Each New Year's Day, I post a retrospect of the past year's writings. Here are the retrospects of 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023.
Cheers to 2025! My 2024 publications appear below.
Book:
The Weirdness of the World, released early in 2024, pulls together ideas I've been publishing since 2012 on the failure of common sense, philosophy, and empirical science to explain consciousness and the fundamental structure of the cosmos. Inevitably, because of these failures, all general theories about such matters will be both bizarre and dubious.
Books under contract / in progress:
As co-editor with Jonathan Jong, The Nature of Belief, Oxford University Press.
- Collects 15 new essays on the topic, by Sara Aronowitz, Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas, Carolina Flores, M.B. Ganapini, David Hunter,
David King and Aaron Zimmerman, Angela Mendelovici, Joshua Mugg, Bence Nanay, Nic Porot and Eric Mandelbaum, Eric Schwitzgebel, Keshav Singh, Declan Smithies, Ema Sullivan-Bissett, amd Neil Van Leeuwen.
Full-length non-fiction essays, published 2024:
Revised and updated: "Introspection", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Creating a large language model of a philosopher" (with David Schwitzgebel and Anna Strasser), Mind and Language, 39, 237-259.
"Repetition and value in an infinite universe", in S. Hetherington, ed., Extreme Philosophy, Routledge.
"The ethics of life as it could be: Do we have moral obligations to artificial life?" (with Olaf Witkowski), Artificial Life, 30 (2), 193-215.
"Quasi-sociality: Toward asymmetric joint actions with artificial systems" (with Anna Strasser), in A. Strasser, ed., Anna's AI Anthology: How to Live with Smart Machines? Xenemoi.
"Let's hope we're not living in a simulation", Nous (available online; print version forthcoming). [Commentary on David Chalmers' Reality+; Chalmers' reply; my response to his reply]
Full-length non-fiction essays, finished and forthcoming:
"Dispositionalism, yay! Representationalism, boo!" in J. Jong and E. Schwitzgebel, eds., The Nature of Belief, Oxford.
"Imagining yourself in another's shoes vs. extending your concern: Empirical and ethical differences", Daedalus.
2 comments:
Impressive list of accomplishments and work-in-progress! Your disposition agrees with you. I was trying to recall where I first read something on dispositionalism. Did not think to catalog it. Was far too stochastic then. I think the guy's name was Kevin.
Me: I wouldn't pluralize sense, for the sake of common sense to all origins?...
Gemini: "For the sake of common sense to all origins" has a certain poetic ring to it. By using the singular "sense," you emphasize the underlying unity of perception and understanding, regardless of the specific origin of that perception.
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