heard IT through Stanford and the connotation was negative. So, as a practical matter, are they interchangeable? Many bits of language come and go. I try to pay attention, without spending too much time. Your paper sounds like something of interest to me.
Thanks.
One of the inherent problems in the analysis is the fact we are all living in a period of widespread social media connections and instantaneous communication. There is virtually no time for consideration or contemplation for that certain portion of the population which seems to get swept up in the “issue of the moment” and then giving a knee-jerk response, using shooting from the hip “verbal bullets”.
ReplyDeleteThe consequence is the surrender of our collective opportunity to try things on for ourselves independently, in the privacy of our own thoughts and to then give it due consideration, without being imposed upon by mass opinions and consensus.
This rush to judgment presumes, at least by some, the opinions and judgments must be correct, simply because a larger group agrees with the premise. The problem is there are no guardrails to this process. This is particularly evident in the situation involving philosophy Professor Stephen Kershnar, who taught at SUNY at Fredonia and is now on extended “sabbatical” for pondering a question about Adult-Child sex - something I personally find morally abhorrent. From what I can gather, Professor Kershnar is of the same opinion. Does that really matter though?
In my view , the entire situation is quite irksome and harkens back to a time when oath helpers were used to vouch for the integrity of the accused. This concept, in simple terms “the more - the better”, clearly has the potential (and the effect) of turning justice and philosophy on its proverbial head.
Thanks for the continuing comments, folks!
ReplyDeleteAdam: Yes, I'm inclined to agree with the implicit signaling function of academic ethical endorsement, and maybe that (partial) analysis of hypocrisy too. But then I do think the epistemic issues discussed in this post arise even for the non-hypocrite who explicitly cancels the signal.
Alfred: I agree that these are serious concerns. My own inclination is to embrace demanding norms but use a soft touch with blame and enforcement.