Monday, January 22, 2007

Philosophy Grad School Applications -- Reflections from the Other Side

Update: I've started an expanded series of reflections on this topic here.

I'm on the admissions committee this year for U.C. Riverside's Philosophy graduate program. Since many readers of this blog are aspiring grad students (or recently were) or sometimes advise students applying to philosophy graduate school, I thought I'd share some of my thoughts on the process.

Letters of recommendation (advice for letter writers): Reading hundreds of letters of recommendation, things become something of a blur. Most letters say "outstanding student" or "I'm delighted to recommend X" or "I'm confident X will succeed in graduate school in philosophy". It would be strange not to say something of this sort, but still -- my eyes start to glaze over. I suspect that trying to detect nuanced differences in such phrases is pointless, since I doubt such nuances closely track applicant quality. More helpful: (1.) Comparative evaluations like: "best philosophy major in this year's graduating class"; or "though only an undergraduate, one of three students, among 9, to earn an 'A' in my graduate seminar"; or "her GPA of 3.87 is second-highest among philosophy majors". (2.) Descriptions of concrete accomplishments: "Won the department's prize in 2005 for best undergraduate essay in philosophy"; or "President of the Philosophy Club".

Regarding those little checkboxes on the cover sheet ("top 5%, top 10%" etc.): My impression is that letter writers vary in their conscientiousness about such numbers and have different comparison groups in mind, so I tend to discount them unless backed up by specific comparison assessments in the letter.

Letters of recommendation (advice for applicants): Three strong letters makes a better impression than three strong letters and one mediocre letter. We can forgive applicants for not having the full three letters in on time, since we know professors are often flaky -- but still a gentle email reminder to your letter-writers around the time of the deadline might help. Also, it's a little strange when a letter-writer's description of your interests diverges from your own. So show your them at least your statement of purpose (preferably your whole application). You might also offer the letter writers a "brag sheet" describing any concrete accomplishments you have or specific hardships you've overcome (though be judicious about the latter).

Lists of awards, resumes, etc.: Long lists of minor accomplishments tend to blur before my eyes. Of course you made honor roll!

GRE scores: UCR requires them. I don't take them that seriously, but some others do. High GRE scores can help applicants win extra fellowship money. We certainly admit some students with mediocre GRE scores. At UCR I'd say below 1250 is a strike against an applicant, above 1400 is a bonus.

Writing sample:
I skim the whole sample of every plausible applicant and try to read a few pages in the middle carefully. First, the sample must be clearly written and show a certain amount of philosophical maturity. (I can't say much about how to achieve these things other than to be a good writer and philosophically mature; I think they're hard to fake.) Second, what I look for in the middle is that the essay gets into the nitty-gritty somehow. In an analytic essay, that might be very detailed analysis of the pros and cons of an argument, or of its non-obvious implications, or of its structure. In a historical essay, that might be a very close reading of a passage or a close look at textual evidence that decides between two competing interpretations. Many otherwise nicely written essays stay largely at the surface, simply summarizing an author's work or presenting fairly obvious criticisms at a relatively superficial level. Applicants should be sure to have at least one professor look over the sample, critiquing it specifically for its suitability in an application.

Transcripts: Overall GPA matters, but even more so one's upper-division grades in philosophy. We like to see mostly A's. A few A-'s or lower grades are okay. It also depends on the institution: A 3.8 average in philosophy from Stanford looks different from a 3.8 average from a Cal State. Unfortunately, master's programs, small liberal arts schools, and foreign universities vary widely in how rigorously they grade, making transcripts hard to assess. Guidance from the letter writers (e.g., this is the highest GPA among graduating seniors) can help considerably here.

Statements of Purpose: These are hard to write well. Many are somewhat, or even painfully, corny: "Ever since I was seven years old, I've puzzled over the timeless problems of philosophy." Others seem phony; others seem arrogant or like a sales pitch. Fortunately for candidates, we're used to it. The best statements, to my mind, simply describe the applicant's areas of interest in philosophy, with perhaps some description of particular sub-issues of special interest. We then ask ourselves: Do the applicant's interests fit with what we can teach?

Personal Contact or Connections: Such things don't help much, I suspect, unless they bring substative new information. If a professor at UCR at some point in the past had a good substantive, philosophical conversation with an applicant and mentions that to us, that might help a bit. But seeking out professors for such purposes could backfire if it seems like brown-nosing, or if the applicant seems immature, arrogant, or not particularly philosophically astute.

New Blog for Florida Philosophy Students...

here. (Welcome to the blogosphere!)

Friday, January 19, 2007

Evil and Failure to Reflect

Today I'd like to consider a view somewhat in tension with my series of posts on what I call the "problem of the ethics professors" -- the problem being that they don't seem to be any more virtuous than the rest of us. (Empirical data here and here.)

It's tempting, perhaps, to suppose in light of ethicists' remarkably ordinary blend of virtue and vice, that philosophical moral reflection is of no use to moral development. But that conclusion is troublingly cynical. If philosophical reflection about ethics -- which is, really, often nothing more than just thoughtful consideration of what's right and wrong -- yields no moral benefit, what's the point? Just to know better our wickedness? It's pretty darkly pessimistic to suppose that reflection, and consideration of the best historical and contemporary writing on virtue, duty, and justice, is powerless to produce moral improvement.

It's appealingly worldly, perhaps, to think poorly of the morality of ethicists; but then, I think, you owe yourself a story about how and why philosophical reflection fails. And I doubt the easiest stories here ("the problem with ethicists is that they ignore the Bible" or "philosophical ethics suppresses moral emotion") will work, at least not without considerable supplementation.

Here are two further thoughts that incline me not to dismiss the value of moral reflection so lightly.

First, there's the remarkable lack of moral reflection common among the perpetrators of great crimes. I'm struck by this, especially, in reading Holocaust literature. It's a famous theme, of course, in Hannah Arendt's portrayal of Eichmann, an expert in the logistics of shipping Jews to death. Albert Speer's well-known book Inside the Third Reich -- conceived while serving prison time for his role as an architect in Hitler's inner circle -- is to my mind amazingly unreflective about the moral dimensions of his activity, focusing instead on such issues as Hitler's movie-watching habits and how the Allies should have attacked ball-bearing factories. I can't help but wonder whether more morally reflective people would be less likely to be swept up in such evil. (Of course, there's the case of Heidegger....)

And second: In the famous Milgram experiment, subjects are persuaded to shock (they think) a screaming, protesting (and eventually eerily silent) man in an adjoining room for the sake of an experiment on learning. They begin by giving a mild shock as "punishment" for a wrong answer, with instructions to increase the level of shock with each wrong answer. Eventually, they believe they are delivering shocks of 300 and even 450 volts (marked "danger" and "xxx" on the instrumentation) to the victim. When subjects protest, they are placidly told, by a man in a lab coat, that they are to continue and that the shocks cause no permanent tissue damage. It's hard to know for sure, but I suspect that most subjects who paused for a while to genuinely reflect, in a philosophical way (why am I shocking this man? do we have any right to keep him here despite his protests? might there be some real risk to his life or health that his experiment doesn't justify?), would refuse to continue to shock the victim. No?

Philosophical moral reflection, powerless to improve behavior? We should not adopt that view lightly. But then we're left again with the problem of the ethics professors.

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Liberating On Liberty (from the Library)

Whew! I got some good linkage from my last post on ethicists stealing books, lifting this blog into the rarefied territory of almost thousand visitors a day -- peanuts for the likes of kottke.org and ordinary for Cognitive Daily -- but virtually a populist revolution for me.

The previous post about missing ethics books focused entirely on books first published in 1960 and later. I promised a separate analysis of classic, older texts. Here it is.

I looked at 10 classic (pre-1900) texts outside of ethics and 12 classic ethics texts. Selection criteria were a bit complicated; but please let me know, readers, if you think there are classic philosophy books I should have included on the lists below but did not include that are: (a.) influential, (b.) widely checked out, (c.) either clearly in ethics or clearly outside of ethics (not a blend), and (d.) generally published under separate cover (not as part of a general anthology including both ethics and nonethics texts by that author). The libraries I looked at were: UC Berkeley, UC Irvine, UCLA, UC Riverside, UC San Diego, UC Santa Cruz, Harvard, Stanford, Cornell, Columbia, Princeton, Michigan, and Texas.

I looked at missing books both as a percentage of books off-shelf (where "off shelf" means either checked out or missing/lost) and as a percentage of holdings. Data were collected over winter break so as to minimize effects due to texts being assigned for a particular class. (I will collect comparison mid-term check-out data in a month or so.)

The results, then, by book:
(Author, Title, Missing as % of off shelf, Missing as % of holdings)
Ethics:
Aquinas....Summa Theologica.......8.1%....1.2%
Aristotle..Nichomachean Ethics...11.6%....1.9%
Bentham....Principles of Morals..14.3%....1.4%
Hobbes.....Leviathan.............22.4%....3.6%
Kant.......Groundwork............22.0%....2.2%
Kant.......Metaphysics of Morals.12.5%....1.7%
Kant.......Second Critique.......12.9%....1.7%
Locke......Treatise of Gov't.....19.3%....2.3%
Mill.......On Liberty............30.4%....5.0%
Mill.......Utilitarianism........27.6%....2.2%
Plato......Republic..............19.7%....2.9%
Rousseau...Social Contract.......30.0%....3.4%
Total Ethics.....................19.4%....2.6%

Non-Ethics:
Bacon......New Organon.............3.3%...0.6%
Berkeley...Principles.............11.1%...1.0%
Brentano...Psychology Empirical....0.0%...0.0%
Descartes..Meditations.............6.1%...0.7%
Frege......Grundlagen.............29.4%...6.9%
Frege......Geach & Black trans.....0.0%...0.0%
James......Principles of Psych.....6.3%...1.7%
Kant.......First Critique.........10.1%...1.8%
Kant.......Third Critique..........3.6%...0.9%
Locke......Essay Concerning Human.16.3%...1.6%
Total Non-Ethics..................8.7%....1.4%

In sum, the classic ethics texts were about twice as likely to be missing, overall, than the non-ethics texts (p < .001; one-proportion tests, two-tailed).

A few books were outliers, with substantially higher checkout numbers (Plato [132] and Aristotle [95]) or substantially lower (Berkeley [18], Brentano [6], Frege [17 and 7], Bentham [21], and Kant Metaphysics of Morals [16]). (Instability due to small sample size may explain the highly variable results on some of the latter books, esp. Frege.) Excluding these books left short lists of books with very comparable holdings and checkout rates, and large enough holdings and checkouts for some statistical stability. Ethics books were still about twice as likely to be missing. (The odds ratios actually went up a bit.)

Looking by book, excluding those books with fewer than 25 off shelf, almost all the books with above-average missing rates are ethics books; almost all those with below-average rates are non-ethics. This effect was so pronounced that even with such a small sample of books (6 non-ethics, 10 ethics), the difference in the mean percentage missing was statistically detectable (7.6% vs. 20.4%, p = .001; 1.2% vs. 2.6% p = .005).

P.S.: I should add that due to the different types of courses classic ethics and non-ethics books are typically assigned for, and due to the high -- and perhaps not comparable -- rates of checkout by undergraduates, I think these data are not as revealing as the data described in my earlier post, which focused on a larger set of more comparable books, likely to be checked out only by professors and advanced students.

Monday, January 15, 2007

Philosophy Graduate Students Say the Most Peculiar Things

In the holiday spirit, I thought I'd post a few of the more memorable utterances of my fellow graduate students when I was a Berkeley in the 1990s. To give credit where credit is due, I'll use their names. I don't think they'll be embarrassed -- they shouldn't be! -- and I hope they'll forgive me if they are. (I'll remove their names from this post if they request it.)

David Barton, sitting in his usual spot on the couch in the graduate student lounge (a place he occupied sometimes for long stretches): "Work, schmerk. Kant, Schmant. For all x, schmex."

Josh Dever, sitting in a hottub, holding up the chlorinator: "This is the name I'll give to my first child." Someone else: "You'll name her 'chlorinator'?" Josh: "No, her name will be this object. If you want to refer to her, you'll have to include this chlorinator in your sentence." (Josh never did follow through with this intention, though.)

An undergraduate had written a paper on Kierkegaard including the following sentence: "Being a knight of faith is like falling off a never-ending cliff into water, hitting various flying things along the way." What can a T.A. do with that? John Holbo struck upon the perfect solution: He circled "flying things" and wrote in the margin "do you mean birds?", then photocopied the page and put it on a corkboard in the graduate student lounge.

Friday, January 12, 2007

Do Ethicists Behave Better Than the Rest of Us? Peer Opinion

Do you think that ethicists, in general, behave morally better, worse, or about the same non-ethicists? I've often posed this question to other philosophers in informal conversation. Most of my interlocutors say "about the same" or "worse"; only a few say that ethicists behave overall better (which would seem to comport with my findings that ethicists steal more books).

Josh Rust and I distributed a questionnaire on this issue at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association a few weeks ago. Josh sat at a table near the book exhibit and offered people snacks in exchange for filling out a questionnaire. The questionnaire came in two versions. Version A asked respondents to compare the moral behavior of the ethics professors they knew first to the behavior of non-ethicists in philosophy and second to that of non-academics of similar socio-economic background. Version B asked similar questions about the moral behavior of the specific ethicist in their department whose name comes next in alphabetical order after theirs (looping from Z to A if necessary). All questions used a scale of 1 to 7, from substantially morally better (1) to about the same (4) to substantially morally worse (7).

54 respondents completed Version A. The mean result on Question 1 (ethicists vs. non-ethicists in philosophy) was exactly 4 ("about the same"). On Question 2 (ethicists vs. non-academics of similar social background) the mean result was 3.9 -- which was not statistically different from 4, given the relatively small sample size. In other words, philosophers when asked their general opinion about ethicists, thought they behaved about the same as non-ethicists.

One interesting trend in the data had to do with academic rank: Undergraduates and distinguished professors were the most sanguine about the behavior of ethicists, assistant professors the least sanguine. Here are the mean responses to Question 1, divided by rank (the means for Question 2 are very similar):

Undergraduate: 3
Graduate student: 3.8
Adjunct instructor, lecturer, or post-doc (non-tenure track): 4.1
Assistant professor (tenure track): 4.6
Associate professor: 4.3
Full professor: 4.3
Distinguished professor: 3.3

Given the small sample, though, it's hard to know whether the appearance of a trend here (with the grimmest views around tenure-time!) is simply chance.

On Version B, the results looked better for the ethicists, with means of 3.4 (Question 1) and 3.2 (Question 2), both statistically different from 4.0. In other words, philosophers thought, on average, that the ethicist next after them in the department roster behaved both better than the rest of the department and than non-academics of similar social background.

So which is it? Do ethicists behave better or not? Which version of the questionnaire better reflects real philosophical opinion? An argument can be made either way. Version A might be misleading due to something like what psychologists call a saliency or availability effect: When asked to think about the moral behavior of ethicists, perhaps the first cases to come to your mind will be cases of particularly nasty ethicists. Version B attempts to control for that, but people may be overly charitable to individuals when asked to compare them to a group -- it may be easier or more comfortable to attribute below-average moral behavior to a group than to a particular individual you know.

Josh and I hope to sort some of these issues out with a longer questionnaire to be distributed at another meeting -- if we can get permission!

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Doubts about (One Kind of) "Purkinje Afterimage"

The eminent 19th century physiologist and vision scientist Johann Purkinje wrote:

Often I have been surprised that blinking the eyes does not disturb sight, assuming that during the blink complete darkness must occur. On closer observation however, I found that the visual field of the open eye, with all its lights and images for a short time remains before the mind, after the eyelids are closed. The more attentively I comprehend a single not very extensive image, the longer I am able to hold it with closed eyes before the mind. This afterimage is precisely to be distinguished from dazzling images [Blendungsbilde; afterimages caused by bright light?]. The afterimage can only be held longer by free activity and disappears as soon as the will diminishes, though it can by the same action be called back again; dazzling images float automatically before the mind, disappearing and appearing again for objective reasons.

[Translations of other related passages are posted in the Underblog here.]

Later psychologists in the introspective tradition (right through Brown's 1965 influential review of the literature on afterimages) often took for granted that such momentary positive images exist, though Purkinje's remarks about the the involvement of the will and the distinction from "Blendungsbilde" were largely neglected.

Close your eyes. Blink a few times. What do you think? Are there "Purkinje afterimages" of this sort?

I think I sometimes experience a positively colored "dazzling image" that quickly fades -- for example, if I look for five seconds at the flourescent light overhead, I seem to experience an afterimage of its bright bars for a fraction of a second after I close my eyes, and before the usual "flight of colors" sets in. Maybe I also have the experience after staring at my computer screen awhile. But I can't find such a momentary image when I'm looking in ordinary conditions at ordinary reflective surfaces -- my bookcase, for example.

I wonder how much Purkinje, in this passage, is driven by a perceived need to explain the lack of interruption in the blink. To the extent that's what's driving him, I'm suspicious -- partly because I think it possible that a blink does momentarily disturb visual experience, and partly because Dennett has convinced me (in his marvellous book Consciousness Explained) that often we don't notice even fairly large gaps and lacunae in our visual experience (temporal gaps, blind spots, impoverished information from the periphery) if there's no particular epistemic need that's going unfulfilled.

There are also temporal issues. Brown describes the "first positive phase" of the afterimage as starting after about 50 milliseconds and continuing for about 50 milliseconds. That's pretty fast! Given the speed of neural processing, our experience in general probably runs some tens of milliseconds behind environmental input (at least unexpected input). So there are issues, at least, about how one draws the line between ordinary visual experience, possibily slightly delayed relative to a brief and unexpected stimulus, and "afterimages", conceived as something distinct from that.

I also worry that once the existence of such images was admitted into the introspective literature, later authors would be reluctant to deny their existence, from fear of being seen as less introspectively expert than those who make such fine judgments about their afterimages: "Well Purkinje saw it, and I see it. If you don't, maybe you're just not well enough attuned to your own experiences, well enough practiced at introspection!"

Tuesday, January 09, 2007

Philosophers Carnival #41 is...

here!

(Thanks to Westminster Wisdom!)

Monday, January 08, 2007

Still More Data on the Theft of Ethics Books

Last month, I noted that ethics books are more likely to be stolen than non-ethics books in philosophy (looking at a large sample of recent ethics and non-ethics books from leading academic libraries). Missing books as a percentage of those off shelf were 8.7% for ethics, 6.9% for non-ethics, for an odds ratio of 1.25 to 1. However, I noted three concerns about these data that required further analysis. I've now done the further analysis.

Here are the concerns:

(1.) Older books are more likely to be missing, and the ethics books were on average a couple years older than the non-ethics books.

I addressed this concern by eliminating from the sample all books published prior to 1985. This brought the average age of the books to the same year (1992.9 for ethics, 1992.7 for non-ethics). On these reduced data, the ethics books were still more likely to be missing: 7.7% to 5.7%, for an odds ratio of 1.35 to 1 (p = .015).

(2.) Ethics books are more likely to be checked out than non-ethics books in philosophy, and there is a tendency for books that are more checked out to have a higher percentage of the off-shelf books missing -- not just a higher percentage of the holdings missing, but a higher ratio of missing to off-shelf-but-not-missing.

I addressed this concern by further reducing the sample, eliminating all the "popular" ethics and non-ethics books -- those cited at least 5 times in the relevant entries of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (This left only fairly obscure books, presumably known to and borrowed by only professors and advanced students in the field.) This actually seems to have increased the effect: 8.5% to 5.7%, for an odds ratio of 1.48 to 1 (p = .026).

(3.) Finally, some people were concerned that maybe law students were driving the effect. Therefore, finally, I eliminated from analysis all "law" books, defined as those books for which at least 10% of the U.S. holdings were in the four law libraries included in the analysis (UCLA, Harvard, Stanford, and Cornell law). This had little effect: 8.3% to 5.7%, odds ratio 1.46 to 1 (p = .044). Also, the percentage of ethics books missing from the four US law libraries was only 7.0%, versus 8.3% for the US non-law libraries.

So it's not (supposedly vicious) law students. And it's not a bunch of (supposedly conscience-impaired) undergraduates stealing Rawls. The effect is large, and statistically significant, just looking at books likely to be borrowed only by professional ethicists and students with a serious scholarly concern with ethics.

Based on these data, it seems indeed that ethicists do steal more books!

Coming soon: I did a similar analysis of the thefts of "classic" texts in ethics and non-ethics -- e.g., Mill's On Liberty vs. Descartes' Meditations. Any predictions?

Friday, January 05, 2007

Online Journal Psyche Seeks New Editors

The online journal Psyche seeks two new editors in chief (one philosophical, one empirical) to replace Timothy Bayne. A copy of the advertisement is here in the Underblog. If you're an established scholar with an interest in shaping a major journal and a new scholarly medium, please consider applying!

Thursday, January 04, 2007

Directional Olfaction?

Philosophers tend to take it for granted that our sense of smell is directional or spatial only in a very attenuated sense: We can infer where a scent is coming from (using background knowledge), or we can piece it together by moving about and noticing if the smell is getting stronger or weaker, but at any particular instant a smell is either here or not here, to some degree of intensity. Scents are not fundamentally and intrinsically experienced as coming from a particular direction. (This view goes back at least to Condillac, in his famous example of the statue endowed only with a sense of smell.)

An interesting article, by Jess Porter and others, in the current issue of Nature Neuroscience challenges this view. Subjects were blindfolded, equipped with noise-blocking earmuffs, and given knee- and elbow-pads and workgloves, then asked to track an olfactory trail that bent across a lawn (produced by a string that had been soaked in diluted odorant). They crawled on hands and knees, noses near the ground. Most could in fact follow the trail. (Woof!)

Each nostril draws smell from slightly different regions of space (a fact Porter and colleagues presented as "contrary to the common notion" but which at least used to be widely known among research psychologists -- as discussed, e.g., in Titchener's [1901-1905] Experimental Psychology). This raises the possibility of directional, "stereo" smelling -- discerning the directionality of a scent by the difference between its strength in the two nostrils.

To support this idea, Porter and her colleagues had subjects perform the task with one nostril closed or wearing a "nasal prism device" intended to mask the stereo effect by creating one "virtual nostril". As predicted, these manipulations significantly impaired performance on the scent-tracking task.

Unfortunately, it seems to me that those last results might be explainable by supposing a general decrease in olfactory sensation, rather than a specific cancelling of the stereo effect, since it's not clear that the researchers tested sufficiently whether having one nostril closed or wearing the "nasal prism" impaired olfactory ability generally.

(Thanks to Paul Hoffman, by the way, for the pointer to the Porter article.)

Tuesday, January 02, 2007

Harvard's Collection in Klingon

I recently noticed that Harvard lists "Klingon" among the languages in its book collection -- languages you can use to limit your search in its electronic catalog. Unfortunately, limiting my search for "Kritik der Reinen Vernunft" (Critique of Pure Reason) to Klingon yielded no results. Neither did I have any success with "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft" (Critique of Practical Reason).

Why this distressing lack of attention to Kant among the Klingons?

The University of California, by the way, does not list Klingon among its languages in its online library catalog, Melvyl. I should send a note to the collection development people here at UC Riverside. We can't have Harvard showing us up like this now, can we?

Friday, December 15, 2006

Brief Hiatus

I'll be off skiing with my family at Mammoth Mountain next week -- so definitely no blogging for me Sunday-Wednesday. I might be able to squeeze a little in next Thursday or Friday, or I might not! (I'll try at least to respond to comments.) Then the week after, too, I'll be in and out of town, so I won't be back on my regular schedule until the new year.

My mother (67 years old) is a maniac skier, and used to sometimes race Super G in the 55+ category. When I was a kid, she did a lot of part-time ski patrol in the mountains near L.A., and I'd tag along. By the time I was 17, the only people better than me were professionals. I had a particular affection for cutting new lines through the crud between the trees -- the steeper the better (Alta, with its weird traverses, was great for this). I haven't skied much since then, but if my son (now seven) takes to it, maybe I will!

A Sampled Experience: Beep 1.1

Regular readers may know that Russ Hurlburt and I have a book forthcoming with MIT Press. Russ and I interviewed a woman -- "Melanie" -- about randomly sampled moments of her experience while wearing a beeper. The book centers on lightly edited transcripts of those interviews. The reader can see what Melanie says about her experience, how Russ and I, in our different ways, question her further about it, and -- both in the dialogue and in side boxes -- how Russ and I disagree about how far to believe her and how to connnect what she says with existing literature in philosophy and psychology.

I'm thinking that periodically, I may feature one of the "beeped" experiences on this blog. Today: Beep 1.1. Melanie says that she has an episode of inner speech or inner hearing paced faster than normal speech, but not rushed; and she says she experiences the humorousness of that thought (the one expressed by the inner speech/hearing) as a kind of "rosy-yellow glow" surrounding her. Two of the interesting questions -- interesting to me at least -- that arise from this sample are:

* Does inner speech normally transpire at the same rate as outer speech, or does it often go faster?

* Do normal (non synaesthetic) people often experience color with their emotions -- like "seeing red" when angry? Or should we take attributions of color to emotions more metaphorically?

Let me invite you to read the transcript for yourself. Comments welcome!

Wednesday, December 13, 2006

A Curious Effect of Vibrating Phones

Sometimes -- not often, actually -- I set my cell phone on vibrate. I keep it in my left front pocket. Now, it seems to me that I feel vibrations at the top of my left leg periodically, even when the phone is not vibrating, even when the phone is not in my pocket at all. I was reminded of this a few days ago when a colleague remarked on a similar experience.

My question is: What's going on here?

Here's one possibility. Primed to feel subtle vibration against that part of my leg, I sometimes misjudge whether there is vibration. Well, maybe! But here are my qualms. On the one hand, if the judgment here is supposed to about the vibration of an external object against my leg, I don't think I'm actually (or at least not usually) making that judgment. Rather, I'm judging that there's a vibrating feeling resembling the feeling when an object vibrates against my leg. But -- and this is the "other hand" -- if the judgment is just about my experience, it seems at least a little strange to say that I'm wrong in that judgment, i.e., wrong that I am experiencing a buzzing feeling of a certain sort -- though maybe!

Here's another possibility: My body is constantly -- or frequently -- abuzz with vibrations, or vibration-feelings, of various sorts, but I rarely notice them. Having the cell phone has attuned me especially to vibrations at the top front of my left leg, so now I notice them there, whereas I didn't before. Quite possibly so! But that's a pretty rich view of experience. It doesn't seem now, as I've been sitting here typing, thinking about buzzing feelings, and even pausing occasionally to reflect on whether anything is buzzing, that my bodily experience is so rich with sensation. On the other hand, it has only been about 20 minutes. If I feel five hundred buzzes a day, and one -- the one I notice -- is in that exact location on my leg (which I'd estimate to be about 1/500 of my body surface), then I should expect a buzz only about... well, doing the math (assuming 16 waking hours), actually about every two minutes! Hm!

Or maybe the buzzing is a new experience, arising somehow from the fact that I have a readiness to feel buzzing in the location, and accurately apprehended as an experience when it occurs. I do now occasionally "buzz" at the top of my leg, as a result of carrying that phone in my pocket, whereas I didn't before. Though this also seems slightly strange, it is perhaps the most appealing possibility -- intellectually appealing I mean! At another level, I'm not sure I like the idea that I've added a buzz to my stream of somatic experience....

Monday, December 11, 2006

When Do You Know You're Speaking to Yourself?

Here's an issue Al Mele and I discussed last week during his visit to UCR: Let's say you're talking silently to yourself and you are aware of the fact that you are doing so. Are the inner speech and the awareness of it strictly simultaneous? Or might there be a delay, on the order of some tens of milliseconds, between the phenomenology of inner speech -- the subjective experience of speaking -- and the knowledge or judgment that you are innerly speaking?

Why do I care about this? Well, the question is diagnostic of more general views about consciousness and self-knowledge. For example, if you think -- as I am inclined to think -- that our phenomenology, or subjective experience, is one thing and our judgments about that phenomenology or experience are quite another -- then you might assume that there must be some sort of causal process, and hence delay, between inner speech and the knowledge of it. On the other hand, if you think that phenomenology or subjective experience essentially involves self-awareness, then you'll probably reject the possibility of any delay between the felt experience and the judgment or knowledge that one is feeling the experience. (I think the latter assumption was implicit in Mele's talk, which is how we got started talking about it.)

More complicated views are possible, too. For example, one might draw a distinction between "dispositional" knowledge (a mere readiness to reach the right judgment about your inner speech, say) and "occurrent" judgment (an actually occuring thought about your inner speech), and say the first is simultaneous with the inner speech, the second slightly delayed. Or one might think that the felt experience of innerly speaking is part of the judgment that one is innerly speaking (a la Shoemaker); and then the exact causal and temporal relationships might be hard to tease out. Or like Dennett, you might resist the idea that there are temporal facts this precise about consciousness.

Another complication is that if the inner speech is intentionally excuted, you have a kind of ongoing knowledge of it as it is occuring as a result of the fact that you know you are (or are about to) put your intention into action. Correspondingly, if I plan to type a word, I know that I am doing it as I am doing it not entirely by virtue of seeing it spelled out on the page. But given my propensity for typos, it's probably true to say that I don't really know that I've typed a word until I actually see it correctly on the page; so the knowledge is delayed, after all. Likewise, perhaps, if we don't always execute the inner speech we plan to -- and that itself is an interesting question: can we, and if so how often do we, err in executing our inner speech intentions? -- the knowledge might not come until after we have, as it were, innerly heard our inner speech. On the other hand, there's something weird -- too many moving parts? -- in the idea that we have to innerly hear (or the like) our inner speech to know that we've said something to ourselves....

Friday, December 08, 2006

Do Ethicists Steal More Books? More Data

I've finished collecting data relevant to the question of whether ethics books are more likely to be missing from libraries than non-ethics books in philosophy. You might think ethics books would vanish at a lower rate, if the people interested in them were influenced by the contents! (See this post for some earlier discussion.)

I was led to gather these data by what I call The Problem of the Ethics Professors -- the fact, or apparent fact, that ethics professors seem to behave no better than the rest of us. This is perhaps one small, imperfect way of assessing the presupposition behind that question. If I'm wrong, and ethicists really do behave better than the rest of us, perhaps this will reveal itself in their library habits?

It doesn't. For this analysis, I constructed a list of ethics books in philosophy and a comparison list of non-ethics books. The ethics list was derived from all the ethics books reviewed in Philosophical Review from 1990-2001 -- mostly technical work in philosophy principally of interest to advanced graduate students and professors -- combined with all the books originally published after 1959 that appear it at least five different bibliographies in the ethics entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (including political philosophy, legal philosophy, and history of ethics, but excluding philosophy of action and moral psychology). The comparison list was composed of about 1/3 of the non-ethics books from the same issues of Phil Review (randomly selected, and excluding philosophy of action, moral psychology, and philosophy of religion), combined with books appearing in at least five different SEP entries on philosophy of mind or language (excluding philosophy of action and moral psychology).

I then looked at the holdings of these books at the libraries in UC Berkeley, UC Irvine, UCLA, UC Riverside, UC San Diego, UC Santa Cruz, Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, Columbia, Cornell, Michigan, and Texas, as well as all the COPAC libraries in Britian, which includes all the major university libraries. (I won't get into the principles of library selection.) A paid research assistant helped me with some of this!

I sorted the information into five categories: On shelf; checked out but not overdue; overdue one year or less; "missing" or more than one year overdue (which I will interpret as also missing); uninterpretable (e.g., "record unavailable").

Here are the uninterpreted numbers:
Ethics books:
Total holdings: 14,551
Total out or missing: 3,708
Total overdue or missing: 780
Total missing: 305

Non-ethics books:
Total holdings: 9,584
Total out or missing: 1,764
Total overdue or missing: 176
Total missing: 113

Obviously more ethics books are overdue and missing, but of course more are also held and checked out. The most interesting figures, I think, are these:

Overdue or missing, as a percentage of those off shelf:
Ethics: 21.0%
Non-ethics: 10.0%

Missing, as a percentage of those off shelf:
Ethics: 8.2%
Non-ethics: 6.4%

An ethics book is more than twice as likely to be overdue, given that it is off the shelf, and about 25% more likely to be missing!

The first difference is statistically significant at p < .001, the second at p = .02, using a simple one-proportion test (two-tailed, of course!).

Now obviously there are confounds. I'm trying to work on straightening those out, and I'll hopefully report more on them next week. I'd be interested to hear suggestions for further analyses.

Here are three worries I have:
(1.) Ethics books are more checked out than non-ethics books, and there is a correlation in the data between number checked out and percentage of those off shelf that are missing or overdue.
(2.) Older books are more likely to be missing than more recent books, and the weighted average age of the ethics books (weighted by number of checkouts) is about two years earlier than that of non-ethics books (1989 vs. 1991).
(3.) It might be those pesky law students! How will things look if I exclude philosophy of law texts or exclude results from law schools?

As far as I can tell from preliminary analysis, controlling for (2) or (3) slightly reduces the effect, but a statistically significant difference remains. Controlling for (1) seems to eliminate the second effect, but not the first.

Wednesday, December 06, 2006

Ethics Books More Popular in Britain

I've been crunching numbers all day in service of my inquiry into whether ethicists steal more books. I was hoping to post results on the blog today, but it looks like it will have to wait 'til Friday. Now I have to dash off to dinner with Al Mele, who just gave a very interesting talk criticizing Libet's work on the timing of decisions and what that has to say about free will.

But here's a tidbit to reflect on in the meantime. In a sample of British academic libraries (those showing checkout information in COPAC -- virtually all the major universities in Britain), major ethics books are about 2.5 times more likely to be checked out than non-ethics books. This applies across the board, from major texts (like Theory of Justice) to texts primarily of interest to a narrow group of specialists. In the United States (looking at the UC's, Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, Columbia, Cornell, Michigan, and Texas), ethics books are still more likely to be checked out than non-ethics books (about 1.6 times), but that difference pretty much vanishes if one excludes a handful of exceptional texts with interdisciplinary appeal in law and women's studies.

Is this a sign that British academics take ethics more seriously than those in the U.S.?

Monday, December 04, 2006

Chalmers on "Modal Rationalism"

In my undergraduate/graduate seminar this quarter, we read David Chalmers's influential book, The Conscious Mind, and now we’re reading some of the subsequent criticism and discussion of it, and Chalmers’s replies.  A common theme in many replies -- and my sense, too, is that there’s something fishy about reflecting from the armchair about what we can conceive and reaching conclusions on that basis about the fundamental structure of the universe.

Chalmers’s response to this (in Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 1999, p. 490; see also "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?") is interesting. He insists -- correctly, I think -- that either you’re doing empirical exploration or you’re engaged in a “rationalist” enterprise centering on ideas such as “consistency, entailment, and ideal conceivability” -- that either you're doing scientific research or you’re exploring our concepts. In particular, he attacks the idea that something might be conceptually possible but still metaphysically impossible: Metaphysics just is about our conceptual space. This is hard for what Chalmers calls “Type B materialists” to swallow: They want to embrace materialism as a “metaphysical” thesis and at the same time allow that it’s conceivable that materialism is false, that it's conceivable (for example) that “zombies” -- beings physically identical to us but with no conscious experience -- exist.

As I said, I’m inclined to agree with Chalmers about this and disagree with the majority of his critics. But I think this only raises even more sharply the fundamental concern that seems to me to be driving them.  If Chalmers’s (and all of our) “metaphysics” is just exploration of our concepts, how can we claim to discover anything about the fundamental structure of the universe thereby -- anything about anything other than our concepts? Metaphysics seems then to become a branch of psychology.

Now, actually, I’m quite happy with that, but I’m not sure Chalmers should be, and it isn’t the tenor of The Conscious Mind as I read it. And if materialism is true, then I’d say it’s not -- or shouldn’t be -- construed as a metaphysical thesis at all, but rather as a scientific thesis, a claim only about the “laws of nature”, and not a claim about Kripkean “a posteriori metaphysical necessity” or the like.

Friday, December 01, 2006

New Book: Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic -- Now Online

here! (forthcoming with MIT Press in 2007)

Russ Hurlburt, a psychologist at University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and I got together and jointly interviewed a subject, "Melanie", about randomly sampled moments of her "inner experience" while she was wearing a beeper. Russ has been using this methodology for decades to discover, he thinks, all kinds of interesting facts about people's inner lives. I've published a number of essays skeptical of our capacity accurately to introspect our experience, even under favorable conditions. At the center of the book is a lightly edited transcript of our six days of interviewing Melanie about 18 experiences.

In this book, Russ and I confront each other's views in the context of concrete, unselected reports by a particular person, Melanie. You get to see what Melanie says about her experience, how Russ tries to bring out what's accurate in her reports, and the sources of my doubts and criticisms. In side boxes, we continue our debates and connect what we say to contemporary and historical literature in philosophy and psychology. We've also written separate introductory and concluding chapters, each from our own point of view.

Right now I'm thinking I might present readers of the blog with one "beep" at a time every Friday, assuming people might be interested in that. Although Melanie’s experiences are in certain respects quite ordinary, we think the reader will find at least some of her descriptions surprising, intriguing, and suggestive -- even independently of Russ's and my disputes about how far to believe them.

Wednesday, November 29, 2006

Two Kinds of Habit?

Last week, Tim Schroeder spoke to the philosophy of action workshop here at UCR on habit and addiction. He gave a unitary account of "strength of habit", according to which a habit is strong to the extent it's difficult to extinguish.

It struck me, however, that there might be two different ways for a habit to be strong. Some habits are difficult to extinguish simply because we thoughtlessly repeat them, but if we pause to reflect they have no pull on us. For example: My new car has a foot parking brake and my old car (which I still sometimes drive) has a hand brake. Now that I've grown used to my new car, I find myself pushing on the floor with my foot even in my old car when I park. Or: I used to absently chew my fingernails, though I recognized this made my fingernails look unappealing. Though when I stopped to think about it, I found no particular impulse or craving to chew the nails, it was a hard habit to break simply because I would find myself chewing them without thinking about it.

Other bad habits -- perhaps these more closely resemble addictions -- are hard to break in a different way: Even when I reflect I find myself drawn to continue them. For example: Eating junk food at night when I'm stressed. It's not unusual for me to stop and reflect as I'm reaching toward the cookies -- but then I rationalize: It's just a little bit, or I'm already eating it, or just this one cookie, or it's a special occasion, or even "how interesting that I'm doing this -- an occasion to reflect on weakness of will!"... In contrast, there's no impulse to rationalize pressing my foot on the floor or chewing my nails!

If a habit is a repetitive pattern of behavior that proceeds somewhat independently of rational guidance (this is close to but not exactly Schroeder's definition), then there are at least two neurologically distinct ways to form a habit. One is mere repetition. Doing something over and over again tends to strengthen the neural pathways that generate that behavior and weaken the pathways to other behavior, independent of any particular reward. The other is reward: If a behavior is rewarded, especially if it is strongly rewarded, that tends to increase the likelihood of its occuring again. Maybe, then, these two different mechanisms of habit formation underwrite two different types of habit with different types of habit strength and different conditions of extinction -- and in particular, the first type of habit may be more thoughtless and more easily defeated by thought than the second.

Monday, November 27, 2006

Most-Cited Ethics and Mind/Language books in the Stanford Encyclopedia

Regular visitors to this blog will know that I'm working on assessing the rates at which ethics books are stolen from academic libraries, vs. non-ethics philosophy books. I've used the bibliographies in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to generate my list of prominent books in ethics and, as a comparison group, philosophy of mind and language.

I divided SEP entries into three categories: (1.) ethics (including legal philosophy, political philosophy, and historical entries specifically focusing on ethics, but excluding moral psychology and philosophy of action), (2.) philosophy of mind and/or language (including historical entries on these topics but excluding logic, moral psychology, and philosophy of action), and (3.) other. I then generated two lists: A list of books appearing in at least 5 of the bibliographies of entries in group 1, and a similar list of books appearing in at least 5 bibliographies in group 2. I didn't distinguish between editions (so, for example, Rawls's original A Theory of Justice and his second edition count as a single book for this ranking).

Since rankings of prominence tend to attract attention, I thought readers might be interested in seeing the lists. The number preceding the bibliographic line is the number of bibliographies in which the book appears. Variations in format, and possible minor bibliographic errors, are due to the fact that the bibliographic information is pasted in more or less arbitrarily from one of the SEP entries.

Some of the caveats about this method are described in my rankings of highly-cited ethicists and philosophers of mind/language. I excluded works prior to 1960.

Ethics books:
41. Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
22. Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books
16. Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.
14. Sandel, Michael, 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
13. Gauthier, David (1986). Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Raz, Joseph (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
13. Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
12. Hare, R. M., 1981, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
11. Brink, David O. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
11. Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge.
11. Dworkin, Ronald., 1986. Law's Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
11. Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
11. Griffin, J., 1986, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
11. Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10. Dworkin, Ronald, 2000, Sovereign Virtue, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, chapters 1-3.
10. Gibbard, Allan, 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
9. Brandt, Richard. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford University Press.
9. Dworkin, Ronald (1978) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
9. Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961).
9. Steiner, Hillel, 1994, An Essay on Rights, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
9. Temkin, Larry S., 1993, Inequality, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books.
8. Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender and the Family. New York: Basic Books.
8. Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Rawls, John. 1999. The Law of Peoples.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
7. Habermas, J., 1996 Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge UK.
7. Jaggar, Alison M., 1983, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
7. Kymlicka, Will, 1995, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
7. MacIntyre, Alasdair. (1984) After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
7. Pogge, Thomas (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press).
7. Smith, Michael, 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell.
7. Tamir, Y., 1993, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
6. Ackerman, Bruce A., 1980, Social Justice in the Liberal State, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press
6. Barry, Brian. 1989. Theories of Justice. University of California Press.
6. Barry, Brian. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford University Press.
6. Coleman, Jules (2001). The Practice of Principle.Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6. Cooper, John M., 1999, Reason and Emotion (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
6. Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960, The Constitution of Liberty, London: Routledge.
6. Korsgaard, C., 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Kymlicka, Will, 1990, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Mackie, J.L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York: Penguin.
6. MacKinnon, Catharine. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Nussbaum, Martha C. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Chapters 8-9.
6. Nussbaum, Martha, 2000, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P.
6. Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon Press.
6. Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
6. Williams, Bernard (1972), Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Annas, Julia, 1993, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press).
5. Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
5. Blackburn, Simon, 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press
5. Blackburn, Simon, 1998, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Broome, John, 1991, Weighing Goods, Oxford: Blackwell
5. Butler, Judith.(1993). Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York: Routledge.
5. Chang, R. (ed.), 1997, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5. Christiano, Thomas, 1996, The Rule of the Many, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
5. Cohen, G. A., 1995, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Dancy, Jonathan, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell
5. Darwall, Stephen L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press.
5. Feldman, F., 1997, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
5. Finnis, John. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford University Press.
5. Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza (1998) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. New York: Cambridge University Press.
5. Foot, Philippa, 1978, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
5. Herman, Barbara. (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
5. Hurka, Thomas. (1993) Perfectionism. New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Irigaray, Luce. 1985. Speculum of the Other Woman. Trans. Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
5. Kymlicka, W. ed., 1995. The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press
5. Lloyd, Genevieve, 1993, The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
5. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
5. Miller, D., 1995, On Nationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
5. Nagel, Thomas., 1986, The View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Nagel, Thomas. 1991. Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Sen, Amartya, 1992,  Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5. Wolf, Susan, 1990, Freedom Within Reason. (New York: Oxford University Press).
5. Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mind and Language:
21. Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York: Oxford University Press.
21. Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19. Dennett, D. C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
18. Fodor, J.A. (1987) Psychosemantics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
17. Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
15. Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.)
14. Searle, John. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
13. Dretske, Fred (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
13. Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.
12. Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.)
12. Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11. Fodor, J. (1975) The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell.
11. Quine, W., 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
11. Stich, S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Carruthers, P. (2000) Phenomenal Consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Dretske, Fred (1988). Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
10. Evans, Gareth, 1982, The Varieties of Reference Oxford: Clarendon Press.
10. Peacocke, C. 1992. A Study of Concepts. MIT Press.
10. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Siewert, C. 1998. The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
8. Levine, J., 2001, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
8. McGinn, Colin, 1989, Mental Content Oxford: Blackwell.
8. Papineau, David (1993) Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
8. Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Salmon, N. (1986) Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Strawson, G. 1994. Mental Reality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
7. Dennett, D. C. (1987) The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7. Dennett, D.C. (1978) Brainstorms, Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books.
7. Jackson, F., 1977, Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
7. McGinn, C. 1991. The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.
7. Searle, J.R. (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Stalnaker, R. 1984: Inquiry. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
6. Carruthers, P. 1996. Language, Thought and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
6. Chomsky, N., 2000, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge.
6. Dennett, D.C. (1969). Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
6. Dummett, Michael (1981): Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Fodor, J.A. (1990), A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
6. Hill, C., 1991, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Lewis, David K. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
6. Lycan, W.G. (1987). Consciousness. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books / MIT Press.)
6. Rey, G., 1997. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Oxford: Blackwell.
6. Thau, Michael, 2002, Consciousness and Cognition Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Armstrong, D.M. (1980). The Nature of Mind, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
5. Bach., K. (1987) Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Bermudez, J.L (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Clark, Andy (1997) Being There: putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Devitt, Michael (1996). Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5. Flanagan, O. 1992. Consciousness Reconsidered. MIT Press.
5. Jackson, Frank (1998): From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon.
5. Kim, J., 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Kim, Jaegwon, 1993, Supervenience and Mind Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Larson, Richard and Segal, Gabriel (1995) Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Loar, Brian (1981), Mind and meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge).
5. Papineau, D. (1987), Reality and Representation, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
5. Papineau, D., 2002. Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Penrose, R. 1989. The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5
5. Perry, J. 2001. Knowledge, Possiblity, and Consciousness. MIT Press.
5. Pylyshyn, Zenon (1984). Computation and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Schiffer, Stephen (1987) Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
5. Sturgeon, S., 2000, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature, London: Routledge.
5. Williamson, T. 1994. Vagueness. London: Routledge.
5. Zalta, E.N. (1988) Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Wednesday, November 22, 2006

Most-Cited Philosophers of Mind and Language in the Stanford Encyclopedia

On Monday, I posted a list of the most-cited ethicists in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Today I'm posting my list of most-cited philosophers of mind and language. I've generated these lists in connection with a particular research project -- comparing the rates at which ethics and non-ethics philosophy books are stolen from libraries -- but the results are, perhaps, independently interesting.

The method and caveats are described in my post on the ethicists. Let me add a few more comments here:
* I excluded posts that I took to be closer to philosophical logic than philosophy of language; often this was a judgment call that could have gone either way.
* I excluded philosophy of action / moral psychology.
* The bibliography on mental imagery was huge, creating some overrepresentation of authors who have written prominently on that topic (esp. Kosslyn, Pylyshyn, Paivio).
* Only first authors are counted for multiply-authored essays.
* There are approximately 7000 mind and language bibliographic lines, compared to over 9000 in ethics.

Here's the list, then. The number indicates the number of bibliographic lines in the relevant SEP entries. I find Kripke's relatively poor showing rather strange. It's probably due to a combination of distortive factors in this method of ranking.

148. Fodor, J.
98. Dennett, D.
94. Block, N.
74. Lewis, D.
73. Chalmers, D.
67. Dretske, F.
67. Tye, M.
66. Davidson, D.
66. Jackson, F.
64. Shoemaker, S.
58. Putnam, H.
56. Searle, J.
49. Burge, T.
49. Lycan, W.
44. Armstrong, D.
44. Peacocke, C.
40. Churchland, P. (Paul)
38. Quine, W.
35. Stalnaker, R.
33. Horgan, T.
33. Kripke, S.
32. Davies, M.
32. McGinn, C.
32. Rey, G.
32. Salmon, N.
32. Soames, S.
31. Schiffer, S.
30. Carruthers, P.
30. Nagel, T.
29. Loar, B.
28. Chomsky, N.
28. Clark, A. (Andy)
28. Kim, J.
28. Sellars, W.
27. Crane, T.
27. Kosslyn, S.
26. Byrne, A.
26. Millikan, R.
26. Perry, J.
25. McDowell, J.
25. Papineau, D.
25. Rosenthal, D.
24. Stich, S.
23. Grice, P.
23. Pylyshyn, Z.
22. Devitt, M.
22. Evans, G.
21. Bach, K.
21. Harman, G.
21. Martin, M.
20. Dummett, M.
20. Kaplan, D.
20. Levine, J.
19. Chisholm, R.
19. Richard, M.
19. Stanley, J.
18. Bechtel, W.
17. Hardin, C.
17. Heil, J.
17. King, J.
17. Paivio, A. (all citations from mental imagery)
16. Hill, C.
16. Strawson, P.
15. Smolensky, P.
15. Yablo, S.
14. Boghossian, P.
14. Brook, A.
14. Church, A.
14. Churchland, P. (Patricia)
14. Haugeland, J.
14. Place, U.
14. Smart, J.
14. White, S.

Coming Monday: A list of books in Philosophy of Mind/Language and in Ethics that appear in at least five different bibliographical lists from the SEP.

Monday, November 20, 2006

Most-Cited Ethicists in the Stanford Encyclopedia

As part of my project of seeing whether ethicists (or at least readers of ethics) steal more or fewer books than non-ethicists, I need lists of eminent ethicists. (I can then look at the rate at which their books are stolen.) No easily-parsed list being handy, I created my own imperfect approximation by the following method:

I compiled all the bibliographies of ethics entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I included all areas of applied ethics and history of ethics, but I excluded moral psychology and philosophy of action. (Of course, in some cases this was a call that could have gone either way.) Then I looked for repeating names and counted the number of repeats. For example, if F.P. Wu had 4 articles cited in one entry, 2 articles cited in another, and one book cited in a third, he'd have a score of 7. I included only authors who published a substantial portion of their work after 1959.

Drawbacks of this methodology:
* The SEP still has large patches of incompleteness,
* The list will reflect the topical choices of the SEP editors (there are a large number of feminism-related entries, for example, and many fewer related to race).
* The bibliographies reflect the choices of the SEP entry writers, and disproportionately the choices of those who write long bibliographies.
* It's not always possible to determine which "Smith, L." (or whatever) is being referred to -- or at least not without more work than I am willing to do with the 9000+ bibliography lines.
* Authors who publish a number of articles may get a higher number of bibliographic lines than those who publish one (equally influential) book.
* Where an anthology is cited, it may not reflect the editor's research contributions. (However, normal practice in philosophy is not to cite the anthology but the essay within the anthology, leading with the essay-writer's name, unless the whole anthology is relevant.)

I'm sure there are other drawbacks to this method as well. Still, I thought some readers might find the results interesting. Here's the list, then:

93: Rawls, J.
77: Dworkin, R.
55: Williams, B.
51: Raz, J.
50: Nussbaum, M.
50: Feinberg, J.
49: Sen, A.K.
42: Kymlicka, W.
37: Scanlon, T.
36: Parfit, D.
36: Hart, H.
36: Frankfurt, H.
34: Walzer, M.
34: Foot, P.
33: Pogge, T.
32: Nagel, T.
32: Brandt, R.
30: Nozick, R.
30: Brink, D.
30: Arneson, R.
29: Young, I.
29: Waldron, J.
29: Hare, R.
29: Butler, J.
28: Vlastos, G.
28: Roemer, J.
28: Pettit, P.
28: Habermas, J.
27: Scheffler, S.
27: Blackburn, S.
27: Barry, B.
26: Taylor, C.
26: Railton, P.
26: Feldman, F.
25: Coleman, J.
24: Anderson, E.
23: MacIntyre, A.
23: Iragaray, L.
23: Gauthier, D.
23: Cohen, G.
23: Buchanan, A.
23: Benhabib, S.
22: Chisholm, R.
21: Temkin, L.
21: Okin, S.
21: Miller, D.
21: Kristeva, J.
21: Korsgaard, C.
21: Finnis, J.
21: Derrida, J.
21: Dancy, J.
20: Vallentyne, P.
20: MacKinnon, C.
20: Copp, D.
19: Sinnott-Armstrong, W.
19: Sandel, M.
19: Kagan, S.
19: Hurka, T.
19: Harman, G.
19: Fischer, J.
19: de Beauvoir, S.
18: Wolf, S.
18: Gibbard, A.
18: Code, L.
17: Singer, P.
17: Leiter, B.
17: Harsanyi, J.
17: Griffin, J.
17: Foucault, M.
17: Fleurbaey, M.
17: Cornell, D.
16: Thompson, J.
16: Sturgeon, N.
16: Sayre-McCord, G.
16: Narveson, J.
16: McDowell, J.
16: Jaggar, A.
16: Irwin, T.
16: Held, V.
16: Dworkin, G.
16: Darwall, S.
15: Smith, M.
15: Kraut, R.
15: Fraser, N.
15: Cohen, J.

Coming soon: A similar list in philosophy of mind and language.

UPDATE: Here's the philosophy of mind and language list.

Friday, November 17, 2006

"Habituation" and Moral Development

On Wednesday, Gavin Lawrence spoke here at UC Riverside on Aristotle's conception of moral development. Lawrence argued that Aristotle stood something like "habituation" -- the acquisition of habits -- near the center of moral development, especially early moral development. Unfortunately, Lawrence left the concept of "habituation" relatively undeveloped.

One issue I find intriguing is the proper method of encouraging the acquisition of moral habits early in development.

Consider first a non-moral example: If you want a child to learn to like broccoli, is it better to force him to eat it again and again, expecting he'll learn to tolerate it more and eventually develop a taste for it? Or is forcing it counterproductive, leading the child increasingly to dislike it?

Correspondingly, if you want a child to learn to share, is it better to force her to share, or does forcing moral actions, contrary to the inclinations of the child's heart, only poison morality for her and impair her moral development?

In asking this question, I had the ancient Chinese philosophers Xunzi and Mencius in mind. Xunzi seems to adopt the first perspective as a general policy, and Mencius may endore the latter (if P.J. Ivanhoe's interpretation is right, though I worry that Ivanhoe depends too much on a dubious interpretation of Mengzi 2A2). Ivanhoe's Mencius suggests that the best spur to moral development is encouraging people to reflect and discover their joy at behaving morally in certain situations; and as you act morally and reflect on this joy, the moral inclinations grow in breadth and strength.

I posed this question to Lawrence in the discussion period after his talk. He suggested that he doubted Aristotle would have thought there was one universally best way to encourage moral development. Maybe sometimes it's better to force, at other times to lay off. Surely that must be right (if a bit cagey). I wonder if we can't lay moral educators on a spectrum depending on the extent to which they see habituation by coercion as an important and non-damaging tool in moral education, and then dispute about how far to one end or the other of this spectrum it's best to go.

I posed the same question to my seven-year-old son Davy that evening, and here's what he said:
If you want a child to learn to like broccoli, put tasty sauce on it. If you want a child to learn to like to share, start with his sharing something he doesn't like anyway and make sure the other child has something really cool to share back.

Ah, the wisdom of those on whom moral education (and broccoli) is inflicted!

Wednesday, November 15, 2006

Can You Introspect Your Judgments?

Here's an issue I find weirdly difficult: Can you introspect your judgments -- that is, your "occurrent", happening-now assessments of (for example) the truth or falsity of some proposition? (I distinguish such judgments from standing, dispositional beliefs.)

Surely we can, often, know what our judgments are. I'm thinking about whether there will be a department meeting next week. I reach the judgment that there won't be, and I can accurately tell myself and others that this is my judgment. But is such knowledge of our judgments generally derived through introspection, exactly?

Well, what is introspection? Here's a narrow definition I find attractive: Introspection is a species of attention to ongoing (or maybe very recently past) conscious experience. If, then, there is a conscious experience of judging that there won't be a department meeting next week, and if I get to know that that's my judgment by attending, in some way, to that conscious experience, then I've learned about my judgment through introspection. But does that happen? Can that happen? If it can happen, is it ordinary or exceptional? (Alvin Goldman and David Pitt seem to think it's ordinary, and indeed the rule in self-knowledge of attitudes.)

A number of philosophers, including Gareth Evans, Robert Gordon, Richard Moran, and Dorit Bar-On, have given non-introspective accounts of self-knowledge in such cases. Roughly speaking, on such views, we think about or attend to the world -- not our own minds -- and self-ascriptive statements like "I think there won't be a department meeting" are simply expressions of such external, world-oriented judgments, but in self-ascriptive language. We do not cast our eyes introspectively inward, as it were, every time we say that we think such-and-such is the case.

It's quite plausible that at least some of our self-ascriptive statements are non-introspective in (roughly) this way -- but are they all? Must they be?

Suppose, turning my mind to the question of whether there will be a department meeting next week, I find myself uttering, silently to myself in inner speech: "No, no department meeting". It seems I can discover this inner-speechy fact about myself though introspection, no? But introspecting inner speech isn't the same as introspecting judgment, is it? For example, if I'm reciting lines from a play silently in my head, or an advertising jingle, I may have inner speech without the corresponding judgment. It also seems that judgment often precedes inner speech.

Similar considerations apply to the visual imagery that may accompany (partly constitute?) a thought.

So is there some distinctive phenomenology specifically of judgment that we often are, or sometimes are, or at least in principle can be, introspectively attuned to, that serves or can serve as a basis for our knowledge about our judgments? I find it slipping my grasp....

Tuesday, November 14, 2006

Those Annoying Security Warnings

So I updated my blog to the new Blogger Beta. (I didn't realize it was still in beta when I did so, though!) There are a few cool new features, like categories (finally!), but now Internet Explorer (not Firefox) gives all kinds of annoying pop-up "Security Information" windows on the comments pages.

Please be patient with that. Hopefully Blogger will resolve the issue. In the meantime, as far as I can tell the only thing you miss out on if you decline to show the "nonsecure items" is the beautiful photos of the comments' authors.

I seem to be having to log in more, also, rather than having the website recognize me.

Let me know if there are any other annoyances or inconveniences, and I can think about possible work-arounds.

Monday, November 13, 2006

The Best-Guess Phenomenon and Degree of Belief

You're a lost tourist. You hit up a local for directions. With apparent confidence and fluency, the local sends you in utterly the wrong direction. I experience this so regularly in travelling that I now no longer ask a single local for directions. About half the time, the second gives a completely different version from the first. Occasionally, someone will express a degree of uncertainty. Almost always, if she's at all uncertain, she's completely wrong; and many who seem perfectly confident are equally wrong.

I've been on the other end of this, too, at least twice, realizing that my directions were seriously mistaken only after having given them. In one case, I sent a Mexican family so far astray that I fear it would take them at least an hour recover, were they unwise enough to trust me!

Similarly, but more serious: The doctor tells you you have disease X, with evident assurance, no visible uncertainty. Another tells you you have disease Y. Or even: The doctor starts out seemingly uncertain, undecided, then settles on something as -- you might think, her best guess -- then, as she spells out the guess to you becomes seemingly confident about it, confident enough, apparently, to stake your health on it. But she's wrong, and in fact changes her opinion easily when the next doctor you see calls up the first and describes his different, better diagnosis.

Let's call this the "best guess phenomenon". In certain situations, when Person A is presumably an expert and Person B has no resources to challenge Person A's opinion, Person A will give her best guess, conveying it with authority and confidence regardless of how well-founded the opinion is. No malice is intended, nor any disguise. It's not that Person A knows she's uncertain and aims to conceal that fact. Rather, the situation invites Person A to take on the mantle of expertise, with very little sensitivity to the proper degree of confidence.

One model I think won't suffice for such cases: Conventional philosophical/economic treatments in terms of "degree of belief" on a scale from 0 to 1. Best-guess phenomena are not, I think, best described as cases in which Person A has an irrationally high degree of confidence. For example, if asked to make a serious wager -- for example, if the local wanted to get there herself, or if the doctor's own health were at stake -- she'd balk, admit uncertainty, consult elsewhere. Rather, it's more like degree of confidence doesn't arise as an issue: Person A is neither certain nor uncertain, really. She's just talking, playing authority as part of a social role, without much thought about how much certainty is justified.

Friday, November 10, 2006

Moral Philosophy as Pathology?

Well, that title is a bit strong! But here's my thought (developed, in part, in conversation with someone at the Philosophy of Science Association meeting last week; I'll protect his privacy, though, unless he tells me he wants acknowledgement).

In psychology, there's a joke, which seems to have some truth in it (how much, exactly, is an interesting empirical question!), that the clinical psychologists are all crazy, the social psychologists are all socially awkward, the developmental psychologists act like children, etc. People are sometimes, it seems, drawn to fields that reflect something of their personal habits of thinking or problem areas in their lives. What about ethicists?

One way of developing the idea is this: Many philosophical ethicists like to approach ethics through explicit reasoning. That may reflect a durable habit or character trait that predates their choice of ethics as a field of study. And I'd wager, also, that there's a weakly negative correlation between being prone to reason in a cool, academic way about ethical matters and having strong gut reactions about such matters. Maybe if your gut doesn't tell you what to do morally, you're more prone to look toward explicit reasoning for moral guidance.

This raises the possibility -- I don't put this forward as a hypothesis, but merely as a possibility -- that a certain portion of those drawn to ethics as a discipline are so drawn because they're attracted to philosophical reasoning about ethical matters as compensation for weaker-than-average moral gut reactions. For them, moral philosophy is, perhaps, a sort of accommodation or crutch. We might then expect them to do morally well when faced with moral decisions of the sort fairly tractable to explicit reasoning and less well with other sorts of moral decisions.

I'd be interested to hear what you think, and also whether you think there's any way to cast empirical light on the matter.

Monday, November 06, 2006

Philosophers' Carnival #38

Welcome to The Splintered Mind's hosting of The Philosopher’s Carnival! My seven-year-old son, Davy, has been asking me what philosophers do, so I thought I’d cast things in playground terms.

The Metaphysical Whirligig:
Whoa, I’m dizzy! Justin Kahn poses some cute and interesting problem cases for the principle of Ockham’s Razor. What kind of sick person would put razors on a children’s whirligig! Wa Salaam gives us mystical reflections on the moon. Phil for Humanity tells all the little children on the gig that Santa Claus – wait, no, I mean God – doesn’t exist, making them cry. How cruel! Ken Taylor claims that smart children can believe in Santa Claus -- or is that God? -- but the question is, how, given that the bad children seem to get just as many toys! Kenny Pearce isn’t so sure that it follows from the fact that he has hands that the physical world exists. The Boundaries of Language reflects on the scope of Dummett’s anti-realism; this is for serious and scholarly children. Heterodoxia warns us that some insights are just too cold for our little hands to handle. We are fearful, hubristic, romantic. The children boo! But Heterodoxia knew they would! Glittering Muse ponders on “nothing” in a way that reminds my son of Heidegger’s remark that “nothing noths” – uh-oh, now there’s this little kid calling himself Carnap who wants to push him off the gig. No, no – Carnap wants to explode the whole gig. Bail out! I here at The Splintered Mind simply wish I knew what metaphysics was.

The Philosophy of Mind Sandpit:
Brain Hammer manages to get the children arguing loudly about whether there’s a difference between the sand’s seeming wet and our simply having the disposition to judge that it’s wet. (But why is it wet, I worry?) Neil Levy reflects on whether the mind stays within the skull or drips and fiddles all over the place. Maybe mine is buried even, right here in this sand! Whoops, not here -- David Chalmers, who is known sometimes to play in the external mind-sands, discovers instead an old, almost entirely ignored article by Fred Dretske spoofing sense-data theories. The Philosopher’s Playground, unearthing a copy of Alice in Wonderland, invites us to reconsider the question of whether we can intentionally believe that the Queen is 101 years old, five months, and a day. Aaron Cotnoir wonders if Alice shouldn’t be blamed if she can’t, or should be if she can. Salamander Candy reflects on what raccoons think of all us children, and how we know whether there’s anything we do look like to raccoons, and how we know there’s anything, indeed, we look like to ourselves. And, if I remember correctly, Philosophy of Memory[sorry for the unspecific link; there seem to be server problems] invites us to think about individual differences in memory.

Philosophy of Language’s Curving Tunnel:
John Greco starts the children off with a serious lesson on contextualism vs. interest-dependent invariantism. Good stuff, but most of the children can’t even pronounce the title. Into the darkness you go! Lemmings asks whether Leibniz would tell all the children that if this piece of play-doh is cruddy but the sculpture they make with it is not cruddy, then the sculpture is not identical to this piece of play-doh. My, my – but I can barely even see it at all, Brit! Dinner Table Don’ts asks about the transitivity of subjunctive conditionals. If only he didn’t talk about this, we’d finally start having fun. If there was a nuclear holocaust, he wouldn’t talk about this. Therefore, if there was a nuclear holocaust, we’d finally start having fun. Wait, that doesn’t seem quite right.... Is this why Gregory Wheeler says conditionals are bad for your health? Benjamin Nelson curves into the deepest darkness of what he calls “Pattern-Oriented Relational Grammar”; too much for a simple seven-year-old like me!

The Epistemic Slide:
Fred Vaughan gives us The Given, but the other children aren’t sure we shouldn’t start our epistemic slide with stainless steel instead. Do you want to stand atop an idea, looking down?

The Moral Teeter-Totter:
Daylight Atheism sets the moral teeter-totter rocking: What we approve of and condemn is historically contingent! Suggested are some issues that future generations might see in a different light. Carnival maven Richard Chappell warns against vigilantism against the Atheistic kid, even if he seems unreasonable – for which the Atheist had better be thankful, I say! Joseph Orosco, however, asks whether “choosing torture might be a democratic prerogative”; playground bullies everywhere agree! Andy Egan wonders if it's fair to ask, though, what the idealized bully self would do. Hell’s Handmaiden argues against the electoral college. College?! Heck, we’re barely in elementary school, shout the kids. Funkified rides the teeter-totter without thinking, purely spontaneously, which he thinks [?] is best! Hueina Su reminds all children that they must love themselves. Westminster Wisdom inquires into the principles of judicial independence; the children make it plain that they like clear rules and consistency, except when the contrary is to their advantage! Moralheath claims that moral objectivity has “fallen upon hard times”, explaining our bad behavior. As though to prove him right, Francios Temblay jumps entirely off the teeter-totter arguing that all morality is just a “religo-political smokescreen”! (But he falls into Pea Soup, where the distinction between moral realism and anti-realism is viscous and murky.)

Philosophy of Science Picnic Table:
The Voltage Gate tells all little children about the politics in the history of the science of human racial diversity. Children of all colors gather round, but they can’t tell each other apart! They may lie about their data, though. Janet Stemwedel wants to know why. Well, of course it's that their parents didn't raise them right! Humbug Online warns all children about too easily dismissing induction. Hasn’t the Humbug learned that each time someone raises this problem it only causes piss and consternation among the boys and girls at the table? Or will it be different, finally, this time?

The Historical Jungle Gym:
A Brood Comb invites us to think about Hegel’s dialectics with the example of left-right. Oh no! Soon the other children are upside-down and reaching the wrong direction, falling off the jungle gym into the deep sand of dialectic! Rethink rails on poor Cleitophon from Plato’s republic, for being concerned only about his reputation and nothing for the common good, a malady he finds all too common. Frankly, I’m surprised to see someone so long dead still taking insults on the jungle gym. But actually, it seems that Cleitophon hasn’t moved much recently – in the last, say, 2000 years at least. Phluaria takes on Socrates himself, asking if he was schizoid! And somewhere in the sand under the Jungle Gym, The Skwib found some of Henri Bergson’s lost PowerPoint slides!

A number of children submitted political diatribes of various sorts. That's not the sandbox I remember! With apologies to them, and in keeping with The Splintered Mind's largely apolitical spirit, I have chosen not to include in this week’s carnival anything that seemed to me more politics than political philosophy.

A Plea for Chaperones:
There is no volunteer for the next carnival. Bloggers: If your blog is listed here, and you have never hosted, I herewith assert that you are morally obligated to host. No, no, children, don’t run away! It’s not as bad as having to set the dinner table, I promise. Go here and sign up! (Or else the Carnival will crumble, and that's the end of all your juicy links....)

Thursday, November 02, 2006

PMS-WIPS: The Unreliability of Naive Introspection

Tomorrow I'll be at the Philosophy of Science Association meeting in Vancouver. In lieu of my usual Friday post, I offer a link instead to PMS-WIPS over at The Brain Hammer, where the paper under consideration is my The Unreliability of Naive Introspection (which, by the way, is also what I'll be presenting at the PSA).

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

Weirdism

In virtue of what am I conscious, while chicken soup is not? Most philosophers regard this as a metaphysical question. It is widely held that something about my internal structure – the organization of my material parts – makes me conscious. Perhaps there is something special about neurons, or perhaps the relevant feature is the abstract functional relationships between my internal states, and between those states and my environment and behavior. Or maybe internal structure is irrelevant: If I possess the right causal relationships to my environment and/or the right behavioral dispositions, I am conscious, regardless of my internal organization.

Or one might reject materialism. Perhaps an immaterial soul is necessary, or the possession of immaterial properties. But in virtue of what do I have an immaterial soul or immaterial properties, while chicken soup does not? One might invoke a powerful, soul-imbuing deity, or one might relate the immaterial somehow to internal, material structure or to material causes and behavior patterns. Or perhaps everything is conscious, including the chicken soup; or material things do not exist at all. Or maybe there's some flaw in the very idea of "material".

If this doesn’t exhaust the alternatives, at least it comes close. Unfortunately, every one of these alternatives has seriously counterintuitive consequences. Most people find it intuitively plausible that alien or artificial beings, entirely lacking neural structures like our own, could at least in principle be conscious. Holding neurons to be uniquely capable of grounding consciousness contradicts that intuition. On the other hand, Block and Searle have shown that it is counterintuitive to regard as conscious everything with the right functional organization, or the right causal relationships to the environment and behavioral dispositions, regardless of composition – for example if the structure is implemented by a vast population of people communicating by radio, or by beer cans and wire in outer space. One might suggest that although neurons aren’t strictly necessary, something resembling neurons in some important way is necessary, but it is doubtful that one can escape the dilemma by that maneuver. Any organization functionally similar to human neural structure could probably be implemented in a system to which it would be counterintuitive to ascribe consciousness. More biochemical measures of similarity seem bound to exclude conceivably conscious aliens of some stripe. Insistence that the system be naturally evolved rules out some of the weirdest systems, but it also rules out the intuitively appealing possibility of conscious robots or conscious brains grown in vats.

Non-materialist views suffer similar difficulties. Naturalistic dualism faces the problems described in the previous paragraph with respect to classifying the kinds of systems that have immaterial souls or immaterial properties. Supernatural dualism faces issues of how immaterial substances could have physical effects and of the apparent smooth gradation from beings without consciousness to beings with consciousness in both phylogeny and development, as well as general arguments against the existence of supernatural entities. Panpsychism and idealism are counterintuitive from the outset. And, finally, it's hard to see how some weak notion of "material" could be fundamentally and ineliminably flawed or what it would buy us if it were.

None of this should be news to anyone who has taught a survey course in philosophy of mind. Every metaphysician of mind has to “bite the bullet” on some issue or other – that is, accept certain counterintuitive consequences of his or her position. But how to know which bullet is best to bite? We could try somehow to compare the relative unintuitiveness of various positions - but even if we could do that in some plausible way, using it as our metaphysical method presupposes that our everyday and philosophical armchair intuitions are a good guide to the nature of consciousness, including in strange cases involving aliens, etc. - and that seems to me a rather doubtful position (see my post "Metaphysics, What?"). But, on the other hand, it doesn't seem that there's any straightforward empirical, scientific way to determine whether a silicon-based alien that behaved much like us (for example) has genuine conscious phenomenology (as opposed to merely behaving as though he does), without begging the metaphysical question at the outset. So I'm at a loss.

Let me dub the view that something weird must be true about the mind, but who knows what weird thing is true, weirdism.