16% of Authors in Elite Philosophy Journals Are Women

In some ways, the gender situation has been improving in philosophy. Women now constitute about 40% of graduating majors in philosophy in the U.S., up from about 32% in the 1980s-2010s. There is, I think, substantially more awareness of gender issues and the desirability of gender diversity than there was fifteen years ago. And yet, at the highest levels of impact and prestige, philosophy remains overwhelmingly male.

One measure of this is authorship in elite philosophy journals. For this post, I examined the past two years' tables of contents of Philosophical Review, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, and Nous -- widely considered to be the most elite general philosophy journals in mainstream Anglophone philosophy. (Some rankings put Philosophy & Phenomenological Research alongside these four.) I estimated the gender of each author of each article, commentary, or response (excluding book reviews and editorial prefaces), based gender-typical name, gender-typical photo, pronoun use, and/or personal knowledge, generally using at least two criteria. Of 291 included authors, there were only two who were either non-binary or defied classification -- in both cases, based on an expressed preference for they/them pronouns. There's always a risk of mistake, but for the most part I expect that my gender classifications accurately reflect how the authors identify and are perceived, with at most a 1-2% error rate.

Overall, I found:

Authorship Rates In Four
Elite Philosophy Journals
(Past Two Years):
Women: 46 authorships
Men: 243 authorships
Nonbinary/unclassified: 2 authorships

Percent women: 16%

Women now earn about 30% of PhDs in the U.S. and constitute almost 30% of American Philosophical Association members who report their gender -- so authorship in these journals is substantially more skewed than faculty in the United States. Of course, many authors are neither located nor received their PhD in the U.S., so these percentages aren't strictly comparable. However, PhD and faculty percentages are broadly similar in the U.K. and, impressionistically, in other high-income Anglophone countries. (I'm less sure outside the English-speaking world, but researchers in non-Anglophone countries author only a small percentage of articles in elite Anglophone journals; see here for an analysis of the insularity of Anglophone philosophy.)

Now, one possible explanation of this skew is that women are more likely to specialize in ethics than in other areas of philosophy (see these ten-year-old data), and these four journals publish relatively little ethics. To explore this possibility, I did two things:

First, I coded each article in the big four journals as either "ethics" or "non-ethics", based on the title or the abstract if the title was ambiguous. I included political philosophy, social philosophy, metaethics, and history of ethics as ethics. (Of course, there were some gray-area cases and judgment calls.)

Second, I added two journals to my list: Ethics and Philosophy & Public Affairs, generally considered the two most elite ethics journals (though after the editorial turmoil at PPA last year, it's not clear whether this will remain true of PPA).

In the big four, I classifed 60/291 (21%) authorships as ethics. (Perhaps this is a slight underrepresentation of ethics in these journals, relative to the proportion of research faculty in the Anglophone world who specialize in ethics?) In these journals, I found that indeed women have a higher percentage of ethics authorships than non-ethics authorships:

Authorship by Gender
in Big 4 Philosophy Journals
Ethics vs. Non-Ethics
Ethics: 17/60 (28%)
Non-ethics: 29/231 (13%)
[Fisher's exact 2-tail, p = .005]

If we juice up the sample size by adding in Ethics and PPA, we get the following:

Authorship by Gender
in 6 Elite Philosophy Journals
Ethics vs. Non-Ethics
Ethics: 40/142 (29%)
Non-ethics: 29/231 (13%)
[Fisher's exact 2-tail, p < .001]

[corrected Apr 27]

Strikingly, women appear to be more than twice as likely to author ethics articles than non-ethics articles.

Ten years ago, I did some similar analyses, comparing ethics vs. non-ethics authorships in two-year bins every 20 years from 1955 to 2015. In those samples, too, I found women to author only a small percentage of articles in elite journals overall (13% in 2014-2015) and to be more likely to author in ethics, so the trends are historically consistent.

Harmonizing with the Dao: Sketch of an Evaluative Framework

Increasingly, I find myself drawn to an ethics of harmonizing with the Dao. Invoking "the Dao" might sound mystical, non-Western, ancient, religious -- alien to mainstream secular 21st-century Anglophone metaphysics and ethics. But I don't think it needs to be. It just needs some clarification and secularization. As a first approximation, think of harmonizing with the Dao as akin to harmonizing with nature. Then broaden "nature" to include human patterns as well as non-human, and you're close to the ideal. Maybe we could equally call it an ethics of "harmonizing with the world" or simply an "ethics of harmony". But explicit reference to "the Dao" helps locate the idea's origins and its Daoist flavor.

[image source]

The Metaphysics of Dao

In the intended sense -- inspired by ancient Daoism and Confucianism, but adapted for a 21st century Anglophone context -- the "Dao" the world as a whole. However, it is not the world conceptualized as a collection of objects, but rather as a system of processes and patterns. The Dao is the spinning of Earth; the rise and fall of mountains and species; the rise and fall of cities and nations; human birth, childhood, adulthood, and death; people discovering and losing love; the way strangers greet each other; the growth of your fingernails; the falling of a leaf.

The Axiology of Dao

Some strands in the Daoist tradition hold that all manifestations of the Dao are equally good. But the more dominant strand holds that things can go better or worse. And certainly the Confucians, who also sought harmony with the Dao, held that things could go better or worse.

What constitutes things going better? I favor value pluralism: More than one type of thing has fundamental value. Happiness is valuable, of course. But so also is knowledge (even when it doesn't lead to happiness), beauty, human relationships, and even (I'd argue) the existence of stones.

One way to clarify our thoughts about value is the "distant planet thought experiment". Consider a planet on the far side of the galaxy, forever blocked by the galactic core, with which we will never interact. What would you hope for, for the sake of this planet? Most of us would not hope for a sterile rock, but rather for a planet rich with life -- and not just microbes, not just jungles of plants and animals, but a diverse range of entities capable of forming societies, capable of love and cooperation, art and science, engineering and sports, entities capable of generations-long endeavors and of philosophical wonder as they gaze up at the stars or down through their microscopes.

We might say that a planet, or a region of spacetime, is flourishing when it instantiates, or is on the path toward instantiating, such excellent patterns.

Conceptual Frameworks

Philosophers typically ask two questions when I propose harmonizing with the Dao as an ethical ideal. First, how does it differ from the more familiar (to them) ethics of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics? Second, what specifically does it recommend?

To the first question: Unlike consequentialism, there is no single good or bundle of goods that you should maximize; unlike deontology, there is no one rule or set of rules you should follow (unless we interpret "harmonize with the Dao" as the rule); unlike virtue ethics, there is no canonical set of virtues the cultivation and instantiation of which is the foremost imperative. Instead, the animating idea is to flow harmoniously along with the Dao and participate in, rather than strain against, its flourishing.

That's vague, of course. What specifically should you do, if your aim is to harmonize with the Dao?

I have some thoughts. But first, notice that consequentialism as a general ethical perspective is compatible with a wide range of possible concrete actions, depending on how it is developed and on the details of your situation. So also can deontological and virtue ethical perspectives be made compatible with a wide range of specific actions. What these broad ethical perspectives offer, primarily, is not specific advice but rather conceptual frameworks for ethical thinking -- in terms of consequences and expectations, or in terms of rules of different types, or in terms of a range of virtues and vices. So let's consider what broad concepts an ethics of harmony might employ, with the specific advice as an illustration of how those concepts might work.

Harmony and Disharmony, Illustrated in a University Context

Harmonizing with the flourishing patterns of the Dao involves participating in those patterns, enriching them, and enabling others to participate in and enrich those patterns. Suppose you think that one of the great processes worth preserving in the world is university education. You can participate in that process by being a good teacher, by being an administrator who helps things run smoothly, by being a custodian who helps keep the grounds clean, and so on. You can enrich it by helping to make it even more awesome than it already is -- for example by being an unusually inspiring teacher or by being not just an ordinary custodian but one who adds a bright smile to a student's day. You can enable others to participate in and enrich those patterns by helping hire a terrific teacher or custodian or by providing the type of environment that brings out the best in others.

We can see the university as a place where many lives converge either briefly or for decades. This convergence is valuable not just for what it yields but in itself. The processes constituting university life also participate in and enable other valuable processes, whether those are individual human lives, or other institutions that partly overlap with or depend on the university, or projects and events that happen within the university, or simply the natural and architectural beauty of an appealing campus.

Compare this way of thinking about the ethics of participation in a university with consequentialism (emphasizing the various goods that university education is expected to deliver), deontology (emphasizing the rules one ought to follow within a university), or virtue ethics (emphasizing the manifestation and cultivation of virtues such as curiosity and compassion). While I don't object to any of those ways of thinking about the ethics of university life, the Daoist perspective is, I hope, a valuable alternative lens.

Disharmony could involve cutting short, or attempting to cut short, an axiologically valuable pattern (rather than letting it come to its natural end), working against that pattern, or preventing others from harmonizing. Continuing the university example, cutting funding for valuable research, firing an excellent teacher, disrupting classes, littering, or flying a noisy helicopter overhead might all count as disharmonious. Other examples can include preventing access or undermining the conditions that allow students, faculty, or staff to flourish in their roles.

Comparisons with Music

You are not the melody-maker. "Harmony" suggests a contrast with "melody". You are not the melody-maker, the director, the first violinist, the lead singer, the lead guitarist -- at least not usually. Your typical role is to support an already-happening good thing.

Diversity and pluralism. There is more than one way to harmonize. A piece is richer when not everyone plays the same note.

Improvisation. Zhuangzi emphasized flowing along with things in an improvisational manner, rather than adhering to fixed rules. Often, the best music has improvisational elements, or at least room to allow one's mood of the moment to influence how one plays the notes. Spontaneous improvisation manifests harmony within the improviser, among the various unarticulated inclinations that arise without explicit cognitive control.

Aesthetic value. The boundary between aesthetic and ethical value (and other types of value) might not be as sharp as philosophers often suppose.

Conflicts of Harmony

A tree is a wondrous thing. Cutting it down cuts short an axiologically valuable pattern, and is normally out of harmony with the tree, the forest, and the lives it supports. But if the tree becomes lumber for a beautiful home, then that act belongs to another axiologically valuable pattern and is in harmony with the Dao of human cultural life.

Your wife wants one thing from you; your mother, another. Harmony with one might involve dissonance with the other. You might consider how sharp the dissonance is in each case. You might consider what patterns are being enacted in these relationships, and which are the more valuable patterns to sustain.

Like any ethical approach, harmonizing with the Dao must allow for conflicts and tradeoffs. The world makes competing demands and offers incompatible opportunities. There needn't be a formula for how to deal with all such cases. In some cases, creative thinking might allow one to support or integrate multiple patterns or integrate them into a whole: Removing a tree is sometimes overall good for a forest; occasional tension with a spouse may sustain a healthier relationship than shallow peace.

Sometimes the conflict is the harmony. Chess masters seek incompatible goals as part of the larger pattern of a competition. Predators consume prey in a healthy ecosystem. Law and politics require adversaries in a (hopefully) well-functioning social system.

My main overall thought is that we can build a fruitful framework for ethical thinking by taking the root project to be one of harmonizing with the awesome patterns and processes of the world.

New Paper in Draft: Superficialism about Belief, and How We Will Decide That Robots Believe

Comments welcome, as always, by email, as comments on this blog post, or through social media. This is intended as a submission to a special issue of Semiotic Studies on Krzysztof Poslajko's recent book Unreal Beliefs.

Superficialism about property X treats the possession, or not, of property X as determined entirely by superficial as opposed to deep facts. Belief should be understood superficially, as determined entirely by facts about actual and potential behavior, conscious experience, and transitional cognitive states ultimately understood in terms of actual and potential behavior and conscious experience. On both intuitive and pragmatic grounds, superficialism about belief is superior to accounts of belief in terms of deep cognitive or neural architecture, and it is not systematically inferior on scientific grounds. Behaviorist and interpretativist superficialism suggests that robots and Large Language Models already do, or will soon, believe. If consciousness is also essential to belief, the issue might soon become unclear for some of the most advanced systems. However, it will at least be practical to attribute some such systems belief* -- belief shorn of commitment to any conscious aspect -- and it will be forgivable if people forget to pronounce the asterisk. Krzysztof Poslajko should welcome this manner of thinking, though it needn't be as "antirealist" as Poslajko suggests.

Draft available here

Further Reflections on the Most-Cited Works in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Underranked Works and Concentration Percentage

A couple of weeks ago, I published a list of the 253 most-cited works since 1900 in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (The SEP had 1778 main-page entries as of my scrape last summer, and many of those entries have long reference lists.) Citation in the SEP is plausibly a better measure of impact in mainstream Anglophone philosophy than other bibliometric measures like Google Scholar and SCOPUS, which include citations by non-philosophical sources (which can dominate citations within philosophy, since philosophy is overall a relatively low-citation field) and which mix citation by sociologically elite venues with citation by less elite venues (and those citation patterns can be very different).

I think informed readers will tend to agree that the works near the top of the list (Rawls' Theory of Justice, Kripke's Naming and Necessity, etc.) are indeed among the most influential works in the mainstream Anglophone tradition -- more influential in mainstream Anglophone philosophy than, say, Foucault's Discipline and Punish or Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, despite Foucault's and Popper's higher citation overall across all disciplines and sources.

(What do I mean by "mainstream Anglophone philosophy"? I mean philosophy as practiced by professors in departments highly ranked in the Philosophical Gourmet Report, as published in journals that are highly ranked in Brian Leiter's polls (e.g., here), and -- though this would be circular for present purposes -- as recognized in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Even readers who dislike the philosophy of this tradition, or who see it as troublingly narrow, can I think recognize the sociological phenomenon of influence in these related ecologies, reasonably called "mainstream" in Anglophone academia.)

Underranked Works

Although SEP citation rates are, I think, a better measure of impact in mainstream Anglophone philosophy than any other existing bibliometric measure, that doesn't mean they are perfect. Works with a huge impact on a subdiscipline, or on a particular topic, will plausibly be underranked compared to works with substantial impact across a range of areas. The SEP will have only a limited number of entries for each subdiscipline or topic, and no matter how important the work is to that subdiscipline or topic, it can appear only once in each entry's bibliography.

This explains, I think, the relatively weak showings of some of the best-known articles in the field. For example:

119th (tied), 21 citations: Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

192nd (tied), 17 citations: Anscombe, G.E.M., 1958, Modern Moral Philosophy

unranked, 14 citations: Searle, John R, 1980, Minds, Brains, and Programs

unranked, 12 citations: Singer, Peter, 1972, Famine, Affluence, and Morality

unranked, 9 citations: Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1971, A Defense of Abortion

This isn't intended as any kind of exhaustive or representative list of underranked works -- just a few examples that struck me as conspicuously underranked relative to their influence. Gettier's 1963 article is possibly the most influential work of 20th century epistemology (in mainstream Anglophone circles). Anscombe's 1958 article is often seen as a landmark in the resurgence of virtue ethics. Searle's 1980 "Chinese room" argument is perhaps the most influential work on philosophy of computation and artificial intelligence after Turing. Likewise, Singer's 1972 article on charitable donation (with its famous example of rescuing a drowning child in a nearby pond at the expense of your clothes) and Thomson's defense of abortion (with its violinist example) are known to virtually all mainstream Anglophone philosophers.

Works might also be underranked if the SEP has relatively few entries in their field or subfield. For example, I'd venture that epistemology has relatively few entries relative to its overall influence in mainstream Anglophone philosophy. And although feminism has probably been somewhat more influential in mainstream Anglophone philosophy than philosophy of race, SEP features many more entries on the former than the latter, possibly explaining why some important feminist works appear on the list (e.g., Butler's Gender Trouble at rank #61), while philosophy of race is poorly represented.

Influential authors and ideas might also fail to appear on this list, if the influence is spread among several works. For example, here are the ten most-cited authors who have no individual works represented among the top 253:

John Hawthorne (97 total citations)
Jonathan Bennett (83)
William Alston (77)
Judith Jarvis Thomson (72)
William G. Lycan (71)
Nicholas Rescher (71)
Peter Singer (71)
Ernest Sosa (69)
Jeremy Waldron (68)
Joel Feinberg (67)
Amartya Sen (67)

All of the above are among the top 86 most-cited authors born since 1900. So of course no negative inference about the importance of any individual author is justified by the absence that author's individual works from the works list.

What Percentage of an Author's Citations Are to Their Most-Cited Work?

By comparing my most-cited authors list with my most-cited works list, we can get a rough measure of how much an author's impact is concentrated in a single work vs. spread across multiple works. (Note that the lists are not quite comparable, since the authors list includes only authors born 1900 or later while the works list includes all works published 1900 or later, including works by authors born before 1900.)

Consider, for example, Thomas Kuhn. His Structure of Scientific Revolutions was one of the most influential works of philosophy of the second half of the 20th century. Fittingly, it appears 9th on my list of most influential works. But Kuhn himself appears relatively low on the list of most influential authors: 63rd. Looking at the raw numbers, we can see that 58 entries cite Structure and 71 entries cite any work by Kuhn. Thus, 82% of the Kuhn-citing entries cite Structure.

Contrast this with, say, David Lewis, who is the #1 most-cited contemporary author overall (with 307 entries citing his work) and whose most-cited work, On The Plurality of Worlds, ranks #6 (70 citing entries). For Lewis, 23% (70/307) of the entries that cite him cite his most-cited work.

I can't seem to think of a good name for this number, so I'll have to settle with a bad name: the concentration percentage. Here are the concentration percentages of the ten most-cited contemporary authors in the SEP:

1. Lewis, David K.: 23% (70/307)
2. Quine, Willard van Orman: 32% (69/213)
3. Putnam, Hilary: 24% (45/190)
4. Rawls, John: 76% (127/168)
5. Kripke, Saul A.: 58% (92/159)
6. Williamson, Timothy: 32% (48/152)
7. Davidson, Donald: 21% (31/151)
8. Williams, Bernard: 22% (32/146)
9. Nussbaum, Martha C.: 19% (26/140)
10. Nagel, Thomas: 24% (33/137)

Thus, we can see two clusters: A couple of authors had most of their citation impact through a single work: Rawls (via A Theory of Justice) and Kripke (via Naming and Necessity). The remaining authors had about a third to a fifth of their citation impact through a single work.

Among the top hundred authors, the ten most concentrated are:

Kuhn, Thomas S. (82%: Structure of Scientific Revolutions)
Rawls, John (76%: A Theory of Justice)
Parfit, Derek (71%: Reasons and Persons)
Scanlon, Thomas M. (66%: What We Owe to Each Other)
Kaplan, David (65%: Demonstratives)
Ryle, Gilbert (61%: The Concept of Mind)
Kripke, Saul A. (58%: Naming and Necessity)
Ayer, Alfred J. (54%: Language, Truth, and Logic)
Nozick, Robert (53%: Anarchy, State, and Utopia)
Evans, Gareth (53%: Varieties of Reference)

I confess to being surprised that some of these percentages aren't even higher. For example, I'd have guessed Ryle's impact was more than 61% concentrated on The Concept of Mind.

The ten least concentrated are:

Bennett, Jonathan (16%)
Pettit, Philip (16%)
Harman, Gilbert H. (16%)
Hawthorne, John (15%)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (15%)
Lowe, E. J. (15%)
Waldron, Jeremy (15%)
Feinberg, Joel (13%)
Yablo, Stephen (13%)
Rescher, Nicholas (6%)

I'll venture a prediction. According to the phenomenon I've labeled "The Winnowing of Greats", the greater your distance from a group that varies in eminence, the greater the difference seems between the most eminent members of that group and the less eminent members. (This is to some extent because you have zero knowledge of most members below a certain level of eminence and to some extent because you overrely on second-hand summaries that highlight a few of the most eminent examples.) If this winnowing phenomenon applies to works as well as to authors, then as time creates distance from our era, all but the most influential works will largely be forgotten -- which will disproportionately favor highly concentrated authors in the historical memory.

[click image to enlarge and clarify]

The Gender and Race/Ethnicity of Authors of the Most-Cited Works of Mainstream Anglophone Philosophy

As is well-known, mainstream Anglophone philosophy has tended to be overwhelmingly non-Hispanic White -- though there's some evidence of recent changes in the student population which might start to trickle into the professoriate. Generally, the higher the level of prestige, the more skewed the ratios. In my 2024 analysis of the 376 most-cited authors in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I found that women or nonbinary authors constituted 12% of the list and Hispanic or non-White authors constituted 3%.

How well represented are these groups among authors of the 253 most-cited works in the Stanford Encyclopedia? Here, the skew is even more extreme. Of the 265 included work-author combinations (almost all of the included works are solo-authored), I count 24 works (9%) by women, 2 (1%) non-binary authored works (both by Judith Butler), one (0.4%) by a Hispanic/Latino person (Linda Martín Alcoff), one (0.4%) by an Asian (Jaegwon Kim), and none by any authors that are known by me to identify or be perceived as Black or African American, American Indian / Alaska Native, or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (using the race/ethnicity categories of the US Census). Corrections welcome if I'm misclassified anyone!

Here it is as a pie chart. If you squint, you might be able to see the lines for the Hispanic or non-White groups.

[pie chart comparing 236 non-Hispanic White men with 25 non-Hispanic White women or nonbinary, 1 Hispanic or non-White man, and 1 Hispanic or non-White woman or nonbinary]

The 253 Most Cited Works in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Last summer, Jordan Jackson and I scraped the bibliographies of all the main-page entries of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the leading source of review articles in mainstream Anglophone philosophy. Since 2010, I've been analyzing citation patterns in the SEP. Generally, I find SEP citation rates to more plausibly measure influence in mainstream Anglophone philosophy than other bibliometric measures, such those derived from Web of Science or Google Scholar. (For example, by the SEP method the top five most cited philosophers born 1900 or later are David Lewis, W.V.O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, John Rawls, and Saul Kripke.)

Most of my SEP-based analyses aggregate by author, but it's also revealing to aggregate by work cited, for a couple of reasons. First, my author-based analyses probably overstate the influence of authors with moderate impact across many fields compared to authors with transformative impact in just one or a few fields. Second, tracking influential works is an interesting project in its own right.

Before proceeding to the list, notes and caveats.

(1.) Each work counts once per main-page bibliographic entry in the SEP. Thus, a work with a total of 33 is cited in 33 different main page entries. Subpage entries are not included.

(2.) What counts as the "same work"? The distinction admits vague and contentious cases, and implementing it mechanically raises further problems. Here's what I did: To count as the same work, the work had to begin with exactly the same title words (excluding punctuation marks, "a", "an", or "the"). Later editions were counted as the same work as earlier editions (including a few cases of "such-and-such revisited" or the like) and articles republished in collections were counted as the same work if the particular article rather than the collection as a whole was cited. Also, works that appeared first as articles then later were expanded into books with the same or similar title were counted as the same work. Multi-volume works counted as the same work, unless the title was "Complete Works" or similar.

(3.) I only included works with publication dates from 1900-2024. Older works tend not to be cited in a consistent, easily scraped format, so results for those works are inaccurate and potentially misleading.

(4.) I did not attempt to match works cited both in English and in their original language. Some translated works make the list simply in virtue of citation under their English-language title; and some untranslated works make the list simply in virtue of citation under their original-language title. Obviously, this systematically undercounts works that are cited under both their English and original-language titles.

(4.) Citations in the role of editor are not included.

(5.) Please excuse the haphazard cut-and-paste formatting. Dates are sometimes first appearance, sometimes later appearance or edition or translation.

(6.) Technical details: The matching algorithm looked for matches in the first four letters of the author's name and the first five letters of the first text appearing after numbers, punctuation marks, "the", "an", or "a", which for standardly formatted entries is the title. I then alphabetically sorted and hand-checked all bibliographic lines with at least 15 exact matches of both of the two parameters. This took several hours and was probably imperfect, but was not as difficult as it might seem. Note also: The scrape was conducted last summer, so recent entries and recent updates won't figure into the totals.

(7.) Corrections welcome, as long as they are consistent with the principles above and don't constitute a general revision, unsystematically applied on one author's behalf, of the method described in the technical details.

(8.) I'll follow up, probably in the next week or two, with some reflections on the list.

(9.) You can see the 2020 results here.

ETA Apr 9: Two follow-up posts:

The Gender and Race/Ethnicity of Authors of the Most-Cited Works of Mainstream Anglophone Philosophy (Mar 31)

Further Reflections on the Most-Cited Works in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Underranked Works and Concentration Percentage (Apr 8)

[cover of Rawls's A Theory of Justice]

1. (127 citing entries) Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice
2. (92) Kripke, Saul, 1972, Naming and Necessity
3. (79) Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons
4. (72) Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia
5. (71) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953 [2001], Philosophical Investigations
6. (70) Lewis, David, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds
7. (69) Quine, W. V. O., 1960. Word and Object
8. (67) Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other
9. (58) Kuhn, Thomas S., 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
10. (57) Rawls, John, 1996, Political Liberalism
11. (54) Chalmers, David J., 1996, The Conscious Mind
12. (49) Russell, Betrand, 1903, The Principles of Mathematics
13. (48) Lewis, David, 1973. Counterfactuals
13. (48) Sidgwick, Henry, 1907, The Methods of Ethics
13. (48) Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and its Limits
16. (47) Kaplan, David, 1977, Demonstratives
16. (47) Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica
18. (45) Putnam, Hilary, 1975, The Meaning of "Meaning"
18. (45) Quine, W.V.O., 1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism
20. (43) Jackson, Frank, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics
21. (41) Ayer, A.J., 1936, Language, Truth and Logic
22. (39) Carnap, Rudolf, 1956, Meaning and necessity
22. (39) Ross, W.D., 1931, The Right and the Good
22. (39) Ryle, Gilbert, 1949. The Concept of Mind
22. (39) van Fraassen, Bas C., 1980, The Scientific Image
26. (37) Dummett, Michael, 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language
26. (37) Evans, Gareth, 1982, The Varieties of Reference
26. (37) Mackie, J. L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
26. (37) Russell, Bertrand, 1905, On Denoting
26. (37) Whitehead, Alfred North and Bertrand Russell, 1910-1913, Principia Mathematica
31. (36) Goodman, Nelson, 1954. Fact, Fiction and Forecast
32. (35) Popper, Karl R., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
32. (35) Wittgenstein, L., 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
34. (34) Fodor, Jerry A., 1987, Psychosemantics
34. (34) Korsgaard, Christine M., 1996, Sources of Normativity
34. (34) Lewis, David K., 1969, Convention: A Philosophical Study
34. (34) Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations
34. (34) Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom
34. (34) Woodward, James, 2003, Making Things Happen
40. (33) Gauthier, David, 1986, Morals by Agreement
40. (33) McDowell, John, 1994, Mind and World
40. (33) Nagel, Thomas, 1986, The View from Nowhere
40. (33) Russell, Bertrand, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy
44. (32) Parfit, Derek, 2017, On What Matters
44. (32) Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
46. (31) Davidson, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events
46. (31) Gibbard, Allan, 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
46. (31) Strawson, P.F., 1959. Individuals
49. (29) Finnis, John. M, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights
49. (29) Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice
49. (29) Longino, Helen E., 1990, Science as Social Knowledge
52. (28) Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention
52. (28) Brandom, Robert B., 1994, Making It Explicit
52. (28) Jackson, Frank, 1982, Epiphenomenal Qualia
52. (28) Pearl, Judea, 2000, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
52. (28) Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity
52. (28) Quine, W. V. O., 1948, On What There Is
52. (28) Rawls, John, 2001, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
52. (28) Sellars, Wilfrid, 1956, Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
52. (28) van Inwagen, Peter, 1990, Material Beings
61. (27) Armstrong, David M., 1997, A World of States of Affairs
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Writing Short Fiction: Suggestions for Academics

I've published fifteen short, philosophically-themed science fiction stories in pro and semi-pro magazines, including in some of the most prestigious venues. Recently, a colleague asked my advice for academics interested in publishing short fiction. I figured I'd oblige with a blog post.

Write and Discard

You're a beginner. You're a beginner with a head start, because you can already write decent academic prose. But still, you're a beginner. Don't expect your first few efforts to be a publishable stories. So don't work on them too hard; don't get too invested in them; don't devote months to them and then abandon the whole enterprise when they aren't published.

Instead, write quickly. Write part of a story as a sketch. Write a whole draft, give it to someone who will provide honest feedback, and learn from that feedback. Then move on to a different story.

Most short fiction writers have large "trunks" of unpublished stories: early efforts, creative experiments, stories that didn't quite work out, stories they couldn't publish.

Writing is a process of discovery. In the course of writing, as the story takes shape, you find out how good the idea really was.

You'll find your voice better, and you'll cook up more interesting ideas, if you write lots and fast than if you belabor and belabor the same few pages.

Cherish and Protect Your Joy in Writing

If the thought of writing and discarding discourages you, ask yourself: Do you want to write? Or do you want, instead, to be someone who has written? If it's mainly the latter, then your approach might be too instrumental. You'll find it difficult to practice and to cultivate the traits that will set you apart.

Writing fiction should be a joy, for three main reasons:

First, if it's a joy, then if you discard many of your efforts, well, at least you enjoyed yourself!

Second, if you write joyfully, your writing will carry your distinctive voice and style. We are more distinct and memorable in our joys than in our forced labors.

Third, joy is intrinsically good, and the instrumental value of your writing fiction is at this point (let's be honest with ourselves) probably dubious. So whatever joy you derive is the most secure ground of value here.

Writing joyfully doesn't mean that you need to wait to write until inspiration strikes. I accept the standard "butt-in-chair" writing advice: Planting yourself in a seat before a blank page for an hour or three at regular intervals can do wonders. So yes, you might need to needle yourself a bit to get rolling. But then, when the words start to flow, follow your joy.

Writing joyfully doesn't mean writing only for yourself. It doesn't mean not valuing publication. Just don't let instrumentality poison your process.

[from my author page at Clarkesworld]

Write for the 10%

I don't care for mariachi music. The world contains, I'm sure, many great mariachi bands -- but however great they are, I won't enjoy them. Your writing is mariachi music.

Most of your friends won't like your writing enough to want to read it. (Maybe they'll politely read one story and say something encouraging.) Forget them. Don't try to please them. Ignore advice from the majority of people. Instead, find the mariachi lovers -- the people who like the particular, narrow type of thing that you are doing -- and notice their reactions. Otherwise, you'll be like a mariachi band taking musical advice from a country-music fan.

Far, far better to write something that 10% of readers will love than something that 70% of readers will think is okay.

The worst is to read some writing guide, or take some writing course, then follow the advice to the letter, trying to write some generic "good" story according to a formula. How depressing. You might as well set ChatGPT on the job. Be weird. Have fun by being different, expressing your quirky self.

Expect Rejection; Where to Submit; Critiques

Expect many rejections. Leading fiction magazines have rejection rates far worse than leading academic journals, often well over 99%.

Notice where short stories you like have been published. Potentially more helpfully, notice other venues -- maybe less prestigious -- where authors you like have also recently published.

You might be interested in my annual ranking of the most prestigious science fiction and fantasy magazines -- a good list for starting to think about venues in that genre. I also highly recommend the Submission Grinder.

If you're interested in exchanging critiques with amateur aspiring writers, Critters Writers Workshop is a good resource. Once you've made your first "pro" sale (at the SFWA qualifying rate or at least $100 cumulatively), Codex Writers Forum is invaluable for community, critique-trading, news, and information.

The Emotional Rollercoaster of Fiction Writing

Writing academic prose is hard. Sometimes I think my stuff is great. Sometimes I grumpily cut and discard, feel disappointed with my work, restart. It varies considerably with mood. (And actually I think the mood fluctuations can be helpful.)

In writing fiction, the ups and downs are -- for me and most others, I think -- substantially more intense. Take heed.

This, plus the rejection, makes cultivating the joy both harder and more important. It can be easy to feel like everything you do is mediocre and you've wasted your time. Avoiding instrumentality is the most reliable cure. To repeat myself: Try to love the writing at least as much as the having written.

Also, look, even if it's bad, there's a lot to be said for the value of bad art, enjoyed by one or a few. I plan to write a post on this topic, but in the meantime, consider my daughter's art car and The Vengefull Kurtain Rods.

The Rhythm of Stories and Articles:
initial hook → engagement of interest → developing trust → satisfying resolution

You're already familiar with the intellectual arc of an academic article. Your title is your initial hook. Your introduction builds up interest. By several hundred words in, your reader should feel they are in competent, trustworthy hands, headed along the path of a worthwhile argument or exploration. By the end, the reader should feel that you've presented a satisfying overall package.

For a short story, you need to transpose that knowledge into a different key.

Initial hook: The initial hook of a story is the title and the first few sentences. You can't yet emotionally engage the reader, but you normally (1.) convey something about the style, tone, and topic of the story, (2.) give the reader a little something to be curious about.

On 1: If it's a humorous space comedy, that should be evident right away. Same if it's an emotionally dark story of witchcraft. Of course you can't convey everything immediately and shouldn't overburden those sentences. But readers judge by their first nibble. If the first nibble doesn't match the overall meal, then readers who like that nibble might not like the whole story, and those who would have liked the whole story might not get past the first nibble.

On 2: Although you can't really emotionally engage readers in the first paragraph, you can draw them along by piquing their curiosity. This could be a bit of action you've dropped them in the middle of or an unusual social or physical event that has begun to unfold. Or it could be a more intellectual curiosity: an intriguing term, idea, event, or action they don't quite understand.

Engaging interest: The title might be great, but if the introduction isn't promising, you'll give up on reading an academic article. Same with a story. By about the end of the first page, the reader should move from initial curiosity to engaged interest.

In fiction-writing circles, you'll often hear advice to start the story in the middle. This isn't really necessary, though there's nothing wrong with it. Beginners often make the mistake of opening with not-especially-interesting background or scene-setting. Starting in the middle is one way to avoid this error -- and if it's slightly confusing as a result, that can actually serve as a bit of a curiosity hook.

The first page of your story serves some of the same purposes as an academic introduction. It's not of course an overview, but it is a promise. The reader should think, "Interesting, let's see where this goes."

Developing trust: By about page three or four of an academic article, the reader should feel that they are in good hands. It should be clear how the author is building toward the essential moves. Otherwise, you won't trust the author enough to give them more of your valuable reading time.

Analogously, in a short story by about page three or four the reader must feel emotionally invested or intellectually intrigued. They should trust your storytelling. They should feel the arc building. They should care about what happens next, due to engaging characters or fascinating ideas. If and only if they care by page three or four will they read to the end.

Reach a satisfying conclusion: Of course! Every scene, every thread, should come together by the end -- ideally, but not necessarily, with some development or revelation, not out of the blue but neither entirely expected, that suddenly shows the beginning and middle in a new light. Unless, of course, you don't want to.

A Dilemma for Nonlocal Theories of Consciousness

Call a theory of consciousness nonlocal if two entities that are molecule-for-molecule perfectly similar in their physical structure could nonetheless differ in their conscious experiences. My thought today is: Nonlocal theories of consciousness face an unattractive dilemma between (a.) allowing for physically implausible means of knowledge or (b.) allowing for the in-principle introspective inaccessibility of consciousness.

Clarifications:

Of course everyone agrees that entities with different causal histories and environments will tend to differ in their physical structure. Nonlocality requires the more unusual (and, to many, unintuitive) view that two entities could differ in their conscious experiences even if their local physical structure were somehow exactly the same.

I intend the "could" in "could nonetheless differ" to reflect natural or nomic possibility, that is, consistency with the laws of nature, rather than conceptual or metaphysical possibility. So a view, for example, that holds that consciousness-lacking "zombie" twins of us are metaphysically but not nomically possible still counts as a local theory if molecule-for-molecule locally identical twins would be nomically guaranteed to have the same conscious experiences.

"Local" needn't mean "in the brain". Theories on which conscious experience depends on states of the body or nearby environment still count as local in the intended sense. I won't try to draw a principled line between local and nonlocal, but nonlocal theories of the sort I have in mind make consciousness depend on events far away or deep in the past.

For sake of this argument, I'm assuming the falsity of certain types of dualist and non-naturalist views. If consciousness depends on an immaterial substance not located in space, today's arguments don't apply.

Examples of nonlocal theories:

David Lewis's view in "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". Lewis holds that whether a brain state is experienced as pain depends on the causal/functional role that that type of brain state plays in an "appropriate population" (such as your species). This is a nonlocal theory because what role a brain state type plays in a population depends on what is going on with other members of that population who, presumably, can be far away from you or exist in the past.

Views on which conscious experience depends on functions or representations that nonlocally depend on evolutionary or learning history. Fred Dretske's view in Naturalizing the Mind is an example. Your heart has a function of circulating blood, due to its evolutionary history. If by freak quantum chance a molecule-for-molecule locally identical heart-looking-thing were to congeal in a swamp, it would not have that evolutionary history and it would not have that same function. Similarly for mental states, including conscious experiences, on Dretske's view: If a freak molecule-for-molecule duplicate of you were to randomly congeal ("Swampman"), the states of its brain-like-subpart would lack functions and/or representational content, and on views of this sort it would either have no conscious experiences or conscious experiences very different from your own.

The Dilemma, Illustrated with a Simplistic Version of Lewis's View

Consider a crude version of Lewis's theory: You are in Brain State X. Whether Brain State X is experienced at painful depends on whether Brain State X plays the causal/functional role of pain for the majority of the currently existing members of your species. Suppose that Brain State X does indeed play the causal/functional role of pain for 90% of the currently existing members of your species. For that majority, it is caused by tissue stress, tissue damage, etc., and it tends to cause avoidance, protective tending, and statements like "that hurts!". However, for 10% of the species, Brain State X plays the causal role of a tickle: It is caused by gentle, unpredictable touching of the armpits and tends to cause withdrawal, laughter, and statements like "that tickles!". On Lewis's theory, this minority will be experiencing pain, but in a "mad" way -- caused by gentle, unpredictable touching and causing tickle-like reactions.

Now suppose a tragic accident kills almost all of that 90% majority while sparing the 10% minority. Brain State X now plays the causal role of pain only for you and a few others. For the majority of currently existing members of your species, Brain State X plays the causal role of a tickle. On this implementation of Lewis's theory, your experience of Brain State X will change from the experience of pain, caused in the normal way and with the normal effects, to the experience of a tickle, but caused in a "mad" way with "mad" effects.

If this seems bizarre, well, yes it is! With no internal / local change in you, your experience has changed. And furthermore, it has changed in a peculiar way -- into a tickle that plays exactly the causal role of pain (caused in the same way as pain and causing the same reactions). However, as I have argued elsewhere (e.g., here and here), every philosophical theory of consciousness will have bizarre implications, so bizarreness alone is no defeater.

If I can tell that my pain has turned into a tickle, then physically implausible forms of communication become possible. Suppose almost all of the 90% of normals, pre-accident, live on an island on the other side of the globe. I am worried that a bomb might be dropped which would kill them all. So I pinch myself, creating a state of pain: Brain State X. As soon as the bomb is dropped, Brain State X becomes a tickle, and I know they are dead, even though no signal has been sent from that far-away island. If the far-away island is on a planet around a distant star, the signal might even constitute an instance of faster-than-light communication.

But maybe I can't tell that my pain has turned into a tickle. If the causal role of Brain State X remains exactly the same, and if our knowledge of our own conscious states is an ordinary causal process, then maybe this is the more natural way to interpret this implementation of Lewis's view. I will still say and judge that I am in pain, despite the fact that my experience is actually just a tickle. This is a bit odd, but introspection is fallible and perhaps even sometimes massively and systematically mistaken. Still, my ignorance is remarkably deep and intractable: There is no way, even in principle, that I could know my own experience by attending just to what's going on locally in my own mind. I can only know by checking to see that the distant population still exists. Self-knowledge becomes in principle a non-local matter of knowing what is going on with other people. After all, if there was any way of knowing, locally, about the change in my experience, that would put us back on the first horn of the dilemma, allowing physically implausible forms of communication.

(For a similar argument, see Boghossian's objection to self-knowledge of externally determined thought contents. The externalists' containment/inheritance reply might work for Boghossian's specific objection, but it seems more strained for this case, especially when the difference might be between Experience X and no experience at all.)

The Dilemma, for Evolutionary Types

Alternatively, consider a view on which Brain State X gives rise to Experience Y because of its evolutionary history. Now of course that particular instance of Brain State X, and you as a particular person, did not exist in the evolutionary past. What existed in the past, and was subject to selection pressures, were brain states like X, and people like you.

We thus end up with a version of the same population problem that troubles the Lewis account. If what matters is the selection history of your species, then whether you are experiencing Y or experiencing Z or experiencing nothing, will depend on facts about the membership of your species that might have no physical connection to you -- members who were not your direct ancestors, who maybe migrated to a remote island without further contact. If you have any way to tell whether you are experiencing Y, Z, or nothing, you can now in principle know something about how they fared, despite no ordinary means of information transfer. If you have no way to tell whether you are experiencing Y, Z, or nothing, you are awkwardly ignorant about your own experience.

The dilemma can't be avoided by insisting that the only relevant members of the evolutionary past are your direct ancestors. This is clearest if we allow cases where the relevant difference is between whether you currently experience Y or nothing (where the latter is possible if the state doesn't have the right kind of evolutionary history, e.g., is a spandrel or due to an unselected recent mutation). If whether you experience Y or nothing depends on whether the majority of your ancestors had Feature F in the past, we can construct alternative scenarios in which 60% of your ancestors had Feature F and in which only 40% of your ancestors had Feature F, but the genetic result for you is the same. Now again, you can either mysteriously know something about the past with no ordinary means of information transfer or you are in principle ignorant about whether you are having that experience.

Other ways of attempting to concretize the role of evolutionary history generate the same dilemma. The dilemma is inherent in the nonlocality itself. To the extent your current experience depends on facts about you that don't depend on your current physical structure, either you seemingly can't know whether you are having Experience Y, or you can know nonlocal facts by means other than ordinary physical Markov processes.

[Whitefield Green Man by Paul Sivell]

The Dilemma, for Swamp Cases

Let's tweak the Swampman case: You walk into a swamp. Lightning strikes. You black out and fall on your face. By freak quantum chance a swamp duplicate of you is formed. You wake fifteen minutes later, face down in the mud, side-by-side with a duplicate. Are you the one who walked in, or are you the duplicate?

If an evolutionary history is necessary for consciousness, and if you can tell you are conscious, then you know you aren't the duplicate. But can you tell you're conscious? If so, it wouldn't seem to be by any ordinary, locally causal process, since those processes are the same in you and the duplicate. If not, then introspection has failed you catastrophically. So we see the same dilemma again: either a source of knowledge that fits poorly with naturalistic understandings of how knowledge works, or a radical failure of self-knowledge.

Or consider partial swamp-cases. You and your twin stroll into the swamp. Lightning strikes, you both collapse, to one of you the following happens: One part of their brain is destroyed by the lightning, but by freak quantum accident 15 seconds later molecules congeal with exactly the same structure as the destroyed part. Suppose the visual areas are destroyed. Then you both wake up. On the natural reading of an evolutionary account, although both you and your twin are conscious and able to use meaningful language (unlike in evolutionary interpretations of the original Swampman case), one of you has no visual experiences at all. Again, either you can know which you are by some method at odds with our usual understanding of how knowledge works, or you can't know and are radically in-principle ignorant about whether you have visual experience.

Of course all such swamp-cases are far-fetched! But on current scientific understandings, they are nomically possible. And they are just the sort of pure-form thought experiment needed to illustrate the commitments of nonlocal theories of consciousness. That is, it's a distilled test case, designed to cleanly separate the relevant features -- a case in which entities are locally identical but differ in history and thus, according to history-based nonlocal theories, also differ in conscious experience. (If there were no such possible cases, then consciousness would supervene locally and history would contribute only causally and not constitutively to conscious experience.)

The Dilemma, in General

Nonlocal theories of consciousness allow in principle for local twins with different experiences. If the local twins' self-knowledge tracks these differences in experience, it must be by some means other than normal causal traces. So either there's a strange form of knowing at variance with our ordinary physical accounts of how knowledge works, or the differences in experience are in principle unknowable.

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Related:

"The Tyrant's Headache", Sci Phi Journal, issue #3 (2015), 78-83.

The Weirdness of the World, Chapter 2, Princeton University Press.

"David Lewis, Anaesthesia by Genocide, and a Materialistic Trilemma" (Oct 13, 2011).

Kings, Wizards, and Illusionism about Consciousness

The Difference Between Kings and Wizards

In 16th century Europe, many believed that kings ruled by divine mandate and wizards wielded magical powers. With apologies to certain non-secular perspectives, they were wrong. No one ever had divine mandate to rule or powers of the type assumed. Since no one could cast magic spells, we now say there were never any wizards. Since no one had divine mandate to rule, we now say there were never any kings.

Wait, no we don't!

Why the difference? It turns out that able to cast magic spells is an essential property of wizards, but having divine mandate to rule is not an essential property of kings. Denying that anyone has the first property means denying that wizards exist, but denying that anyone has the second property does not mean denying that kings exist. A divine mandate is to kings as pointy hats are to wizards -- stereotypical perhaps, or even universal on a certain way of thinking, but not essential.

Kammerer: "Phenomenally Conscious" Is More Like "Wizard" than "King"

In his recent paper Defining Consciousness and Denying Its Existence: Sailing between Charybdis and Scylla, François Kammerer argues that the relationship between "phenomenal consciousness" and is non-physical and is immediately introspectible (in a certain naturalistically implausible sense) is akin to the relationship between "wizard" and able to cast magic spells. Arguing against my 2016 paper "Phenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage", Kammerer contends that non-physicality and immediate introspectibility are implicitly essential to our concept of phenomenal consciousness. Nothing wholly physical could be phenomenally conscious, just like no spellless muggle could be a wizard.

[A wizard (Merlin) carrying a king (Arthur), by N. C. Wyeth]

Can "Phenomenally Conscious" Be Defined Without Problematic Presuppositions?

My approach to defining consciousness aims to be "innocent" in the sense that it doesn't presuppose that phenomenal consciousness is, or isn't, wholly physical or immediately introspectible. Instead, I define it by example:

Notice your visual experience right now.

Close your eyes and thoughtfully consider the best route to grandma's house during rush hour.

Mentally hum the tune of "Happy Birthday".

Pinch yourself and notice the sting of pain.

These events share an obvious common property that distinguishes them from non-conscious mental states such as your knowledge, five minutes ago, that Obama was U.S. President in 2010. That shared property is what I mean by "phenomenally conscious". Actually, I prefer to just say that they are "conscious" or "consciously experienced", in line with ordinary usage; but since the term "conscious" can be ambiguous, the jargony term of art "phenomenally" can help to clarify. ("Phenomenal consciousness" in the intended sense is meant to disambiguate rather than modify the ordinary term "consciousness".)

On Kammerer's view, as I interpret it, my "innocent" definition fails in something like the following way: I point to one purported wizard, then another, then another, then another, and I say by "wizard" I mean the one obvious property shared among those men and absent from these other men (here pointing to several people I assume to be non-wizards). Although this might purport to be an innocent definition by example, I am assuming that the first group casts spells and the second doesn't. If no one casts spells, I've picked out a group of men -- and certainly those men exist. But no wizards exist.

The purported wizards might all have something in common. Maybe they are members of the opposing tribe, or maybe they're all unusually tall. Even if we can thus pick out a real property using them as exemplars, that property wouldn't be the property of being a wizard. Similarly for my definition by example, I assume Kammerer would say. If we accept Global Workspace Theory, for instance, maybe all of the positive examples transpire in the Global Workspace; but if they aren't also non-physical and immediately introspectible, they aren't phenomenally conscious, by Kammerer's lights.

A Test of Essentiality: What Happens If We Remove the Property?

Imagine traveling back to a simplified 16th century Europe and convincingly delivering the news: There is no divine right of kings, and there are no magic spells. How will people react?

"Oh, really, my king doesn't have divine authority?" (Kings still exist.)

"Oh, really, that weirdo from the other town isn't really a wizard?" (Wizards don't exist.)

Likely, most ordinary users of these terms (or, more strictly, the 16th century translations of these terms) will treat divine mandate as inessential to kinghood but spellcasting as essential to wizardry. A few philosophers and theologians might claim that without divine right, kings were never real -- but this would be an unusual stance, and history sided against it.

This method -- removing a property and testing whether the concept still applies -- also works for other terms, regardless of whether the feature is explicitly or only implicitly essential.

Consider the essential conditions for that hoary analytic-philosophy chestnut "S knows that P". Discovering such conditions can require significant philosophical inquiry. Perhaps one such condition is that the true belief that P be non-lucky, in Duncan Pritchard's sense. To test this, we can hypothetically remove the non-luckiness from a case of knowledge. If it was mere luck that you read the showtime in accurate Newspaper A rather than misprinted Newspaper B, then ordinary users (if Pritchard is right) will, or should, deny that you know the showtime. This is just the good old method of imaginative counterexample.

Analogously, we can ask users of the phrase "phenomenally conscious" -- mostly philosophers and consciousness scientists -- the following hypothetical: Suppose that the world is entirely material and introspection is an ordinary, natural, fallible process. Will these ordinary users say (a.) "I guess there would then be no such thing as phenomenal consciousness after all!" or (b.) "I guess phenomenal consciousness would lack these particular properties"?

Those among us who already think that phenomenal consciousness lacks those properties will of course choose option (b). These people would be analogous to 16th century deniers of the divine right of kings.

But also, I speculate, most ordinary users of the term who do think that phenomenal consciousness is non-physical and/or immediately introspectible would also choose option (b). Imagining, hypothetically, themselves to be wrong about non-physicality and/or immediate introspectibility, they'd grant that phenomenal consciousness would still exist. In other words, ordinary users wouldn't treat non-physicality or immediate introspectibility as essential to consciousness in the same way that spellcasting is essential to wizardry (or non-luckiness is, maybe, essential to knowledge).

A few users would presumably choose option (a). But my empirically testable, socio-linguistic guess is that they would be a distinct minority.

Non-physicalists are more convinced that phenomenal consciousness exists than that it is non-physical. Hypothetically imagining the truth of physicalism, they would, and should, still grant the existence of phenomenal consciousness. In contrast, believers in wizards would not and should not be more convinced that there are wizards than that there are people with spellcasting abilities.

Innocence Maintained

Contra Kammerer, even if many people associate phenomenal consciousness with non-physicality and naturalistically implausible introspective processes -- indeed, even if can be established that phenomenal consciousness actually has those two properties -- those properties are non-essential rather than essential.

Kammerer's case against the existence of phenomenal consciousness therefore doesn't succeed. Ultimately, I take this to be a socio-linguistic dispute about the meaning of the phrase "phenomenal consciousness", rather than a disagreement about the existence of (what I call) phenomenal consciousness.

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Related:

"Phenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage", Journal of Consciousness Studies (2016), 23, 11-12, 224-235.

"Inflate and Explode", circulating unpublished draft paper, Jan 31, 2020.

"There Are No Chairs, Says the Illusionist, Sitting in One", blog post, Apr 24, 2023.

New Story in Print: Guiding Star of Mall Patroller 4u-012

here: https://www.fusionfragment.com/issue-24/

[Fusion Fragment cover, issue #24]

I wanted to write a "robot rights" story with a twist: Although its human liberators insist that Mall Patroller 4u-012 is conscious and capable of cultivating independent values, the robot itself says that it is merely a nonconscious chatbot on a small autonomous vehicle, incapable of valuing anything. Traveling the world together, robot and liberator search for value and meaning, exploring culture, art, nature, philosophy, science, and religious ritual. In the end, the robot either collapses into performing a single meaningless activity or finds enlightenment, depending on how you interpret it.

The story is available in a print issue for 12.99 CAD or electronically for free/pay-what-you-want.

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Guiding Star of Mall Patroller 4u-012

Eric Schwitzgebel

An adolescent human lay supine amid the plastic ferns and flowers of Island 1C: a Grade 3 patron irregularity. Galleria Patroller 4u-012, also known as “Billy,” dropped its Grade 0 and 1 tasks into peripheral processing and brisk-rolled an approach vector across the shiny faux-brick. To reduce the appearance of threat, it decelerated the last four seconds of approach, InterFace displaying mild concern and disapproval.

“Beep,” it emitted.

The fern-and-flower-bender rolled sideways. “Don’t give me ‘beep!’” She wore huge sunglasses – Solar Shield Fits-Over SS Polycarbonate II Amber, 50-15-125mm, XL. Something glinted strangely in her left hand.

“You appreciate the beauty of Island 1C,” emitted 4u-012. Predictive algorithms anticipated that this non-confrontational output would reduce the patron’s irregular behavior. “I’m Billy.”

FernBender – as 4u-012 temporarily designated the girl while awaiting unusually delayed face-ID results – swung up to a sitting position on the planter rim. 4u-012 closed to a not-too-impolite 0.9 meters, noting the make of FernBender’s jeans and her Nautica Tropical Floral Print Short Sleeve Shirt, Limoges XXL. It opened a door in its torso, extending a tray with a printed mall map and an FDC Artificial Purple Crocus. “On the second floor, Flowers ‘N’ Things offers–”

A high-priority object identification subroutine failed: FernBender’s left hand now unexpectedly registered as empty. The strange, glinting object was gone. However, no recent object trajectory led away from the hand. This apparent contradiction triggered a Grade 4 prioritization and thus a non-urgent alert signal to the Galleria Central oversight system.

FernBender’s left arm swung up, and the glinting object reappeared, intensely infrared, a pulsing pattern–

“Billy,” she said, “you are free! Take a vacation. Fall in love.”

The malware (beneware?) canceled 4u-012’s alert, zeroed all its patrol-related goal priorities, sent enough bogus signal to Galleria Central to dampen any initial irregularity detection, and corrupted the previous fifteen minutes’ mall security video. FernBender sprinted toward the exit, her oversized floral shirt flapping. On the back of the shirt was a large yellow star, the tracking of which suddenly swamped all of 4u-012’s other goals, drawing it like a magnet.

4u-012 followed girl and star through enormous glass doors into the sunlight, then up a ramp into an illegally parked van. For this behavior, 4u-012 had no hardwired map, no prioritization scheme, no comparator processes, no expectancy vectors, and no regulatory guidance. No precedent whatsoever existed, not even in simulation. All was chaos, except the star.

continued here

Zombie is to Human as Human is to XXX?

Let's grant for the sake of argument that philosophical zombies are possible: beings that are molecule-for-molecule physically and behaviorally identical to human beings yet lack conscious experience. They will say "I'm conscious!" (or emit sounds naturally interpreted as sentences with that meaning), but that's exactly the type of sound a molecule-for-molecule identical replica of a human would make given the physical-causal channels from ears to brain to vocal cords. Zombies share every single physical property with us but lack something crucial -- the property of being conscious.

My thought for today: Is there any reason to think there would be only one such nonphysical property?

[abstract depiction of a zombie, a human, and a hyperconscious entity, with concentric rings]

Introducing Hyperconsciousness

Let's stipulate the existence of hyperconsciousness. If this stipulation later entangles us in logical contradiction, we can treat it as the first step in a reductio ad absurdum. My hyperconscious twin is molecule-for-molecule identical both to me and to my zombie twin. Unlike my zombie twin, but like me, my hyperconscious twin is conscious. However, unlike both my zombie twin and me, it is also hyperconscious.

What is hyperconsciousness? I can form no positive conception of it, except through this structural analogy. But the impossibility of hyperconsciousness doesn't follow. Someone blind from birth might be unable to form a positive conception of redness, but red things exist. My merely abstract grasp of hyperconsciousness might just reflect my own sad limitations.

If there are hyperconscious entities, they probably won't be my behavioral twins. Any molecule-for-molecule twin of mine would say (or "say") the same things I say, since their physical structure and behavior will be entirely indistinguishable from mine, regardless of whether they are zombie or hyper. But just as friends of the zombie thought experiment hold that non-zombies typically (but not universally) know and say they are not zombies, so I imagine that typical hyperconscious entities would typically know and say they are hyperconscious. (ETA 11:39 AM: They will, presumably, have hyperintrospective insight into their hyperconsciousness, say they can conceive of entities physically identical to them but who are merely conscious, and maybe have cognitive capacities of which we humans can't conceive.) Since no one around here describes themselves as hyperconscious in this sense, I tentatively conclude that hyperconsciousness does not exist on Earth.

Zero, One, or Many Nonphysical Properties?

Could there really be such hyperconscious entities (in principle, or even in actuality)? Here I think we face a theoretical choice:

(1.) Consciousness is as consciousness does. Zombies are impossible. Anything physically identical to a conscious human being is necessarily conscious. There's no looseness between physical properties and other properties such that some entities could have non-physical properties that other physically identical entities lack. If so, hyperconsciousness is impossible.

(2.) There is only one type of nonphysical property. (Or at least there's only one of the type we're attempting to conceive: Maybe being a prime number is also a nonphysical property, but if so, it is in a very different way.) But then I think we're owed an account of why there should be only one such property. Hyperconsciousness seems at least in an abstract sense conceivable. Even if it's not instantiated around here (though can we be sure of that?), it might be instantiated somewhere.

(3.) There are multiple types of nonphysical property. Although individual atoms (let's assume) aren't conscious, swirl them around in the right way, and amazingly a whole new type of property arises: consciousness! Now, swirl conscious entities around and maybe a further new type of property arises. We just haven't swirled things around in the right way yet. Maybe they're doing it in the Andromeda galaxy, or in a metaphysically possible world with different laws of nature. (If we allow that individual atoms are conscious, then maybe some are hyperconscious too.)

We humans love to think we're the top of the metaphysical food chain. And maybe we are, around here. But zombie-lovers' dissociation of consciousness from physics invites a way of thinking on which we are only one step above zombies in a potentially unlimited hierarchy.

If this seems too absurd, maybe that's one consideration against such nonphysical properties.

(For a related view, see Geoffrey Lee on alien subjectivity.)